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Preface
Since the writing of this thesis, Indonesia has entered a period of severe economic and 
political disorder and collapse. It needs to be emphasised that this thesis pertains only to 
the late-Suharto period, prior to the beginning of this turmoil in mid-1997. This crisis 
has produced profound economic, political and social change which will potentially have 
a huge impact on HIV/AIDS prevention activities and policy in Indonesia. This has been 
briefly addressed in a Postscript.
vii
Chapter One
Introduction
This study considers the influence of Indonesian secular and religious institutions over 
the construction of sexual morality in the context of the prevention of human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
HIV/AIDS prevention activities in Indonesia are based on the principles of the National 
AIDS Strategy formulated in 1994, which emphasises a multi-sectoral approach and 
considers the cultural and religious values found in Indonesia. Many prevention 
programs implemented under the National AIDS Strategy to 1997 have focused primarily 
on the promotion of abstinence for single people and faithfulness within a married 
relationship. While President Suharto's Indonesian government has attempted to take a 
practical health-based approach to controlling the spread of HIV, the blatant association 
of sexually transmitted diseases with the sexual act infuses HIV prevention efforts with 
moral concerns 1.
This moral concern focuses on the role of condoms in HIV prevention programs. 
Condom promotion for HIV prevention, termed kondomisasi (literally, condomisation), 
has been soundly condemned by religious organisations and leaders as it is considered to 
encourage promiscuity and adultery. At the same time, condoms themselves are not 
condemned. Their use is acceptable as a married couple's contraceptive, or in 
'emergencies', where one member of a married couple is already infected with HIV and 
needs to keep the other safe. The Indonesian governing elite, conscious of the strong 
religious objections and of the influence of religious leaders and institutions over the 
majority of Indonesians, actively encourage a moral approach and 'family resilience' as a
1 It is important to emphasise that this study considers the late New Order period in Indonesia before the 
economic turmoil and change of government in early 1998 - see the 'Postscript' for further comments.
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tool in HIV prevention activities. The main protection against the spread of HIV is seen 
to be mediated through the social, economic and moral strengthening of the family, which 
is considered the most fundamental unit of social and economic development. Condom 
promotion is limited to those considered to be at highest risk for contracting HIV: sex 
workers and their easily identifiable clients. Both government officials and Islamic 
leaders are saying "Kondom Oke, Kondomisasi No"2, ‘condoms are OK, but condom 
promotion is not acceptable’, a phrase encapsulating the conflict between the public health 
and moral approaches to HIV/AIDS prevention. This conflict arises in the context of a 
widespread and influential Islamic revival which the New Order government of President 
Suharto has been forced to heed in the development and implementation of HIV/AIDS 
prevention policies.
1.1 HIV/AIDS in Indonesia
The first cases of HIV/AIDS in Indonesia were among foreigners and homosexuals and 
the first official death from AIDS was in 1987 when a Dutch tourist died in Bali (Murray 
1993:3; Hardjanti 1994:79)3. HIV was found among female sex workers and banci 
(transsexuals) in Surabaya in June 1988 (2 people) and in August 1991 (4 people) 
(Murray 1993:3). At the time of the official endorsement of the National AIDS Strategy 
(June 1994), a total of 235 cases of HIV/AIDS (60 AIDS cases and 175 HIV infected 
people) and 38 deaths from AIDS had been reported (Brotowasisto and Roesin 1994). 
The figures to November 1997, indicate a total of 602 cases of HIV/AIDS reported to the 
Directorate General of Communicable Disease Control and Environmental Health of the 
Ministry of Health. This is broken down into 145 people-with-AIDS, and 457 HIV-
2 This phrase (and so the title of the thesis) is the title of an article by Haryanto Laksono, which appeared 
in Warta Konsumen, 8.8.96.
3 Sciortino (1994:54-7) describes reports from as early as 1983 of people infected with HIV and with 
AIDS symptoms - three in Jakarta and five in Bali. These were explained away by government officials 
as being people with AIDS-related complex (ARC), "the syndrome suffered by people who were infected 
with HIV and symptomatic but who did not fulfil the criteria for the surveillance definition of AIDS" 
(Sciortino 1994:55).
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infected people. Eighty-two people have died of AIDS. HIV/AIDS has been reported in 
23 of the 27 provinces, with those most affected being DKI Jakarta, Irian Jaya, Riau, 
Bali, and East Java. Of those infected, 388 (64.5%) are men and 193 (32.1%) are 
women (with 21 unknown). Of the 602 reported cases, heterosexuals make up 67.8% 
(408). Eighty-eight percent of these official cases are among those aged 15-49 years. 
Most cases of HIV infection are among 20-29 year olds, while AIDS has most affected 
the 30-39 year olds (‘Statistik Kasus HIV/AIDS di Indonesia’, November 1997). The 
officially reported cases most likely do not reflect the actual figures, which are estimated 
at 20,000 by Indonesian officials and at 40,000-50,000 by the World Health 
Organisation (Dharmaputra, Utomo and Iljanto 1996:3-4).
The threat to Indonesians from HIV/AIDS comes mainly from unsafe sexual 
practices but there is also a threat from the multiple use of unsterile needles in village 
health centres (Puskesmas) and a lax attitude to blood donor screening outside the major 
cities (The Australian 21.1.94). Transmission of HIV through intravenous drug use is 
not significant in Indonesia as there is not a large community of users. Knowledge of 
HIV/AIDS is generally poor and condom use is extremely low, only around 5% 
countrywide (Stevens 1994). Among female sex workers, condom use is variable. High 
and middle class sex workers are more likely to negotiate for condom use than are low 
class sex workers, who are generally not in financial positions to insist on their use 
(Ford, Fajans and Wirawan 1994:134-5).
Although HIV/AIDS first officially appeared in 1987, it took until 1992 for the 
Indonesian government to fully come to terms with its presence in Indonesia and the 
problems it was causing for Indonesian citizens. Initial responses involved denial that 
Indonesians could be infected and then went on to define the disease as one confined to 
foreigners, gay men and sex workers. There was a strong denial by the government and 
community leaders that Indonesians beyond these groups would be at risk of contracting 
HIV. Sciortino (1994) describes four stages of discourse on HIV/AIDS through her
3
analysis of the Indonesian press between 1983-1993: denial of the existence of the 
illness; AIDS as a foreign illness; AIDS as a homosexual illness; and AIDS as a illness of 
sex workers. While the first is obviously no longer believed, the other three are still 
strongly adhered to both in the media and among Indonesians in general (Sciortino 
1994). The concept of AIDS as an illness of sex workers is particularly dominant, and 
has a historical basis in the association between sex workers and other sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs).
1 .2  The prevention o f the spread o f sexually transm itted diseases: 
a public health approach
HIV prevention in Indonesia is to some extent built on the existing STD control and 
prevention activities. The primary responsibility for STD control and prevention has 
belonged to the Ministries of Health and Social Affairs, which both come under the 
People’s Welfare Sector headed by the Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare. The 
Ministry of Health takes responsibility for primary health care and public health services 
implemented through the government health centres (puskesmas), subcentres (puskesmas 
pembantu) and integrated health posts {posyandu). As well as providing basic health 
care, these centres also focus on communicable disease control (such as tuberculosis and 
leprosy), community health education, and preventative health care services. Posyandu 
are particularly important in the delivery of mother and child health programs in 
immunisation, nutrition, diarrhoeal disease control, antenatal care and family planning 
(Comer and Rahardjo 1993:11-12). Beyond the treatment of symptomatic patients, 
STDs are not a priority in public health programs at the posyandu level. In larger towns 
and cities, government hospitals provide health care, and medical training and research 
facilities. Public health policies and programs for STD (including HIV) prevention are 
developed within the various divisions of the Ministry of Health, including the 
Directorate General of Medical Care, the Centre for Health Education Training, the Centre 
for Community Health Education, and the Directorate General of Communicable Disease
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Control and Environmental Health (‘Ministry of Health, Republik of Indonesia’, Internet 
site). These are implemented by being passed down through the hierarchy of regional-, 
subdistrict- and village-level health services. In relation to sexually transmitted diseases, 
the Ministry of Health is contributing through actions such as working to improve the 
clinical treatment of STDs in hospitals and health centres, and providing check ups and 
treatment to sex workers at official brothel complexes. In addition, the Ministry provides 
educational literature on HIV/AIDS, trains nurses and doctors in the non-discriminatory 
care of HIV/AIDS patients, and provides monitoring and surveillance of STD and 
HIV/AIDS levels (Iskandar 1996:4-6).
The spread of sexually transmitted diseases is obviously more than simply a 
medical issue and so is not exclusively in the realm of the Ministry of Health. The spread 
of STDs is closely associated with social issues such as sex work and increasing sexual 
openness in Indonesian society. Throughout both colonial and independent times, sex 
workers and their clients have been perceived as the sources of STD infection, and so 
worthy targets of STD prevention efforts. Public health measures to address the spread 
of STDs have, therefore, focused on the regulation and control of the sex industry. 
Under the colonial Dutch government, relationships between single Dutch men and 
concubines or prostitutes were accepted as being “an unfortunate, but understandable, 
result of the relatively high single male population in an alien land" (Ingleson 1986:138). 
In order to limit the spread of STDs, prostitutes became subject to an 1852 regulation 
which increased police control and medical supervision of the prostitution industry. 
Prostitutes were required to register with the police and to carry an identification card. 
They were 'encouraged' to move to brothels and were subjected to weekly medical 
checkups for STDs. If found infected, a prostitute would need to relinquish her card and 
commit herself to an institution for treatment (ibid 1986:127)4. The 1852 Regulation was
4 The control of sexually transmitted diseases was also an important reason for maintaining and 
supporting the institution of barracks-concubinage. There was an impression of lower incidence of STDs 
among cohabiters who did not need to seek the services of prostitutes (Ming 1983). The military also 
attempted to reduce and limit sexually transmitted disease infection among soldiers, sailors and plantation
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repealed in 1874, and the regulation of STDs and prostitution was left to the Municipal 
governments and local authorities, many of which implemented regulations similar to 
those of the central government's 1852 Regulation. Municipal health authorities were left 
to organise the regular medical examinations of prostitutes and to implement local 
regulations to keep prostitutes off the streets and in the brothels.
In the Republic of Indonesia (RI), the regulation and control of the sex industry 
has continued to be the most utilised public health measure to address the spread of 
sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV/AIDS). This is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. Under this Ministry, a subdirectorate of the Directorate of 
Social Rehabilitation (Rehabilitasi Tuna Sosial) is responsible for developing and 
implementing programs to rehabilitate sex workers. While national laws support its 
continuation, local and municipal governments are primarily responsible for the 
regulations to control the sex industry at specific locations. Local regulations enable sex 
workers to legally operate from official brothel complexes, lokalisasi, so providing 
centralised locations for health checks, STD education, and condom promotion. Regular 
health checks and injections are required by local government regulations for sex workers 
in lokalisasi and often in private brothels too. Government-funded examinations by 
health personnel from local health authorities are rare, and many sex workers are required 
by their employers to visit private doctors for their medical checks (Jones, 
Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:13-24). Most of the STD education and condom 
promotion to both official and unofficial sex workers is carried out by non-government 
organisations.
workers by providing them with regular checkups and with prophylactics. Soldiers and sailors, like 
prostitutes and concubines, were subjected to a weekly STD checkup. For a more detailed discussion of 
STDs in colonial Indonesia, see: van der Sterren, Murray and Hull 1997.
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1.2.1 Development of the National AIDS Strategy
In 1993, in response to the growing number of HIV cases in Indonesia, the government 
began to mount an aggressive campaign against HIV/AIDS. The high incidence of non- 
HIV STDs, particularly detected among sex workers5, and the patterns of HIV 
transmission in other Asian countries galvanised the Indonesian government into action. 
HIV/AIDS prevention has been identified as a public health issue which reaches beyond 
the scopes of the Ministries of Health and Social Affairs. There has been a recognition 
that “[t]he challenge of HIV/AIDS is not just a health problem, rather it has major 
political, economic, social, ethical, religious, and legal consequences which sooner or 
later will touch on all aspects of national life” (Indonesian National AIDS Committee 
1994:5).
In June 1993 a commission, headed by the Coordinating Minister for People's
Welfare and including representatives of several ministries, was established to prepare a
plan of action against HIV/AIDS. A team of medical and public health experts chosen by
the Coordinating Minister drew up the Strategi Nasional Penanggulangan HIV/AIDS
(National AIDS Strategy - NAS), a practical health based strategy based on nine guiding
principles (Indonesian National AIDS Committee 1994:7-8):
(1) both community and government are involved, with the 
responsibility of the government being "to lead and guide the 
efforts and to help create a supportive environment";
5 The connection between sexually transmitted diseases and the spread of HIV/AIDS is well accepted and 
the presence of non-HIV STDs throughout Indonesia serves as a predictor of how extensive HIV infection 
could become. Data on the prevalences of non-HIV sexually transmitted diseases in Indonesia are difficult 
to determine, but are thought to be higher than officially reported. Studies among groups of sex workers 
show various results: in a 1983 study of sex workers in official brothel complexes in Surabaya, 4% had 
syphilis; while a 1988 survey of sex workers in a brothel complex in Jakarta found that 90% had a 
sexually transmitted disease (van der Sterren, Murray and Hull 1997). High levels of STDs have been 
shown to correlate with increased likelihood of transmission of HIV. Lesions associated with many non- 
HIV STDs and the biology of the organisms involved increase transmissibility of HIV (Wasserheit 
1992). The lowering of levels of other sexually transmitted diseases through medical interventions has 
been shown in an African study to be a cost-effective strategy for HIV prevention (Grosskurth et al 1995). 
On a behavioural level, the unsafe sexual behaviours which may lead to STD infection are also factors in 
acquiring HIV. Behavioural interventions to decrease STD transmission will, therefore, also address HIV 
transmission.
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(2) "approaches to control HIV/AIDS should reflect the religious- 
cultural values found in Indonesia";
(3) “activities will aim to strengthen the resilience and welfare of 
the family and the traditional social support systems rooted in the 
community";
(4) " HIV/AIDS prevention will focus on education and public 
information to reinforce behaviour which does not facilitate the 
transmission of the HIV and which promotes change in high risk 
behavior";
that every person has the right to (5) accurate information about 
the disease, (6) dignity and self-respect, and (7) informed 
consent and appropriate pre- and post-test counseling;
(8) "law, regulations and their application should be consistent 
with and supportive of the National aids strategy [sic] at all 
levels";
and (9) "all those providing service to people living with AIDS 
are obliged to carry out their duties without discrimination".
The National AIDS Strategy was officially endorsed in mid-1994, and the Presidential 
Decree, KepPres No.36/1994, formalised the multi-sectoral approach advocated in the 
strategy. This supported the formation and authority of the National AIDS Prevention 
and Control Commission (Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS Nasional - KPA) and the 
Regional AIDS Commissions (Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS Daerah - KPAD) 
(.Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.36/1994). The National AIDS Prevention 
and Control Commission (KPA) is responsible for: the promotion, provision and 
supervision of services essential to the success of the strategy; the development of 
appropriate guidelines; and the creation and maintenance of an environment suitable for 
encouraging and facilitating responsible activity in the HIV/AIDS campaign (Indonesian 
National AIDS Strategy 1994:21-2). It is led by the Minister for People's Welfare who is 
responsible for coordinating the AIDS policy and program development. The Chair is 
assisted by four deputies (Ministers of Health, Religion, Social Affairs, and Population) 
and by other sectoral ministers (Home Affairs; Justice; Information; Tourism, Post and
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Telecommunications; Education and Culture; Manpower; Youth and Sport; Role of 
Women) (Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.36/1994).
Regional support to the National AIDS Commission is provided by the Regional 
AIDS Commissions (Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS Daerah - KP AD). Each KPAD is 
led by the Governor, Bupati or Walikota supported by a Provincial, Kabupaten or 
Kotamadya HIV/AIDS Commission respectively. The members of these Regional 
Commissions include representatives of “appropriate government sectors as well as 
people with special expertise and interest [sic] (community leaders, members of the 
academic community, professional people, etc.)” (Indonesian National AIDS Committee 
1994:23). These Regional Commissions: lead, manage and coordinate the HIV/AIDS 
campaigns throughout their areas; identify high risk areas; mobilise resources; ensure 
appropriate budget allocations and use of resources; and provide support to local 
community groups and NGOs active in HIV/AIDS prevention (Indonesian National 
AIDS Committee 1994:22-4). At the next level down in the hierarchy, at the sub-district 
or kecamatan level, the Camat: leads, manages and coordinates the HIV/AIDS campaign 
throughout the kecamatan; identifies high risk locations; and ensures effective 
mobilisation and utilisation of resources. He/she is assisted in this by people from 
appropriate government departments, representatives of local NGOs and the community. 
Further support is provided at the village level where the Head is responsible for ensuring 
effective implementation of HIV/AIDS programs by encouraging and facilitating local 
community efforts, including collaborating with government agencies and NGOs 
(Indonesian National AIDS Strategy 1994:24-5).
The National AIDS Strategy also outlines the roles and responsibilities at the 
community level, including the involvement of the family and household, and of non­
government organisations. The family is seen as important in the formation of healthy 
and responsible behaviour, and in providing support and assistance for people with 
HIV/AIDS. The primary way of achieving this is through increasing the family's
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resilience (Indonesian National AIDS Committee 1994:25-6). The role of non­
government organisations (NGOs) has been recognised as important because:
they are full partners in the national HIV/AIDS campaign in 
Indonesia to reach individuals and groups with special interests 
and needs (religious, youth, women, professionals etc) as well as 
those excluded or not reached by government programs, for 
example sex workers, transvestites, drug users (Indonesian 
National AIDS Committee 1994:26).
The business community and international agencies are also seen as playing important 
roles in HIV/AIDS prevention activities (Indonesian National AIDS Committee 1994:27). 
Through the National AIDS Strategy it is hoped "[t]o protect the process of national 
development and our goals for human development .... [by] strengthening] our efforts 
for prevention and control of HIV/AIDS involving all sectors of development in a well 
focused, integrated, comprehensive and multi sectoral program" (Indonesian National 
AIDS Committee 1994:5). The NAS represents a strong commitment by the 
government, religious organisations and leaders, and non-government organisations to 
HIV/AIDS prevention.
1.2.2 Implementation of the National AIDS Strategy
The application of the National AIDS Strategy to HIV/AIDS prevention activities in 
Indonesia can be summarised as ABC' - (A)bstinence, (B)e faithful, (C)ondom use 6. 
This is a formula which Nafsiah Mboi, a prominent AIDS activist, calls 'total football'. 
It advocates that HIV prevention should involve several strategies as this provides a well- 
rounded and more effective approach to the problem. To many, neither advocating 
abstinence and faithfulness, not promoting condom use are enough by themselves.
6 Articles which refer to this use the English with translations in Indonesian in parentheses. The 
Indonesian translations do not fully retain the A,B, and C. One article uses: Abstinentia (pemantangan); 
Be Faithful (bertanggung jawab); and condom (K 26.11.95b).
10
Neither method is 100% effective when used incorrectly (K 26.11.95b7; Nafsiah Mboi, 
pers comm).
Programs aimed at HIV/AIDS prevention are based in and coordinated from the 
office of the Coordinating Ministry of People’s Welfare (Kantor Menko Kesra). Specific 
HIV/AIDS prevention plans and programs have been developed by the various ministries 
involved in the National AIDS Prevention and Control Commission (KPA), in particular, 
Health, Social Affairs, Family Planning, Religious Affairs, and Education and Culture. 
The framework for these plans and programs is the National AIDS Strategy, which 
identifies the following primary program areas (Indonesian National AIDS Committee 
1994: 8-20):
• inform ation, education and com m unication (IEC)
activities to the general public, health care providers, 
individuals and institutions with a special role (teachers, 
religious and community leaders, mass media), women, 
adolescents, and people with high risk behaviour
• prevention: availability of supplies, services and
information; effective treatment of STDs; testing of donated 
blood; and issues such as empowerment of women to 
negotiate safe sex, protection of minors from exploitation, 
and the availability and acceptability of condoms
• blood testing and appropriate counselling
• treatm ent, service and care which is appropriate and 
non-di scrimi natory
• research: to develop and improve HIV/AIDS policy, 
strategies and programs; to monitor the epidemic in 
Indonesia; and to identify and develop alternative strategies
• m onitoring the spread of HIV/AIDS and evaluating the 
implementation of the National AIDS Strategy
Plans and programs follow the basic principles of the National AIDS Strategy, with the 
leadership for their development, approval and implementation expected to come from the
7 In references, ‘K \ ‘R \ and ‘JP’ have been used in citing articles from the newspapers Kompas, 
Republika, and the Jakarta Post respectively.
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KPA and KPAD (Regional AIDS Commissions). While a comprehensive strategy to 
combat HIV/AIDS has been formulated at a national level, and each of the Ministries has 
developed a plan of action appropriate to their field, this has not trickled-down through 
the established bureaucracy to affect HIV/AIDS prevention at the more basic regional 
levels. For example, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has developed a comprehensive 
plan of information, education and communication (IEC) activities (outlined in Chapter 
5). While this is firmly established in department policy, it has not yet been implemented 
at the local level (Iskandar 1996:5). There has been little input into HIV/AIDS prevention 
at the level of the Regional AIDS Commissions, and the National AIDS Strategy is still to 
be defined further into 'Plans of Action' at the provincial levels (ibid). This is an 
objective under the national five-year development plan (1994-99), but it has only been 
partially implemented in a small number of provinces, due mainly to limited funding, 
resources and staff. Although the strategy is well-established at the national level, there 
are no high-profile sustained government-initiated campaigns targeting HIV/AIDS 
prevention. Where there have been HIV/AIDS prevention strategies implemented, 
initiatives are highly localised and targeted at specific groups, such as sex workers, gay 
men, youth, village health workers, and doctors. Programs include education and/or 
training through workshops, development of education materials, setting up hotlines, and 
needs assessment research. Much of this work is undertaken by non-government 
agencies with funding coming mainly from overseas organisations such as USAID, 
AusAID, PATH, the Ford Foundation, and foreign embassies. These projects proceed 
with the approval of the local AIDS Commission (KPAD) (‘Indonesia HIV/AIDS and 
STD prevention and care project’ 1997). The government supports only those 
community based initiatives and NGO actions which recognise the basic principles of the 
National AIDS Strategy and act according to its guidelines.
While the National AIDS Strategy establishes broad guidelines for proceeding 
with HIV/AIDS prevention, the actual implementation of the strategy has been found to
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be more difficult. The government is incredibly conscious of not offending the members 
of the religious community or the public and so pays careful attention to their 
sensibilities. As Islam is the dominant religion of Indonesia and that professed by the 
majority of politicians, the government pays particular attention to the ulama (Islamic 
leaders). Religious organisations and leaders have given widespread approval of the 
National AIDS Strategy. They advocate compassion for those with HIV/AIDS and 
support non-discriminatory access to medical care, information and counselling. They 
have supported the development of prevention activities against HIV/AIDS, but insist that 
this prevention should have a moral focus, and not involve widespread condom 
promotion, kondomisasi. In order to avoid offending religious sensibilities, therefore, 
the focus of HIV/AIDS prevention is on abstinence (A) and being faithful (B), while the 
'C  is "just a little c" (Kompas 26.11.95b; Nick Dnarmaputra, pers comm). Within the 
context of Indonesian religious and cultural values, there is heavy reliance on Islamic 
teachings and the concept of ‘family resilience’ in HIV/AIDS prevention. Kondomisasi, 
condom promotion, is rejected as it is thought to encourage promiscuity. However, the 
government turns a blind-eye to the limited kondomisasi carried out by non-govemment 
organisations to people in high-risk situations8, people who are considered more likely to 
be exposed to HIV, like sex workers, some of their clients (military men, truck drivers, 
migrant workers), and gay men. While targeting sex workers with safe sex prevention 
messages is considered sound public health practice, to the moral mind this association 
justifies blaming them for HIV spread. The issue of HIV prevention through
8 There has been a tendency to discuss those infected with HIV/AIDS in terms of 'high risk groups' rather 
than in terms of 'high risk behaviours' or ‘high risk situations’. Because HIV/AIDS has historically been 
associated with members of particular groups (eg sex workers, homosexuals, drug users), many have been 
inclined to categorically label members of these groups as 'at high risk'. This ignores the fact that it is 
an individual's behaviour which determines risk, not membership of a particular 'group'. A female sex 
worker who consistently uses condoms with her clients is probably at lower risk of contracting HIV than 
a woman who is not a sex worker but who has unprotected sexual intercourse with multiple partners. In 
public health, there has been a move away from the label ‘high risk group’ to talk about ‘high risk 
behaviour’ and more recently about ‘high risk situations’ (Hankins 1997).
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kondomisasi is, therefore, still charged with moral concern, and both government and 
religious leaders prefer an emphasis on a return to religious values and family resilience.
1 .3  The public construction o f sexuality
Both the government and Islamic leaders and organisations are influential in transmitting, 
authoritatively interpreting and enforcing moral attitudes towards HIV/AIDS prevention 
in modem Indonesia. These institutions exercise enormous authority over the 'public' 
sphere of Indonesian life by virtue of their dominance over the media and their control of 
political, economic, social and cultural spheres of society. The degree to which each 
institution influences people depends on the extent to which people place confidence in 
them as sources of moral authority. Both the government and religious institutions 
publicly promote a moral belief system which unites the 'moral community' of the 
Indonesian nation: "The sense of community helps to sustain the regard for moral 
standards, and the common standards reinforce the identification with and loyalty to the 
community" (Bird 1990:299). The government and religious institutions thus control and 
propagate moral information and define labels of moral deviance. Individuals are 
categorised as being inside or outside a moral community based on their behaviour and 
this is reinforced by the authority of these institutions to name their behaviour as deviant. 
The transmission of this ideal of a moral community reinforces the authority of the 
government and Islam over the morals of Indonesians.
1.3.1 State authority and sexuality
President Suharto's New Order government not only controls the economic and political 
aspects of national life, but also the social, cultural and moral ones. With its support 
from civil servants (through Golkar) and with the might of the military behind it, the 
government has succeeded in centralising and tightening its control over national and 
local politics and over various institutions and public activities. The government
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bureaucratic structure enables the national government to have strict control over all levels 
of government - provincial, regional, city and even village administrations. The 
government also maintains economic control by monopolising national companies and 
industries and by strictly regulating independent businessmen. Cultural and social 
control is established by promoting a 'national culture'. The necessity of one culture has 
been recognised since "a diversified cultural system...would inevitably lead to inter suku 
[cultural group] rivalries and hostilities. The Oneness of the nation would constantly 
come into danger" (Soemardin 1988:61). Already, the nation has been unified through 
the implementation of a national language (Bahasa Indonesia) which is used to 
communicate with all people outside ones own cultural group and as the official language 
of the government. Unity of the nation is also created through allegiance to the Pancasila 
principles (faith in one God, humanity, nationalism, representative government and social 
justice) which form the basic philosophy of all Indonesian organisations (Morfit 
1981:840-1). The first of these, faith in one God, creates an important solidarity of 
religious and moral principles among all Indonesians. By establishing and maintaining 
the concept of a moral community of Indonesians, the government attempts to uphold the 
illusion of national unity.
The political, cultural and social agendas of the government are effectively 
transmitted through the media, which, as a major vehicle of public culture, is tightly 
controlled by the government. The government has charged itself with the task of 
censoring information which reaches the people through television, cinema, radio, and 
print:
Because of the important role of the mass media and the 
susceptibility of the general public, who are mostly poorly 
educated, the government feels it necessary to curb some of the 
flow of information to prevent "excessess [sic] which can be 
harmful to the people" (Soemardin 1988:96).
The state is able to maintain its control over official and public morals, as it controls to a 
great extent what reaches the people.
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The Indonesian governing elite utilises this state-controlled media and various 
government programs to transmit ideals of correct and moral male and female sexuality to 
the populace. Through its rhetoric and programs, the government provides authority on 
the proper sexual behaviour of men and women within the moral community of 
Indonesia. Male and female sexuality is incorporated into the broader plan of political, 
economic, social, and cultural 'development' of the nation. The family is considered the 
basic unit of this development and the wife/mother the primary player in the healthy life 
of the family. In this model of sexual morality, sex outside marriage is forbidden as this 
disrupts the moral fabric of the family and society. In contrast to the wife/mother ideal, 
sex workers are considered the ultimate symbols of sexual sin. The sexual spread of 
HIV can only occur through non-monogamous sexual relations, unacceptable within 
Indonesia's dominant 'official' moral system. Those people infected with HIV have 
violated these codes of moral conduct and their infection may be seen as retribution for 
their 'sins'. Publicly implemented HIV/AIDS prevention efforts, therefore, focus on 
improving the moral conduct of individuals, primarily by increasing attention to religious 
values and family life. The official construction of sexual morality as implied in the 
government programs and rhetoric provides the context for the focus on religious values 
and 'family resilience' in HIV/AIDS prevention efforts.
This contrasts with the reality where the government has encouraged the 
modernisation and development which have led to a greater emphasis on a consumer 
culture and a Western lifestyle. Socio-economic changes in this climate have led to an 
acceptance of greater sexual freedom and a growth in the sex industry. Recognising that 
this industry can not be eliminated, the government tolerates its existence. The 
Indonesian government is, thus, caught in a contradiction in which its rhetoric promotes 
an official ideology of sexual restraint, while its practice encourages greater sexual 
indulgence.
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1.3.2 The growing authority of Islam over sexuality
This perceived support of sexual openness and promiscuity is in direct tension with 
devout Muslims and Islamic religious organisations. A great number of Indonesians 
have become disillusioned with modem life and the perceived decadences that accompany 
it, and have in response reclaimed their religious beliefs and duties. As the majority of 
Indonesians are at least nominally Muslim9, the resurgence of the Islamic religion in 
Indonesia has been particularly strong. This resurgence, which has followed the lead of 
a worldwide resurgence of Islam, has little to do with the restoration of faith, but refers 
rather to a return to the adherence to Islamic attitudes and practices. Even nominal 
Muslims in Indonesia have retained their belief in God, although they may have been 
negligent in their religious duties and behaviours (Muzaffar 1986). The resurgence in 
Islam in Indonesia has occurred primarily among two groups - the young middle class 
and the urban working class (ibid). Materialism, secularisation, hedonism and 
individualism, all perceived to be characteristics of Western culture have become part of 
Indonesian social life. Increasing crime and divorce rates, juvenile delinquency, family 
breakdowns, teen pregnancy, and suicides are seen as symptoms of the moral crisis 
occurring in both Western countries and Indonesia itself. This impression of the 
decadence and moral downfall of the West is illustrated through the lifestyles and 
conspicuous consumption of Indonesian elites, many of whom profess to be Muslims. 
These lifestyles contradict the Islamic values of moderation and simplicity, and contrast 
with the squalor of urban working class life. The elite have become materialistic, an 
ideology linked to the culture which they seek to emulate through their choices of 
consumer products and lifestyles (ibid). Many Muslims perceive the Western ideologies 
of socialism and capitalism as unable to deal with economic and social problems such as
9 While about eighty-seven percent of Indonesians profess to be Muslims (Noer 1991), many of these are 
abangan Muslims (nominal Muslims), those who may belieive in God and associate with Islam but who 
do not whole-heartedly and consistently follow Muslim doctrine and practice (McVey 1989:203). Santri 
Muslims are pious and fully practicing and form the minority of Indonesians who profess to be Muslims. 
With the revival of Islam, however, the numbers of santri Muslims are increasing.
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poverty, corruption, widening social disparities, economic exploitation and political 
oppression. Consequently, there has been "the dethronement of the West as a civilization 
worthy of emulation" (ibid: 11). Islamic norms and values are sought as an alternative 
way of life, and as a means of restoring moral order to the lives of individuals and to 
Indonesian society as a whole.
Muslims are returning to the moral teachings of the Qur'an and other Islamic texts 
and are referring to them in their daily lives. With the Qur'an as its reference, Islam is 
considered by Muslims to be an unambiguous source of authority on moral issues. Its 
legitimacy is based on sacred reality, supported by reference to traditions, rational 
arguments and by the charisma of those rendering interpretations (Bird 1990). These 
sacred realities are considered, by those who adhere to them, to be less subject to 
distortion and corruption than profane realities. They are considered "a sure, impartial 
and objective basis for moral standards" communicated through revelations which are 
"reliable, unquestionable expressions of sacred reality" (ibid:298). Where moral 
behaviour is well-grounded in religion, individuals are likely to find particular moral 
principles more easy to adhere to. In this context, people are attracted to religious 
movements as they "seek to provide a more total, comprehensive authoritative direction" 
(ibid:307).
Many people have also been led to rediscover Islam due to the stresses of urban 
life. Modem urban living has been accompanied by a dichotomisation of the public and 
private lives of individuals which has created a "spiritual vacuum in man .... a feeling of 
emptiness, of life devoid of meaning" (Muzaffar:18). These feelings of alienation cause 
some people to turn to religion which "can act as a sort of sanctuary in the midst of the 
irreconcilable tensions of urban living" (ibid). Rural-urban migration can also lead 
migrants to turn to religion for support in an alien environment. To migrants coming 
from rural areas, urban centres are comparatively more secular and the urban culture 
foreign. Religion is a way of keeping in touch with rural cultural values and gaining a
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sense of belonging and identity. The attraction to Islam is reinforced by Islamic leaders 
and propaganda which claims that the problems and inequalities in the city result from the 
absence of religious faith and that the migrant should therefore increase his/her 
commitment to Islam (Muzaffar 1986)10.
The perceived decadence of modem life has led to an increased concern for, 
among other issues, sexuality and male and female relations, expounded in an explosion 
of commentary in the media and in religious sermons. The teachings of the Qur'an 
provide strict and explicit guidance on these topics. In particular, they establish a very 
definite construction of moral women as wives/mothers as opposed to immoral women as 
sex workers. Although Islamic ideals of sexual morality are mainly transmitted to the 
faithful through sermons, educational institutions, and the publicly expressed views of 
uiatna (religious leaders and teachers), the media serves an important function in 
reinforcing these. The recent Islamic revival has led to the rise of magazines and 
newspapers dedicated to Islamic audiences and even mainstream television and secular 
newspapers and magazines have enormous Islamic content. Rules on marriage, dress, 
divorce and adultery are promoted through social commentary in the media, particularly 
that aimed at Islamic audiences. Commentary is also provided on prostitution, 
homosexuality, the decadence of modem life, and on sexually transmitted diseases, 
particularly HIV. On these topics, many Islamic leaders and institutions are in agreement 
with the moral concepts publicly promoted by the government. The explicit Islamic 
teachings on these moral issues serve to confirm and reinforce those values implied in 
both public and government rhetoric.
10 The resurgence of Islam in Indonesia has also been encouraged by the worldwide revival movement and 
by the success of Islamic nations. The economic boom in oil rich Islamic countries such as Saudi 
Arabia has enabled the financing of religious revival movements and institutions in other countries, 
including Indonesia. The 1973 Egyptian victory over Israel and particularly the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
raised confidence and pride in the Islamic cause. In addition, the Islamic calendar is entering its fifteenth 
century, which according to the cycles of seven century periods marks the expected rise of Islam after a 
decline from the eighth to the fourteenth centuries (Muzaffar 1986).
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On the topic of HIV/AIDS prevention, major Islamic organisations, such as the 
Indonesian Council of Ulamas (Majelis Ulama Indonesia - MUI) and two major Islamic 
NGOs, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (MUH), support the concepts of 
prevention through promotion of abstinence and faithfulness under a broader program of 
family resilience. While HIV/AIDS is viewed by some ulama as punishment for 
individual transgression, for the majority it is regarded as a cobaan (trial) or peringalan 
(warning) from Allah that mankind’s piety must be improved. A return to religious 
values in HIV/AIDS prevention is thus an appropriate response. Kondomisasi, even if 
only to sex workers, is contradictory to this approach as it is thought to encourage 
promiscuity and to legitimise prostitution. Condom use is only acceptable for those 
already known to be infected with HIV who should prevent further transmission. The 
Indonesian government pays particular attention to the sensibilities of Islamic leaders and 
organisations and the Muslim majority in the formations of its policies. It is in this 
context that consideration of the motivations behind a moral approach in HIV/AIDS 
prevention activities becomes important.
1.3.3 Relations between Islam and the state
Recognising the power and influence of Islamic leaders and institutions over the 
Indonesian population, the New Order governing elite is forced to accommodate Islamic 
views, while at the same time attempting to maintain control over the leaders and 
institutions. Islam is seen as the champion of the ordinary people in opposition to the 
government, and the elite are fearful of such institutions over which they have very little 
control. Islam advocates justice and equality in a climate of economic exploitation by this 
elite class. As the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, the potential power base of 
discontented citizens to support Islamic leaders is considerable. Many people are attracted 
to the institutions of Islam as they “see them as being closer to the common people than
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are the institutions of the modem state -  correctly so, for they are culturally more familiar 
and physically more accessible to the population at large” (McVey 1989:211).
Muslim leaders are thus seen as a potential threat to the ruling elite, including the 
military: "Islam's potential for organizing popular resistance to the status quo remains 
very significant" (McVey 1989:219). State leaders are constantly mindful of the past 
effectiveness of Islam as a unifying force against the colonial order and as a significant 
player in the defeat of the communists and in the overthrow of Sukarno (McVey 
1989:199). Recognising the influence which the ulama hold over the masses, the 
political elite do not wish to alienate them or their followers. While attempting to curtail 
any political aspirations of religious leaders or groups, the government encourages 
limited commentary on social and moral issues in the state-controlled media. 
Accommodating Muslim leaders is in their own interests, as defying them could lead to 
an erosion of their own political power (Muzaffar 1986).
Since its ascension to power, the New Order government has sought to tightly 
control Islam. Already, Islam had been neutralised by Sukarno’s failure to recognise it as 
the basis of the newly independent state or even as the state religion. Instead, Islam was 
recognised as one of many of the religions represented in Indonesia and was incorporated 
into the secular state under the first principle of the Pancasila, belief in one God 
(ketuhanan yang maha esa). On the political front, Islam's role was diminished in 1972 
when all Islamic parties were amalgamated into one, the PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, Party of Unity and Development). The control of the government over 
this party is considerable. It controls the right of the party to organise, and it is able to 
manipulate the appointment of those sympathetic to the government to its leadership. The 
PPP has very little influence on the directions of national policy. Nevertheless, Muslim 
leaders have continued to have considerable political clout. While they have turned away 
from formal political activity, they are still able to wield political influence through the 
social arena: there has been the "removal of Muslim political activity from the vulnerable
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and by now pointless arena of party politics to the more salient one of broad social 
action" (McVey 1989:218).
Even within non-political Islamic organisations, the government attempts to
maintain a degree of influence. In 1985, legislation was formally implemented which
required all social organisations to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation
(asas tunggal). This constituted an important form of government control over Islamic
organisations (Liddle 1984:11 in Ramage 1995:36):
The government perceived Islam as the only social force not yet 
brought to heel, not yet fully willing to accept the government’s 
notion of where authority ultimately resides. Acceptance of the 
state doctrine of Pancasila by the Muslims symbolizes this 
recognition. It also legitimizes the government’s growing control 
of their organizational life.
Muslims were given a further rebuff when the state recognised mystical religious 
movements as aliran kepercayaan, “creed without religious affliation”, in the Garis-garis 
Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN, Broad Outlines of State Policy) on the same level as 
religion (Tamara 1986:31; Wahid 1986:84). Control by the government over Islamic 
organisations was further illustrated during the 1994 election of the Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) chairman. During these elections, the government instructed NU delegates to vote 
for a pro-government candidate, a wealthy business man with close links with the 
government and the president's family. The outspoken incumbent, Abdurrahman Wahid 
(Gus Dur), was seen as a threat to government control over the NU (Fealy 1995:10). 
Despite this government intervention, Gus Dur managed to retain his position.
The New Order regime has also attempted to place religion under tighter state 
control through the reorganisation of the Ministry of Religion. Dedicated to upholding 
the first principle of the Pancasila, 'belief in one God', the government charges the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs with the coordination of the religious and ritual well-being 
of Indonesians. While supporting the spiritual side of the activities of religious groups, 
the government wishes to limit any political aspirations of religious leaders or groups
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(Tamara 1986). The Ministry of Religious Affairs, thus, also acts as a vehicle of control 
over religious groups, particularly very devout Muslims who may be seen as a threat to 
political power (Boland 1982). Only those who are willing to cooperate with the 
government in its quest for national development are appointed as Ministers of Religion. 
These like-minded religious bureaucrats are often out of touch with the religious 
community, and are consequently relatively ineffective at bridging the gap between 
religious leaders and institutions, and the government (McVey 1989:207). By attempting 
to serve as an intermediary between these groups, the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
provides political elites with a measure of religious and moral legitimacy. While on the 
one hand wishing to maintain political and social control over Islamic organisations, state 
elites at the same time utilise religion for their own purposes. By publicly embracing it 
and the morals ideals associated with it, they seek to enhance the perceptions of their 
moral character and legitimate their political power (Mulder 1993).
Since the early 1990s, Suharto has sought to 're-Islamise' Indonesian politics as a 
means to counterbalance the power of the military (Fealy 1995:10; Ramage 1995:78). 
His willingness to do this has been spurred on by the acceptance of Islamic organisations 
of Pancasila over Islam as asas tunggal, their sole ideological foundation (Ramage 
1995:78). Suharto has attempted to court the Muslim majority by offering a number of 
concessions on the place of Islam in Indonesian law, business and culture n . As a 
gesture towards increasing Islam’s contribution to political life, the state has sponsored 
the formation of the ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia - Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). The association was established to woo and attract 
leading Muslim academics to an organisation strongly associated with the government. 
Most of the top positions in the organisation are held by senior bureaucrats and
11 A 1992 article in Inside Indonesia (van Klinken 1992:5), points out several concessions given to 
Muslims as an attempt to legitimate the state in the eyes of the Muslim community: the passing of the 
Law on National Education recognising the madrasah (Islamic schools); the passing of the Law on 
Religious Courts giving an increased role to Islamic law in the areas of marriage and other matters; the 
establishment of an Islamic bank; prominent state backing to a significant Islamic festival; and in 1991, 
a Suharto-led highly publicised tour by government leaders to Mecca.
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politicians, with the first Chairman of the organisation being BJ Habibie (the Minister of 
Science and Technology). Nurcholish Madjid, a well known Muslim scholar, points out 
in a Jakarta Post article that the strong government interest in ICMI is "because ICMI is 
an organization that represents a majority group in Indonesia" (JP 12.12.95). Although 
two senior Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) members were appointed to ICMI's board, they are 
recognised as "being very close and accommodative to those in power" (JP 12.12.95). 
ICMI has not been able to attract a significant following from NU members. For 
instance, the chairman of the NU, Abdurrahman Wahid, refused to join, claiming that 
ICMI had sectarian tendencies and that its ties to the government were too strong (Fealy 
1995). According to him, “Islamic activists are allowing themselves to be manipulated 
by Soeharto in order to advance their own goal of Islamizing government and society” 
(Ramage 1995:64). The government is thought to be using the ICMI to gain legitimacy 
in the eyes of the Muslim community. Meanwhile, the military, suspicious of Islam as a 
political force and of the President's attempts to re-Islamise Indonesian politics, is 
exerting influence to keep Islam and the government elite separated. For instance, during 
the 1994 NU elections, the military supported Abdurrahman Wahid, as opposed to the 
Suharto-backed candidate. They perceived Abdurrahman Wahid as an "ally in their 
struggle against ICMI, which they saw as the use of Islam by Suharto and Habibe to 
counter the influence of the armed forces" (Grant 1996:91).
Despite being formally excluded from the political scene, Islamic organisations 
and institutions are nonetheless influential in the political arena. Islamic leaders are able 
to legitimately criticise the regime through reference to principles which Muslims hold in 
high regard: social justice, equality and morality. The government can not easily counter 
these criticisms without appearing ammoral, unreasonable and unpopular. The Islamic 
movement has, thus, become the only legitimate form of protest against the actions of the 
Indonesian governing elite. Islam has become a dominant social, moral, and political 
force in Indonesian society and is having a growing influence among the Indonesian
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populace. The government is, therefore, under great pressure to consider the moral 
concerns of Muslims and ulama (Islamic leaders) in the development and implementation 
of its policies.
In the context of STDs and HIV/AIDS, the government is under pressure to focus 
on morally-based policies and prevention efforts, and to involve Islamic religious 
organisations in formulating and implementing these. The government is caught between 
undertaking a concerted public health approach, including kondomisasi, and considering 
the conservative moral stance of the Islamic community. Given the growing influence of 
the Islamic movement over the lives of Indonesians, HIV/AIDS prevention activities must 
take on a moral focus in order to be implemented at all. To Muslims, HIV/AIDS 
prevention must focus on utilising the vehicle of the family to promote abstinence and 
faithfulness within marriage, and should discourage widespread condom promotion. The 
development of the National AIDS Strategy and the prevention efforts resulting from it 
occur in the context of the government seeking to maintain a balance between its control 
over public policy and its attention to the moral concerns of Muslims.
1 .4  O rganisation of the th esis
This study investigates the influence of the attitudes and publicly expressed opinions of 
Islamic institutions and leaders on issues related to HIV/AIDS prevention, and the 
subsequent impact of these attitudes on the government's HIV/AIDS prevention policies 
and strategies. While there are other religions in Indonesia, which are undergoing a 
revival and are influential in HIV/AIDS prevention issues, this study will concentrate on 
the most dominant religion, Islam12. With around 87% of Indonesians professing to be 
Muslims, the attitudes of Islamic leaders and organisations towards HIV/AIDS have the
12 Of the other religions, Catholics have been particularly outspoken about HIV/AIDS prevention, in 
particular over the role of condoms. At a meeting of the Council of Bishops, it was decided that the 
Catholic Church should promote responsible sexual behaviour. The Council maintained a stance against 
condom use for family planning purposes, but agreed to their use to prevent disease. The widespread 
promotion of condoms was, however, considered unacceptable as it was thought to encourage 
promiscuous sexual behaviour (Nafsiah Mboi, pers comm).
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greatest potential to influence the development of prevention policies. It should be noted 
that there are a multitude of actors and agendas which contribute to the process of 
HIV/AIDS policy development and implementation in Indonesia. This study choses to 
consider only two of the most influential, the government and the Islamic movement 
during the pre-1997 New Order regime of President Suharto. While Muslim activists and 
organisations have not been involved in actually writing HIV/AIDS policies, their moral 
attitudes are reflected in them. They are certainly influential in how prevention activities 
are carried out. As the study concentrates primarily on the national and public 
interactions between Islam and the state on issues of sexual morality, it is somewhat 
limited in scope. The many other players in the prevention of HIV/AIDS, such as non­
religious NGOs, are not discussed in detail. The study is also limited to Java as this is 
the site of public policy development, and the region where such tensions between the 
state and the growing Islamic movement are most apparent.
In examining the influence of Islam on HIV/AIDS policy, this study will often 
refer to media articles related to sexual morality, and specifically HIV/AIDS prevention. 
While several newspapers and magazines have been sourced, the majority of material 
comes from three newspapers aimed at a middle class readership - Republika. Kompas. 
and The Jakarta Post 13. References to articles from these newspapers are indicated 
using ‘R, ‘K’, and ‘JP’ respectively. While the time period of articles ranges from 1992 
to 1997, an intense study of the period November and December 1995 is referred to. 
This particular time period coincides with a discussion of an HIV/AIDS plan of action at a 
conference held by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (26-30 November), with World AIDS 
Day on December 1, and also with a number of important debates about condoms, 
kondomisasi, and other HIV prevention issues. Reference will also be made to the 
formulations of various government programs and religious conferences where directions
13 Republika is a newspaper supported by the ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) 
which as mentioned above is strongly associated with the government elite. Kompas is a Christian 
newspaper (Grant 1996:85), while The Jakarta Post is an English language daily newspaper.
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were given on moral issues related to HIV/AIDS prevention. In addition, information 
has been obtained from communications with several researchers involved in HIV/AIDS 
issues, as well as from personal experiences from living in and visiting Indonesia14.
The Introduction, has presented the problem of how the Indonesian government 
can implement a workable policy towards HIV/AIDS prevention in the face of growing 
Islamic influence within society. This chapter has provided background information on 
the development of the National AIDS Strategy and prevention policies, and the nature of 
their implementation. It has also briefly described the authority of the government and 
Islamic leaders and institutions to provide guidance on moral issues related to sexuality 
and HIV/AIDS prevention within the moral community of the Indonesian nation. The 
study will continue in Chapter Two with a discussion of the influences of government- 
driven development and modernisation on increasing economic inequality and changes in 
notions of sexual morality. It examines the connection between these economic and 
social changes and the growth of the sex industry and increasing pre-marital sex among 
young people. Chapter Three presents the apparent contradictory stance of the 
government on sexual morality. On the one hand the Indonesian government utilises 
programs (such as the Pembinaan Kesedjahteraan Keluarga, The Applied Family Welfare 
Program) to reinforce a concept of ideal sexuality which promotes sex only within 
marriage. The dichotomy established between 'good' women (faithful wives/mothers) 
and 'bad' women (prostitutes) is influenced by the Christian outlook of the Dutch 
colonial regime, Islamic morality, and a notion of ‘traditional’ morality. Based on this 
construction of sexuality, both female sex workers and STDs/HIV become associated 
with immorality. This then places a stigma of immorality on anyone who uses condoms 
and, thus, presents difficulties in HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. The following chapter
14 I am drawing on personal observations gained while living in Indonesia between 1983-88 and visiting 
every year since then to 1993 and then again in December 1996. On the last visit, I had the opportunity 
to speak with several researchers involved with HIV/AIDS and/or sexuality issues: Budi Utomo and Nick 
Dharmaputra of the Center for Health Research, University of Indonesia; Meiwita Iskandar of The 
Population Council; Nafsiah Mboi, Member of Parliament; and Masri Singarimbun of the Population 
Studies Center, Gadjah Mada University.
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considers Islam as a growing source of authority on sexuality and on moral issues related 
to HIV prevention, transmitting the teachings of the Qur'an through its organisations, 
educational institution and religious leaders. It presents some of the dynamic and fast 
growing Islamic movements to which many Indonesians have been attracted. Finally, 
Chapter Five, examines the responses of Islamic organisations to the HIV/AIDS problem 
and considers the influences of these responses on the development of HIV/AIDS 
policies and the implementation of prevention activities. It discusses the double bind with 
which the government is faced: how to deliver effective HIV/AIDS prevention activities 
in the face of its own moral ideology and the growing moral conservatism among the 
Islamic community.
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Chapter Two
M odernisation, social change and sexual behaviour
The government has overseen and promoted a process of development in Indonesia 
which has impacted enormously on sexual attitudes and behaviours and on the current 
spread of the HIV epidemic. Development has caused many economic and social 
changes which have led to the growth of the sex industry and a perceived increase in 
indulgence in pre- and extra- marital sex. The process of modernisation has introduced a 
consumer culture and a greater acceptance of Western lifestyle and values, which in turn 
has brought a greater acceptance of publicly expressed sexuality. The diversification and 
greater utilisation of the sex industry in Indonesia has been largely due to an explosion of 
economic development which has brought increased unemployment and urbanisation, 
migration for work, and an influx of foreign workers. Development has been selective, 
and the resulting income inequality gives some people greater purchasing power than 
others. This provides both the clients and workers for the sex industry. These side- 
effects of government-endorsed modernisation are cited as central to the spread of HIV, 
with religious values and family resilience considered vital to combat these decadences of 
modem life.
2 .1  M odernisation and social change
When the New Order under Soeharto began in 1966, the economy was in disarray, 
including high inflation and enormous foreign debt. After establishing a new nation 
following the turmoil of war and revolution, the first President, Sukarno, concentrated 
his efforts primarily on political activities and foreign policy, and paid little attention to 
economic policies. When Soeharto came into power, he revoked prohibitions on foreign 
aid and investment, allowed the importation of consumer goods, and then rescheduled the
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national debt. These measures stimulated the investments of international companies who 
were attracted by the largely untapped natural resources, the vast market, and the 
relatively low wages. The most desired outcome of development was to make the 
"development cake" bigger: to raise the national wealth and to increase the amount of 
capital available for investment in the development of the nation (Budiman 1979:212).
The equal distribution of this wealth has been secondary and the effective 
development has been directed towards the elite. Development has been location-specific 
and has given less benefit to the rural population, and to both the rural and urban poor. 
Investment has been primarily directed at particular localities: cities; regions of resource 
extraction, such as plantations, and timber, oil, coal and mining areas; and tourist 
destinations. Even though the first of the Five Year Development Plans (Repelita - 
Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun) emphasised the important role of agriculture in the 
development of the nation, large scale industrialisation was the main target of investment 
at the expense of labour intensive local industries. Cottage industries have been pushed 
out of production and many people have been forced off their land by developers and 
corporations. Many of these unemployed people have left their villages, attracted by 
employment opportunities in urban areas, and at sites of industry, mining and large-scale 
agricultural activity.
Although the New Order government has managed to raise the national wealth, 
little attention has been given to actual income distribution. Up to the mid-1990s, overall 
poverty has been reduced so that by 1993, 26 million (14%) of the Indonesian population 
lived in poverty compared to 70 million (60%) in the 1970s (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and 
Hull 1995:19). The poverty that remains has increasingly become an urban problem. 
While in 1976, fewer than one in five poor Indonesians were urban dwellers, in 1990, 
the figure had increased to one in three (Hugo 1993:47). Moreover, the proportion of 
urban Indonesians living below the poverty line in Indonesia in 1993 was 30% (Shubert 
1993:25). Social equality has not accompanied rapid economic development and so
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while the majority of the population has benefited in some way from development, the 
differences in how much individuals have benefited is enormous. There are considerable 
income disparities between rural and urban areas as well as between different provinces. 
For instance, while Central Java is on average poorer, East Java has a less equal 
distribution of income and a greater gap between rural and urban earnings (from 1993 
SUSENAS statistics obtained from Terry Hull, pers comm). Such disparities are among 
the motivations for men and women to migrate to urban areas seeking employment, 
including employment in the sex industry (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:19).
The declining importance of subsistence agriculture, a fall in the number of job 
opportunities in rural areas, an emphasis on export-oriented manufacturing, and the 
expanding industrial and service sectors of urban areas have resulted in the attraction of 
men and women to urban areas searching for work both in the formal and informal 
sectors. While in 1950, 12.4% of the total population lived in urban areas, this figure 
reached 20.2% in 1980 (Surjadi 1988:3), and 26% in 1985 (MacIntyre 1993:33). In 
1993, around one third of the population lived in urban areas and it is predicted that by 
2010, more than half the population will be classified as urban (Hugo 1993:46). The rate 
of growth of urban areas in the 1980s was more than six times greater than that of rural 
areas and the urban population has grown twenty times bigger since 1920 while the rural 
population has less than trebled (ibid:46-7). The majority of urban population growth 
results from the net redistribution of people from rural to urban areas. The influx of 
people has led to a lateral expansion of urban areas along the major transportation routes 
radiating from them (ibid:47).
The urban population consists of workers established both in the formal sector 
(white collar workers, merchants, civil servants) and the informal sector (hawkers, 
farmers, crafts people, becak drivers, sex workers, building labourers, maids, as well as 
the homeless and people seeking employment). Those in the formal sector are more 
permanent urban dwellers and either live in the city or commute from surrounding
31
kabupaten (regencies). In the three kabupaten surrounding Jakarta (Bogor, Tangerang 
and Bekasi) the annual population growth rates between 1971 and 1980 were 4.6%, 
4.04% and 3.6% compared with the national average of 2.33% (Hugo 1982:63). 
Workers in the informal sector may commute or may be seasonally involved in circular 
migration, ie they "do not change their usual place of residence in the village but are 
absent at an urban destination for periods longer than a single day" (ibid:61). According 
to Hugo (1982), Indonesians do not simply view nonpermanent mobility as a preliminary 
stage before permanent relocation to urban areas, but exhibit a "strong and apparently 
long-term commitment to bilocality, opting for the combination of activities in both rural 
and urban areas..." (ibid:74). The motivations for non-permanent migration vary from 
household to household, but involve careful consideration of maximising economic and 
social outcomes.
Essential to migration and travel patterns are the transportation networks which 
are fast growing to meet the demands imposed by economic growth and population 
expansion. In 1994, the bus service to Jakarta catered for an average daily influx of 
1,556,011 passengers (van der Sterren, Murray and Hull 1997:215). Media reports 
estimate that Jakarta loses between 2-2.5 million people to rural areas at Lebaran time 
(Dharmaputra, Ariawan and Iskandar 1996:25). The transportation system itself involves 
more than 20,000 truck drivers travelling throughout Indonesia (Dharmaputra, Ariawan 
and Iskandar 1996:29), and in Surabaya over 11,000 sailors (6,000 of whom are navy 
personnel) visit each month (Blowfield 1992 in Dharmaputra, Ariawan and Iskandar 
1996:29).
With development has come increased educational attainment by both males and 
females of the working age population. Despite this, in 1994 only 22% of the total 
Indonesian population over 10 years old had received the nine years of basic education 
(Dharmaputra, Ariawan and Iskandar 1996:22). Males are, in general, better educated 
than females, with fewer females attending university. A rising number of school leavers
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can not, however, find work, particularly that which measures up to their level of 
education. An estimated 62% of youth between 15 and 19 with a high school education 
were looking for work in 1986 (Hugo 1993:48). The 1990 census indicates that both 
unemployment and underemployment have been increasing, especially in urban areas. 
Employment opportunities have fallen significantly. Since the early 1970s, the primary 
sector's share of total employment fell from 74% in 1971 to 31% in 1990 (Jones, 
Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:9). The formal sector is increasingly not able to pay 
adequate wages to their employees in low level jobs in the textile, garment, tobacco and 
electronics industries. Ninety-percent of these workers are women many of whom do 
not earn enough money to cover their basic expenses. Women receive a lower income 
than men in the same age-group and educational category. Most female migrants who 
come to the urban areas for employment are inexperienced, uneducated and have limited 
skills. There is great competition for jobs and so these migrants tend to enter low-status, 
low-pay employment in the areas of manufacturing, clerical activities, sales, hotels and 
restaurants, and particularly in the informal sector as traders, unpaid family workers, 
domestic labour or as sex workers (ibid:9,19).
2.1.1 The emergence of a middle class consumer lifestyle
The growth of industrial capitalism has been accompanied by a transformation in social 
structure, with the emergence of a middle class. While the exact membership of this 
middle class in Indonesia is the subject of debate, it is commonly accepted to include 
members of the following professions: civil servants (including teachers and academics); 
professionals such as engineers, doctors, lawyers, journalists, airline pilots, and 
business executives; and other 'white collar' workers and employees. The makeup of the 
middle class is heterogeneous and fragmented as they are economically, ethnically, 
religiously, politically, and ideologically varied (Lev 1990).
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The coherence of the middle class lies not so much in their wealth but in the
lifestyle and attitudes of its culture. Dick (1985; 1990) describes the social behaviour 
accompanying middle class consumer behaviour as 'the privatization of the means of 
consumption'. Rather than sharing consumer durables within the community, a 
household will restrict the goods to its own members. The lack of privacy in the 
kampung (village unit, city quarter) and the social pressure to share drives the more 
wealthy out of, or at least to the periphery of, the kampung. Here they bar their 
windows, lock their doors and build fences around their properties against theft, and so 
become more middle class.
Certain elements of the middle class have also accepted what have been 
considered Western ideologies. Many are committed to the achievement of equality 
(permerataan) in Indonesian society and have a growing concern with the notions of 
democracy, the rule of law and the freedom of speech. Moreover, there is increasing 
recognition of the possibility of upward mobility in Indonesian society based on merit 
through education and experience rather than on connection, although this is still less true 
in the business world. More than anything, members of the middle class seem to share a 
commitment to development as a national priority as this is the means to steadily rising 
living standards and the enjoyment of a consumer lifestyle. A 1996 study of Jakarta's 
middle class revealed that most "[want] political and social change but ...[do] not want to 
take any risks....the middle classes [care] more about economic growth than political 
freedom" (JP 14.12.96).
Identity with the middle class is manifested practically as:
pursuing a modem, westernised lifestyle that has, to a 
considerable extent, been based on role models fashioned and 
propagated by the national mass media and especially television 
(Dick 1990:65).
The nature of this modem, westernised lifestyle is clear from the conspicuous 
consumption of the well-off who respond to the advertising campaigns of television and
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magazines. The extent of such advertising is obvious. In one issue of a middle class 
women's magazine, typical of many others like it, advertising made up 44% of the total 
magazine (109 of 247 pages). Of the advertisements it contained, 36% were for beauty 
products (25) and clothing (14), with several advertisements for banks or credit cards 
(10), jewelry/watches (7), airlines/travel (4) and luxury cars (3) (Femina. 12-18 Oktober 
1995). Murray (1991:129) has remarked that advertisements usually make up around 
30% of the content of women's magazines, such as Femina. Kartini. and Gadis. Similar 
advertising on television reaches a wider audience, most of whom cannot afford the 
consumer products which symbolise the middle class wealth and lifestyle. The 
increasing wealth of many Jakartans can be seen in the mushrooming of shopping plazas 
which carry expensive brand names and imported goods. While in 1983 there were only 
two or three such plazas, there are now over twenty-five, including the newly opened 
Taman Anggrek which is reputed to be the largest plaza complex in Southeast Asia. In 
late 1995, the modem and ritzy Pondok Indah Mall in South Jakarta was attracting an 
average of 25,000 people per day, with 40,000 people on the weekends and holidays (JP 
19.11.95). Such a lifestyle is seen to be increasingly Western in nature with Western 
foods, clothing styles and music combining with or replacing local tastes. In the centre 
of Jakarta, the MacDonalds restaurant (open 24 hours), the Hard Rock Cafe, and Planet 
Hollywood are popular 'hang outs' for trendy young men and women. Adapted into 
Jakarta slang is the word 'you' (instead of the Bahasa Indonesia equivalents), used 
predominantly by the young. The imitation of Western trends and consumer behaviour, 
such as the wearing of particular clothing styles or the ownership of particular items, 
such as mobile phones, is considered keren (trendy). Exposure to a consumer culture 
comes not only from the media, but also the film industry and through the increasing 
numbers of foreign tourists and workers. In addition, better-off Indonesians can afford 
to travel overseas and to send their children to schools and universities in other countries, 
thus exposing them to a Western consumer lifestyle. Dick (1985:74) notes that this
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middle class culture is most evident in the big cities, particularly Jakarta, and being 
"diffused throughout the country by the powerful media of education, television, and 
magazines, is becoming the national culture".
2.2 Changing morals in changing times
The increased consumerism and the influence of the media exposes people to a new, 
Westernised and more openly permissive global culture. According to Istikanah 
Soepardo, Director of Social Rehabilitation at the Ministry of Social Services: "the impact 
of globalization and the rapid influx of information from abroad ... [are factors] ... 
prompting young people to sample forbidden fruits" (JP 13.1.95). There has even been 
a decline in the influence of supportive institutions such as the extended family networks. 
The ‘frame of reference’ through which people view the world has been shifting to 
include not only their community, family and ethnicity, but is now also based on the 
nation state, education, media exposure, and ‘Westernisation’. These serve to “legitimate 
new behaviour” (Utomo and McDonald 1997:4).
Rural-urban migration has led to the lessening of family and community ties 
which are important in censuring social behaviour. Village life emphasises community 
solidarity and beliefs. Migration not only separates people from these relationships, but 
at the same time exposes them to new ones. Life in urban areas is characterised by 
individualism and social isolation where the tradition of mutual help (gotong royong) has 
been replaced by relationships where financial compensation is expected for services 
rendered (Hugo 1982). Extended families living in quarters of the city according to 
ethnic group have been replaced by nuclear families living in separate houses in mixed 
communities. The cities are much more heterogeneous in nature cutting across ethnic, 
cultural and religious boundaries, exposing residents to different ways of life and 
diminishing the impact of an individual's own cultural group on their behaviour. This
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exposure to a more cosmopolitan culture and the lack of an extensive social support 
network may lead to more relaxed moral ideals and to more permissive sexual behaviour.
2.2.1 The development and diversification of the sex industry
The perception of relaxing morals in modem Indonesia is to some extent supported by the 
continued demand for sexual services and the resulting diversification of the sex industry. 
The sex industry has continued to flourish in areas where there is a demand from 
working men: in towns and cities; along railways and roads; at truck stops; near military 
bases; and timber and mining camps. Transport workers, sailors and migrant workers 
make up a high proportion of clients as they are frequently on extended absences from 
home and have disposable incomes in their pockets. In the towns and cities, female sex 
workers operate from a variety of milieux: brothels, hotel coffee shops, bars and discos, 
massage parlours, barber shops, beauty parlours, escort services, streets and street 
markets. Those working from brothels or the streets tend to cater for low to middle class 
clients, whereas those operating from discos, nightclubs and hotels cater for middle to 
upper class clients. Some of these women are registered with the authorities, but the vast 
majority are not. All women who work from the streets are doing so illegally and at great 
risk. In 1994/95, there were 71,281 sex workers registered with the Ministry of Social 
Affairs (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:27)15, although Murray (1993:2) believes 
that the actual figure could be as many as 300,000 sex workers. Blowfield (1992 in 
Dharmaputra, Ariawan and Iskandar 1996:29) has estimated that over 120,000 sex 
workers offer services along the trucking routes of Indonesia. Homosexual prostitution, 
including lesbians, gays, and banci/waria (transsexual/transgender people) has recently 
become more prominent. Lesbians and gay sex workers tend to operate more 
clandestinely from the same types of locations as heterosexual sex workers, while
15 Figures of registered sex workers come from official lokalisasi and other brothel complexes which are 
routinely monitored. Sex workers in massage parlours, bars, night clubs, high-class call girl 
establishments or those working independently or on the streets are not included in these official 
statistics.
37
banci/waria work openly in specific street areas (Sunindyo and Sabaroedin 1989:270- 
276). Gigolos have become more common in Bali and other tourist centres to cater for 
Western and Japanese women (Jennaway 1993).
The growth and diversification of the sex industry is not only influenced by the
changes in moral attitudes resulting from modem life, but also by the economic
conditions which influence incomes, distribution of wealth, and migration patterns.
Prostitution was already a widespread industry in Indonesia during colonial times,
legitimated by the perceived need to allow military men and civil servants access to sexual
services. During the Second World War and revolutionary period, the political and
economic upheaval led to general social restlessness and to the dislocation of families and
communities. Some women, to escape the poverty and famine which prevailed at the
time, moved into the cities and became sex workers. Following the war, there was a
general perception of a moral crisis, and in 1952, the Kongres Wanita Indonesia at their
conference in Bandung recommended actions to "induce the affliated associations to
organize courses in moral instruction". This step was advocated, as "the whole of
society suffered from the consequences that usually result from war and revolution: the
perceptible relaxation of morals and marked idleness among young people" (ibid: 119).
According to Vreede-de Stuers, writing in 1960:
The influence of a similarly undisciplined way of life during the 
Revolution has apparently not yet run its course and is certainly 
responsible in part for the disturbingly high percentage of 
repudiations, especially in Java (Vreede-de Stuers 1960:131).
In the 1950s, the rates of divorce in Java were among the highest in the world (Jones 
1994; Vreede-de Stuers 1960:129). Divorce potentially left a woman in financial or 
emotional difficulties making prostitution an attractive option for her. Since this time, the 
rates of divorce have dropped considerably, below the level of many Western countries. 
This may be partly due to the growing resistance against forced marriages (which was 
frequently given as a reason for divorce), the improved stability of the economy, growing
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individualism, better education for girls, higher age levels at which marriage takes place, 
and a rebellion against adat (customary law). Divorce is, therefore, probably less 
important than it used to be in providing large numbers of women for the sex industry, 
although it is still a contributing factor for some sex workers (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and 
Hull 1995:9). A study of sex workers in Yogyakarta by the Lentera project of the 
Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association found that “the large majority...started 
working in the sex industry after their husbands left them or died” (‘Lentera’s programs 
with female sex workers’, internet site).
The motivation for women to enter into sex work continues to be predominantly
economic, both in terms of absolute poverty and of relative income. A 1983 study found
that the majority of women had started working as sex workers due to rural poverty
(Pumomo and Siregar 1983:106 in Murray 1991:107). Similarly, a 1994 study carried
out by the Jakarta Municipal Social Office and the newspaper Pos Kota found that:
61 percent of the prostitutes willingly took up the profession for 
economic reasons, 18 percent because they were hurt by either 
former husbands or boyfriends, eight percent after being trapped 
by someone and finding themselves unable to free themselves 
afterward, while another six percent said they became prostitutes 
after being persuaded by their peers (JP 9.6.94).
Even though the number of women in poverty has fallen, there are still enough to supply 
women for sex work should poverty be the major reason to take it up. Many women find 
sex work provides them with a better income than the low pay, low status work which 
they, as unskilled workers, are otherwise able to get. The possibility of earning five to 
ten times more in sex work than any other employment is tempting and the relative 
anonymity of people living in the cities facilitates entry into this work. Even though 
women are becoming better educated and skilled, this is only relevant when there are also 
appropriate job opportunities available for them. The considerable differences between 
the incomes of rural and urban dwellers provide enormous motivations for women to 
enter into urban commercial sex activities. The income differentials between men and
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women leads to a supply of customers from higher income groups and a supply of sex
workers from lower income groups. These income differentials, the increased
consumerism of Indonesian society, and the conspicuous consumption of the elite and
middle classes leads to dissatisfaction and the desire for a better life. This may affect the
willingness of some women to enter into sex work:
If it is a sense of relative deprivation rather than absolute poverty 
that fosters a willingness to put aside moral scruples in order to 
obtain a better income, then recent developments in Indonesia 
will not have helped allay the incentives for women to engage in 
prostitution (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:19).
The majority of women entering the sex industry seem to do so because it is the best 
choice for them under conditions of limited economic opportunities. Furthermore, as 
Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull (1995:48) point out, the sex industry is so extensive 
because there are so many men who are willing and able to purchase sexual services. 
They have estimated that between 2.7 million and 4.3 million men visit prostitutes each 
month. While this is a large number, it constitutes only a minority of Indonesian men 
aged 15-64, only around 5-8% 16.
2.2.2 Sexual openness and promiscuity
In most urban areas, changes in traditional norms and values accompanying development 
appear to have influenced moral attitudes and sexual behaviour. A survey of 169 men 
and women in Surabaya in 1988 found that while only 6.25% (4) of the women had ever 
had extramarital intercourse, 82.11% (78) of the men had. Fifty-one (65.4%) of these 
men had sexual intercourse with sex workers (Siahaan and Pumomo 1988). Thus, while 
many pre- and extra-marital sexual relations are with sex workers, a great deal are also
16 In this estimate, Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull make the following assumptions: that the number of 
sex workers in Indonesia is between 140,000 and 230,000 (based on overestimates of the officially 
reported figures for 1993); that the average numbers of transactions per month are 40 for low and middle 
class sex workers and 20 for high class ones; and that the average client has two transactions per month. 
The estimate also assumes that all of the clients are Indonesians (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull 
1995:47-8).
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with non-sex workers. Seks suka sama suka (a relationship outside marriage based on 
mutual attraction) appears to be an increasingly common type of sexual relationship.
Changes in sexual attitudes and behaviours are perhaps most dramatic among 
unmarried youth. Notions of publicly acceptable displays of affection appear to have 
become more permissible over the past ten years or so, with more young men and 
women walking together hand-in-hand and cuddling or kissing publicly. The tendencies 
of young men and women to enter into premarital sexual relationships has been affected 
by the increase in the average age at marriage to 21.1 years in 1990 (Jones, 
Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995; Dharmaputra, Ariawan and Iskandar 1996). Many young 
people wish to delay marriage, but not their first sexual experiences. Singarimbun's 
(1996:108-127) survey of studies over the past 25 years on the moral norms and sexual 
behaviours of young people show a range of findings. A 1972 study found that between 
1.2%-9.6% of youth approved of sex before marriage (Sarwono 1981:84 in Singarimbun 
1996). In a 1981 study, 12.2% approved of 'free sex', ie sex with a non-constant 
partner (Sarwono 1981 in Singarimbun 1996). In a 1983 study in Yogyakarta where 
8.5% were sexually active, 33.5% had watched 'blue movies', and 7.5% had enacted 
what they had seen in these movies (Tempo. 22.1.83 in Singarimbun 1996). A study in 
Yogyakarta found that between January - June 1984, 26.4% of unmarried respondents 
were having sex before marriage (Tempo. 20.10.84 in Singarimbun 1996). A 1989 
study of unmarried 17-24 year olds in urban and rural areas of Yogyakarta and Bali, 
found that 15.5% of urban Yogya men and 1.6% of urban Yogya women had been 
sexually active, while 23% of the men and 5.4% of the women said that they would 
engage in pre-marital sex if they really loved their partners (Faturochman and Soetjipto 
1989 in Singarimbun 1996:116-121). Sarwono concluded from a 1981 study of Jakarta 
youth that:
there has been a shift in the norms of sexual behaviour among 
youth in DKI. Activities such as kissing and petting, tabu to the 
youth of the 1950s are now accepted by the youth of the 1980s.
In fact there are a small number who agree with 'free-sex'. Not
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only that, a small number of respondents also admit to having 
had sexual relations. Mainly [this has been] with prostitutes or 
adult women or friends, but there are those who have slept with 
their boyfriend or girlfriend (Sarwono 1981 in Singarimbun 
1996:112).
There has, in addition, been a change in middle and upper class family values, 
such that options which would not have been considered twenty years ago are now viable 
alternatives. For example, well-educated women with advanced careers are seriously 
considering the option of living with a man out of wedlock. According to Yaumil Agoes 
Achir, the former Dean of the School of Psychology, University of Indonesia (UI), and 
assistant to the Minister of Population, many of these career women still favour the 
institution of marriage over single life, but allow practical considerations to influence their 
short term needs (JP 29.6.94a). An article in the Jakarta Post (16.1.95) reports the need 
for the government to come up with an official decree on the legal status of illegitimate 
children bom out of wedlock. An official from the Ministry of Religious Affairs cites the 
increasing number of cases of illegitimate children in modem day life and states that, "in 
this age of globilization, now is the 'right moment' to issue such a decree" (JP 16.1.95).
The perception of changing sexual openness among Indonesians, in particular the 
youth, is reflected in the huge increase in commentary in the media. There is an 
enormous concern for the infiltration of consumerism and sexual openness into 
Indonesian society, particularly through television, film, music, and magazines. Articles 
and letters to the editors in newspapers and magazines discuss among other issues: 
teenage pregnancy and contraceptive use; kumpul kebo (living together out of wedlock); 
sexuality; the dangers of cinema and television; pornography; drug use; rape and 
domestic violence; and the influence of consumerism and advertising on youth. The 
increase in public discussion over teenage sexuality and morals has focused particularly 
on teenage pregnancy and contraception among girls (Suara Pembaruan 7.7.91a; Suara 
Pembaruan 7.7.91b; Suara Pembaruan 27.7.91). Many articles and letters to the editor
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comment on the dangers to Indonesians of violence, love stories and foreign content on 
television (JP 25.2.94; JP 30.6.94a; JP 25.8.94; JP 18.1.95; JP 26.1.95), and sexual 
content in films (Suara Masjid 1994). Some programs and films are considered to be 
detrimental to viewers, particularly the younger generation who "tend to imitate the 
violence and love affairs aired on TV" (JP 26.1.95). Of added concern, is the 
proliferation of pornography in the form of magazines, storybooks, cards, stickers and 
video cassettes, and the ease of obtaining and viewing these (JP 3.8.94a; JP 13.8.94; 
Forum Keadilan 8.6.95). Karaoke bars and nightspots have come under fire because of 
their association with promiscuous sexual behaviour (JP 20.12.96; JP 27.12.96). One 
article describes the disruption caused by discos operating as brothels in a market area. 
The discos are blamed by local residents for causing disruptions in religious life (as they 
are close to mosques), selling alcohol to high school students, and acting as brothels: 
"opening discos in the market is not only inappropriate, but also violates the basic moral 
fiber of the nation because the market is surrounded by residential areas" (JP 3.3.94). 
There is concern not only for alcohol use among the young, but also for the increased use 
of other drugs such as ecstasy (JP 29.12.96; R 1.12.95c). The prosperity of the middle 
and upper classes means that they are not only able to afford better schools, homes, 
goods and family recreational activities, but also alcohol, drugs and promiscuous sex 
(Mboi 1995 in Dharmaputra, Ariawan and Iskandar 1996:58).
Since the mid-1980s, the openly autonomous sexual behaviour of some middle 
class high school and university girls has come to the attention of the public. Perek 
(perempuan eksperimen, 'experimental girls') are ‘middle-class’ school girls who, 
greatly influenced by materialism, stress individualism and having sex with whoever they 
chose, paid or unpaid. They are generally between 14-20 years old, live in moderately 
well-to-do neighbourhoods and attend school or university. They 'hang-out' for their 
'clients' at malls, cafes and restaurants (particularly those in hotels). Their 'clients' 
should be good-looking, well-dressed, interesting, and have money ('Guinea pig' 1993).
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Perek refuse to be called prostitutes since "they can select their dating partner, while 
prostitutes look for money, not the person" (Hadiz, Aripumami and Sabaroedin 
1992:12). Poverty has little to do with choosing to be a perek. Although they do expect 
something in return, this is not necessarily in the form of money, but may be gifts or 
simply a good night out. According to Hadiz, Aripumami and Sabaroedin (1992), they 
"do this as [a] hobby or as they say 'just for fun'". The term perek was picked up by 
some workers in the sex industry, especially those who sought clients in coffee houses 
and bars, since "to claim to be a perek was to claim youth, adventurism, and a kind of 
obtuse purity, that was missing from the term 'prostitute'" (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and 
Hull 1995:10). Perek have become more professional and other terms are now 
commonly used to describe the activities of school girls, such as pekcun, ABG  (Anak 
Baru Gede, precocious adolescents) (Tiara 6.10.96) and mimi-momo (Utomo and 
McDonald1996:5). Pekcun, a word derived from perek cuma-cuma, 'free experimental 
girls', are junior high school girls who date older men without receiving payment (Tiara 
6.10.96). According to an article in Tiara (6.10.96), pekcun can only 'hang out' on 
Sundays and holidays, their appearance is in everyday dress rather than specially 
groomed, and their language is more refined than that of perek. Pekcun appears to be a 
less professional and earlier 'stage' in this 'experimental' behaviour: perek have usually 
been pekcun first.
Young women at university engaging in such independent sexual behaviour have 
been referred to as kupu-kupu kampus or campus fried chicken (CFC). These young 
women 'hang out' at hotel cafes and restaurants, fast food restaurants and opulent mall 
complexes. Some are involved "just for fun" (Sinar 23.11.96b). According to a survey 
of 50 kupu-kupu kampus reported in Sinar magazine (23.11.96a), 72% do it because of 
the sense of freedom and enjoyment which they get (with 46% also doing it for the 
money they earned). For many, their earnings puts them and/or their family through 
school/university and enables them to raise their standard of living. Many of these young
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women will establish a relationship with a 'sugar daddy', an older man who may promise 
money, luxury goods, paid tuition, and a place to stay. A foreign 'sugar daddy' is even 
better, as this may also provide a path to a more prosperous life in another country. To 
these young women, therefore, this is a conscious strategy to enable them to get ahead in 
life.
Whether named perek, pekcun, kupu-kupu kampus or any other term, the public 
effects of their actions remains the same. Since many of these girls attend school or 
university, are from middle-class backgrounds, and openly flaunt their sexuality, their 
sexual behaviours are shocking to public sensibilities (Murray 1993:5). The behaviours 
of these girls shows that the line between commercial and non-commercial sex may be 
blurred.
In the public forum, such sexual behaviour has been attributed to the breakdown 
of institutions which provide moral control (such as the family) which in turn is attributed 
to the Westernisation and industrialisation of Indonesian society. This has been blamed 
for the "sinking of social values and control in the day to day actions of a person" (JP 
2.8.94). As expressed in a letter to the editor of Bisnis Indonesia (in JP 19.9.96), social 
problems in Indonesia are intensified by "[t]he declining intensity of religious education, 
ethics and morals, and insufficient parental authority". Parents can no longer be relied 
upon to provide a control over their children and are often criticised for letting their 
children run wild. Parents are called upon to regain their authority and to re-instill proper 
values in their children (JP 30.6.94b). Several articles comment on the fact that "many 
well-to-do families pay less than the necessary attention to their children's problems" and 
that this is causing serious social and moral problems for these children who turn to 
drugs, crime, violence and sex work (JP 13.1.95). Acceptance of new ideals of the 
global culture creates tensions between children and their parents over issues such as 
individual rights, autonomy, respect and adherence to values. There is no longer a 
"respect for the sacred institution of marriage. Many people regard premarital sex only in
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terms of sexual enjoyment. An increasing number of people look upon living together as 
natural" (Matra 1996). According to various commentators, Indonesia should be striving 
for a society "built upon strong moral and religious values, and on the state ideology 
Pancasila, and not simply on economic principles" as this "can counter the negative 
impacts of the industrial society" (JP 9.8.94).
To a great extent, the revival in Islam is in response to the perceived decadences 
which have accompanied modernisation in Indonesia. Many Muslims, in particular those 
living in urban areas, are not against the improvements in science and technology which 
have come with modernisation, but object to the Western influences (like alcohol, drugs 
and sex), and the commercial and individualistic attitudes which have been allowed to 
pervade Indonesian social life. Muslims are being called upon to reject these destructive 
forces and to return to the teachings of Islam as a means to combat the decadence of 
modem life. This is reflected in the call for abstinence before marriage and faithfulness to 
the spouse and family as the mainstays of HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. Increasing 
religiousness is seen as an appropriate response to the threat of HIV/AIDS, as HIV/AIDS 
is believed to have arisen as a consequence of people giving in to the temptations offered 
in modem society. This response is consistent with the state’s construction of sexuality 
which also values abstinence and faithfulness. Government officials join religious 
commentators in condemning the negative effects of modernisation, including 
materialism, individualism, secularism, increased sexual freedom and the breakdown of 
social institutions such as the family. At the same time, however, they are seen as 
responsible for creating and maintaining the mechanisms which facilitate economic and 
social changes and the Western consumer lifestyle which they criticise.
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Chapter Three
The state’s contradictory approach to sexuality: 
state ideology vs tolerance of ‘im m orality’
The implementation of HIV/AIDS prevention programs is made more complex by the 
apparent contradictory approach by the Indonesian government towards sexuality. On 
the one hand, as described in the previous chapter, the state does not stand in the way of, 
and indeed promotes, modernisation and the economic and social changes which 
accompany it. The by-products of these changes have been a shift in attitudes towards 
sexuality, and the growth and diversification of the sex industry. The state attempts to 
counterbalance its apparent support for permissive sexual attitudes by extolling a concept 
of ‘traditional Indonesian’ values, a set of moral principles common to all Indonesians. 
In part, these ‘traditional’ values promote the virtues of sex within marriage. A 'good' 
woman is associated with motherhood, and the 'bad' one with sex work. This 
dichotomy between 'good' and 'bad' women is reinforced by government media 
propaganda and programs, such as the Keluarga Berencana (KB, Family Planning 
Program) and Pembinaan Kesedjahteraan Keluarga (PKK, Applied Family Welfare 
Program). Condemnation of sex workers in Indonesia is obvious not only from the 
positive emphasis placed on the 'wife/mother' ideal in official rhetoric, but also from the 
more direct criticism arising in the public discourse.
In contradiction to the officially touted ideal, the state elite accept the sex industry 
as a ‘necessary evil’ and allow its continuation. Legislation ensures that sex work itself 
is legal, and that the sex industry is tolerated so long as it remains out of the public view 
and is strictly controlled. This contradictory stance presents a dilemma for the national 
government in the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. From a 
public health point of view, government officials recognise that those engaged in non-
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monogamous sexual intercourse without using condoms must be addressed in prevention 
efforts. However, this necessitates an automatic recognition of the sex industry, a 
tolerance of sex outside marriage, and acceptance of the widespread promotion of 
condoms and safe sex messages. This flies in the face of official government ideology as 
well as Islamic religious principles. These contradicting circumstances which at the same 
time favour and condemn the continuation of the sex industry are the backdrop against 
which the government must deliver HIV/AIDS prevention policies and activities.
3 .1  The construction o f ‘trad ition a l’ Indonesian sexuality
As part of the state’s attempt to maintain ideological legitimacy and unity of the nation, it 
aims to develop a national culture, including a common set of moral values. To create the 
perception of an Indonesian moral community, the state refers to what is vaguely termed 
‘traditional Indonesian’ values. It is impossible to define exactly what ‘traditional’ 
morals and cultural values are, except in opposition to what they are not: “the state ... 
[has] engaged in a vigorous and successful construction of ‘Indonesian’ values and 
traditions, defined in relation to a negatively-perceived ‘other’” (Foulcher 1990:302). 
These ‘other’ values are those which have been introduced from the West and which have 
accompanied economic development and modernisation. In countering these ‘other’ 
values, the state has developed an ideology of cultural and moral values justified by 
‘tradition’, or an ideal of ‘what it was like before modernisation’. These common morals 
rooted in ‘tradition’ are legitimated by the principles of the state doctrine of Pancasila. In 
particular, the first principle, belief in God (ketuhanan yang maha esa), recognises that 
the state is based on religious belief and that all Indonesians should believe in God. The 
state is a religious one, although not based on any one particular religion (Ramage 
1995:12). Religious tenets thus form the basis of the state’s ideological construction of 
morality. In terms of the construction of sexual morality, the state’s ideology appears to 
be influenced largely by the constructions of sexuality within the religious traditions of
48
Christianity and Islam, both influential in Indonesian history. A brief consideration of 
these is useful in the understanding of the present state ideology.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state constructions of 
sexuality in the Dutch East Indies were dominated by the Christian moral codes and 
Victorian attitudes predominant in Europe at the time. Sex outside the confines of a 
marital union was considered to be sinful and women were expected to be virtuous and 
'Madonna-like'. The Christian tradition equated women with Eve as a seducer, while 
expecting her to live up to the example of chastity set by the Virgin Mary (Truong 
1990:74). This established a dichotomy between the 'immoral' sexual prostitute and the 
'virtuous' mother/wife/virgin. A woman's socially significant role was defined as wife 
and mother, a role denied by the unnatural sexual intercourse of prostitutes, unnatural in 
that it was not performed with procreation as the desired outcome. Christian moral 
attitudes became the basis of the perceived roles of women, and the laws and regulations 
which controlled related issues, including marriage, and prostitution and concubinage.
Throughout the twentieth century, Islam has become increasingly dominant in 
Indonesian society. Islamic moral principles have been influential in the formation of the 
nation and the ideologies which now shape it. Islam was the basis of many nationalist 
movements in the early twentieth century, and became a unifying force during the fight 
for independence. Although Indonesian statesmen refused to set up an Islamic state at 
independence, and Muslim organisations later lost their right to formal political activity, 
Islam has continued to grow in influence in all arenas of society. As the predominant 
organised-religion in Indonesia, Islam has had a significant effect on state constructions 
of morality. Islamic Law, as laid down in the Qur'an and other Islamic texts, strictly and 
explicitly prohibits pre- and extra-marital sex. Marriage is basic to the formation of the 
family and has been hailed as 'a solemn covenant' (Sura 4:21 in Omran 1992:17). The 
ideal marriage partner should be chosen on the basis of their moral and religious character 
and their relationship based on the qualities of love (passion, friendship, companionship)
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and mercy (understanding, reconciliation, tolerance, forgiveness). The overall objective 
of marriage is tranquility (.sakan ) (Omran 1992). Sex is regarded as a powerful urge for 
both men and women, and men are urged to marry not simply for procreation, but also 
for sexual pleasure. The urge for sex is so great that it is thought that when men and 
women are alone together they cannot and will not resist temptation (Ayubi 1995:83-4). 
Women are segregated and urged to dress modestly, "...because she is regarded as a 
source of sexual provocation (seduction) and therefore of social disarray (sedition); the 
word fitna in Arabic has both meanings" (Ayubi 1995:84). Pre- and extra-marital sexual 
relations (zinah) are prohibited as laid down in several passages of the Qur'an, such as 
"And go not nigh to fornication; surely it is an indecency and evil is the way" (Sura 
17:32, translated by Shakir 1982; see also Suras 24:3; 25:68; 60:12; 30:21 from Akhmad 
and Rasyid 1992). Under Islamic Law, all sexual relations outside marriage are therefore 
considered adulterous and are punishable with one hundred lashes (Sura An-Nur:2).
While the Qur'an does not expressly indicate specific roles for women, Islamic
teachings are often refered to in justifying women’s place in the home and society. The
only female Muslim member of the Majelis of Muhammadiyah, the body which issues
statements on Islamic law, has found that:
most of the Islamic preachers and Islamic teachers say that the 
household affairs is really the responsibility of women....[but] 
this is a misconception in our society that women are always kept 
in the house because of Islamic teaching....This is our cultural 
perspective in seeing the role of women, actually (‘Indonesia’s 
Islam’ 1997).
A female Indonesian activist who focuses on women and Islam has found that ideas
about women’s places in Indonesian society have become increasingly conservative and
are being justified in terms of Islam:
Since I think, late 80s or early 90s when there is this growing 
tendency of neo-conservatism, people started to talk about the 
ideal of women being a good mother and stay at home and give 
up working outside the house. Second thing is things related to 
marriage and sex issues in which people or man started to talk 
about polygamy is acceptable because it’s in accordance with
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Islam....Then people started talking about women should not be 
in the leadership position. The religion says that it should be man 
who should be leaders, you know. All those things limit 
women’s position (‘Indonesia’s Islam’ 1997).
Therefore, while the Qur'an does not explicitly limit women to particular roles in 
Indonesian society, it is still interpreted and refered to in many cases to justify such roles. 
‘Muslim culture’ attributes women with roles which limit them to the home. Although no 
aspects of Islamic Law are codified in national law, Islamic teachings are still a strong 
indicator of community attitudes and actions. As a crucial component of the moral 
systems of many Indonesians, they are influential in state constructions of morality and 
sexuality.
3.1.1 The construction of female sexuality
Influenced by the religious traditions of both Christianity and Islam, the state ideology on
sexual morality has been constructed around a notion of a dichotomy between 'good'
women (wives and mothers) and 'bad' women (sex workers). The cultural ideal for
Indonesian women (and men) is to get married: ''it is a great misfortune for the woman to
remain unmarried. It is a disgrace as well" (Raden Adjeng Kartini 1964:154). In this
model, a 'good' woman is a virgin when married and should only have sex within her
marital union. Premarital pregnancy is shameful and a marriage will often be undertaken
to hide this indiscretion. The moral standards expected of women is high. Official
attitudes remain similar to those expressed at the beginning of the century by one of the
pioneers of the women's movement in Indonesia, Radan Adjeng Kartini:
Can anyone deny that the woman has a great role to play in 
shaping society morally? She is precisely the person for it; she 
can contribute much, if not most, to raising society's moral 
standards....It is the mother who first plants in a person’s heart 
the seeds of good and evil, which generally remains throughout 
one's whole life ('Geef den Javaan opvoeding!' 1974:86-7).
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The images of the sexual morality of the 'bad' woman is created primarily as an implied 
opposition to the life of the 'good' woman. Women who deviate from the 'good' path 
are immoral and cannot possibly be expected to "raise society's moral standards", since 
they have no morals of their own.
The state’s construction of sexual morality focuses particularly on the sexual 
behaviour of women in Indonesian society. This is presented through the construction of 
the proper gender roles of women. There is an emphasis on the ideal of wifehood and on 
women's duties as obedient wives and loyal citizens. In 1973, the Minister of Home 
Affairs announced a new strategy for development which, rather than making the process 
the sole responsibility of the state, would call upon all Indonesian citizens to participate. 
Married women were seen as being crucial to this. Women's participation in national 
development became law in 1974 (Undang-undoing No 5, Tahun 1974) and the 
legislation specified the links between the women's movement and all levels of the state 
administration (Sullivan 1991:63). In 1975, Sjaref Thajeb, Minister for Education and 
Culture, called "on women to increase their participation in modernization and 
development in those fields appropriate to their nature and biology" (Peranan Wanita 
Indonesia dalam Pembangunan 1975:41). Suryakusuma (1991) has termed this official 
discourse on women's sexuality State Ibuisme (see also, Katjasungkana 1992). Ibu, 
literally mother, has also been used as a term of respect for women in general, no matter 
what their marital status. The term has, however, been distorted into "the notion of 
women as mothers operating in the domestic sphere" (Suryakusuma 1994b:27). 
According to Suryakusuma (1994b:26), this "ideology of domesticity for women" has 
stripped the Indonesian women's movement of its political content. The overemphasis 
by the government on the traditional role of women has been criticised: "In their 
speeches, government officials keep reminding women time and again about their role in 
the family" which "often ... [gets] in the way of their ambition to pursue careers outside 
the home" (JP 7.1.95). In formulating its ideology, the government reinforces a
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'traditional' societal segregation of roles assumed to exist in Javanese society (White and 
Hastuti 1980:46). On the other hand, this ideology, having the force and support of the 
state behind it, has been accepted as 'updated' norms and values by villagers and city 
dwellers alike (Sullivan 1991:79).
Indonesian marriage laws legitimate the male and female roles in the marital 
union, supporting the ideals prescribed by the state. Before 1974, Muslim Indonesians 
(the majority) were subject to adat (customary) law or Islamic religious law, but after the 
ratification of the Undang-Undang No. 1/1974, marriage was finally codified into law. 
Not only did this restrict polygamy and arbitrary divorce, but it also specified the roles of 
men and women in marriage: "The husband is the head of the family and the wife is the 
mother of the household" (Article 31); "The husband shall have the responsibility of 
protecting his wife and provide her with all the necessities of life in a household in 
accordance with his capabilities" (Article 34(1)); "The wife shall have the responsibility 
of taking care of the household to the best of her ability" (Article 34(2)) (From Law of the 
Republic of Indonesia No 1 of the Year 1974 on Marriage Articles 30-34:19). Adultery 
is given as a reason for which either party may request a divorce. Although the marriage 
law does not provide strict precepts of morality, it does add weight to the family ideals 
portrayed by the government.
3.1.2 Female sexuality and the development plan
State-constructed ideals of sexual morality are evident in the basic philosophies of many 
of the state’s development programs. The implementation of development programs in 
Indonesia relies very much on the promotion of families as the 'smallest unit of 
development' and the roles of men and women in creating and maintaining these units. 
The government supports a very strict definition of the family and is very keen to 
maintain these as the ideal. In 1992, a law on the development of population and 
prosperous families recognised only married couples with or without children, or a
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widow or widower and child/children. Defacto couples with children and gay couples 
are not recognised as families (K 20.2.95). Prior to attending the 1994 population 
conference in Egypt, Haryono Suyono, the Minister of Population stated: "... [activists] 
want gay relationships and non-married couples to also be called families...but we'll do 
everything to ensure that only 'proper' family structures be maintained" (JP 29.6.94a). 
The government's ideal family is considered an important "bastion to filter the onslaught 
of alien values that are now penetrating into Indonesia as part of the rapid globilization 
process" (JP 30.6.94b). Keluarga Berencana - KB (the Family Planning Program), is an 
example of a government-initiated program which through its activities presents the 
state’s ideals of the roles of families in development. Implied in all of the propaganda of 
KB is that sex before marriage is against community norms, as the program is aimed 
strictly only at married couples. Others should not need contraception. While the first 
phase of the program was dedicated to producing small families, the second phase is 
aimed at making those families prosperous ones. It is called the "small, prosperous 
families as agents and beneficiaries of development" movement (JP 29.6.94b). It is 
obvious from this that the family is the ideal unit to participate in Indonesian social life. 
People not belonging to an ideal family unit can not contribute nor benefit from 
development.
The government has control over the construction and maintenance of particular 
ideals of women through its control of all organisations. Not only must all organisations 
pledge allegiance to the Pancasila, but many are also utilised by the government to 
promulgate its messages. Undoubtedly, no organisation will be able to successfully 
transmit its messages on a mass level without the approval of the government, so tight is 
its control over political, economic, and social aspects of society. An organisation used 
to transmit government ideology in this way is Pembinaan Kesedjahteraan Keluarga - 
PKK (The Applied Family Welfare Program). The PKK is a government program 
implemented through a govemment-affliated women’s organisation. The program
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specifies the 'proper' role for women in the development process and establishes an 
organisational framework within which this can occur. The main objective of the second 
five-year development plan (Repelita II, 1974-79) was to improve living standards and 
social welfare services. To do this, the government wished to integrate families into the 
development process by utilising women, who were seen as being the main players in the 
family unit. This objective was achieved by utilising women who led the formal 
women's organisations to propagandise and implement the government programs, such 
as the PKK and family planning. The primary role of the PKK is then to transmit the 
state ideology of the 'proper' role for women to the mass of ordinary women.
The close association of the PKK with the government maintains the direct control 
of the government over the activities of the PKK. Furthermore, the women involved in 
the organisation and running of the PKK obtain their positions by virtue of the position 
of their husband in the government hierarchy. For instance, the husband of the National 
Chairwoman of the PKK is the Minister of Home Affairs. This holds true all the way 
down to the village-level head of the PKK whose husband is the village head. This 
allows further government control of PKK activities. The women involved in running 
the organisation and its activities come from an elite group as they are the wives of 
government employees, professionals, religious leaders, intellectuals and other important 
men. While having a good understanding of the governments' wishes, they are perhaps 
more removed from the real needs of the women they are supposed to be serving 
(Sullivan 1991).
The PKK upholds the government ideology of women living in morally correct, 
heterosexual and monogamous families. The family is "the fundamental social 
institution, in which are formed the crucial roles, values, attitudes and behaviours on 
which fruitful development depends" (Sullivan 1991:64 from Kelompok Pelaksana PKK 
1977:1). The woman is considered the "critical central agent of the family" (Sullivan
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1991:64) and is attributed with Five Basic Duties (Ponca Dharma Wanita ) in that family 
unit (Pimpinan Daerah PERTIWI 1977:4 in Sullivan 1991:64):
1. as loyal backstop and supporter of her family
2. as caretaker of the household
3. as producer of future generations
4. as the family's prime socialiser
5. as Indonesian citizen
The PKK has, furthermore, itemised the specific areas in which "women could work 
most fruitfully to help modernize their nation" (Sullivan 1983:154). This is in accordance 
with the following Ten Point Formula (Kelompok Pelaksana PKK , 1977:5-7; Pimpinan 
Daerah PERTIWI 1977:4 in Sullivan 1991:68-9):
1. The creation of good relations within and between families.
2. Correct childcare.
3. The use of hygienic food preparation techniques and close 
attention to nutrition.
4. Care that clothing is suited to its proper functions - 
protection, morality, modesty.
5. Intelligent use of house space to meet needs of hygiene, 
privacy, entertainment, etc.
6. The securing of total family health - physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral.
7. Effective household budgeting.
8. Effective basic housekeeping, calculated to maximize order 
and cleanliness.
9. Preservation of emotional and physical security and a tranquil 
environment in the home.
10. Development of family attitudes appropriate to the 
modernization process and future planning.
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The activities of the PKK are all in line with the 10 point formula and include 
projects such as literacy classes, classes on the Pancasila, and training in handicrafts and 
cooking. The activities of the PKK teach skills which are an extension of the domestic 
activities of women. Any money-making activities are geared to supplementing the 
'main' incomes of their husbands (Wieringa 1992). At the local level, the official organ 
through which many PKK activities are carried out is the Lembaga Ketahanan 
MasyarakcU Desa, LKMD (The Institute for Village Resilience) (Wieringa 1992). 
Through the LKMD, the PKK is instrumental in the running of mother and child health 
programs through the posyandu (Köllmann and van Veggel 1996:97-98). All of the 
activities of the PKK are aimed at women, as it is considered to be her responsibility to 
maintain the household and to educate the children: the "children should be so guided that 
they can be mentally balanced and grow up with good personality and morality" 
(Moenadi 1971:6); and "if the household affairs are in order, members of the family 
would not like to stay away from home" (Moenadi 1971:13). The role for women 
specified under the PKK "puts an official stamp on the belief that women's place [sic] is 
in the home...not in the fields nor in any other influential sphere of economic activity" 
(Sullivan 1983:156).
Although not an explicit statement of the expected sexual morality of Indonesian 
women, the points of the PKK support the officially defined roles of women as good 
wives and mothers. The PKK, therefore, propagates the concept of 'ibuism', whereby 
the 'ibus' are "obedient and loyal, don't protest, and submit themselves to the authority 
of husbands and fathers, and ultimately of Bapak Pembangunan (Father of 
Development), President Suharto, himself" (Wieringa 1992:108). Women carry out their 
duties in accordance with the Kodrat Wanita (Women's Nature) whereby women are 
'"lemah lembuf (soft and weak), don't speak out loudly, and certainly not in their own 
interests, don't push their own interests against those of husbands and fathers, but are 
instead compliant wives and mothers and dutiful daughters" (Wieringa 1992:110). This
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presents an ideal of how women should be acting, and implies how they should not be 
acting. While the roles of women are very clearly laid out, the PKK pays less attention to 
the roles of men. Not much is said beyond: the husband's function is "to bear
responsibility for and protect the family, act as a responsible leader, give examples of 
good behaviour and earn a living for the family" (Moenadi 1971:5).
3.1.3 'Women lacking morals' - attitudes to sex workers
In contrast to the ideal woman, the prostitute is seen as both an immoral sinner and a non­
productive member of society. The very term wanita tuna susila (WTS-woman without 
morals) to refer to female sex workers indicates the perceived lack of moral fibre. A 
number of women's groups object to the use of either WTS or pelacuran (prostitute), and 
prefer the term pekerja seks (sex worker). This later term is rejected by officials as it 
implies a valid category of employment, meaning its presence would need to be publicly 
acknowledged. Others are 'shocked' by the expression 'sex worker' as the term "has a 
connotation of social legitimacy" (JP 17.12.96): "to give a respectful privilege to 
prostitution would only pollute the whole community" (JP 27.12.95). Some see female 
sex workers as pathologically deviant as opposed to their clients who are 'normal', just 
sexually promiscuous men. Kartono (1981:236-9 in Murray 1991) claims that women 
become sex workers because they are nymphomaniacs, have been deserted by their 
husbands, are too lazy to work, have no morals, or are just stupid. Other depictions of 
female sex workers show them to be pathetic and helpless and victims of circumstances 
beyond their control (Murray 1991).
The majority of women entering the sex industry seem to do so as the result of a 
conscious decision: "prostitution is an act of rational choice rather than slavery or 
pathology, offering lower-class women economic gains and freedom from social 
restraints" (Murray 1991:108). Public condemnation of their morality places these 
women in vulnerable situations against oppression from government agencies, the police,
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and other social groups. Streetwalkers, in particular, are targeted and removed from the 
streets for making the city 'unclean'. In a survey by the Municipal Social Office and the 
newspaper Pos Kota prominent community figures were questioned on what should be 
done about prostitution: "42 percent...asked the city administration to ban prostitution, 42 
percentage [sic] asked not to legalize it but handle it gradually and responsibly, 12 percent 
asked to legalize it and four percent asked not to handle it because it is difficult to 
eliminate" (JP 9.6.94).
The government demonstrates its public opposition to sex work and acts as the 
upholder of national morality by raiding and closing down illegal sex businesses and 
removing sex workers from public areas. Official figures boast of the success of the 
rehabilitation of sex workers. Such endeavours are made public in newspapers and the 
news in order to give the impression that the government is serious in its actions against 
the sex industry. There has been an intensification of the outward action against the sex 
industry possibly sparked by reaction to the discovery of HIV/AIDS and its perceived 
association with sex work. In Jakarta, for instance, the municipal administration has 
been cooperating with the Jakarta Police Force to step up campaigns against sex workers. 
In January 1995, it was reported that the city's peace and order office (Kamtib DKF), for 
instance, recruited and trained women for their municipal policing group, Polisi 
Pamongpradja, specifically for operations against sex workers and vagrants. There was 
also to be a 24 hour hotline to report complaints about disturbances of the peace or 
disruptions of public order (JP 23.1.95). Examples from the press of other moves made 
against the sex industry include the very public arrest and prosecution of the pimp 
Hartono Setyawan. His 'empire' was reportedly destroyed by the closing down of his 
'chain' of high-class brothels in Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya and Denpasar (JP 
27.7.94; 29.7.94; 3.8.94b). There has also been an increase in the numbers of raids on 
illegal brothels, gaming houses, and pornography producers. The Jakarta Post reported 
the shutting down of an illegal red light district in Kalijodo, "the latest anti-vice operation
59
conducted by the authorities against the city's mushrooming illegal brothels" (JP 
11.1.95). The structures were to be demolished without the owners receiving 
compensation and the operation was to be followed up by closing down any new brothels 
arising in the area. One of the leaders of the operation, North Jakarta Police Chief Lt. 
Col. Edi Damadi, furthermore warned that they would "arrest the men patron [sic] if they 
keep coming back" (ibid). Although no patrons had yet been arrested or detained, the 
172 sex workers working in the area had been rounded up and sent to the Cipayung 
rehabilitation centre and dozens of pimps had been put under house arrest and were 
required to report to the police of their whereabouts. This operation is simply an example 
of those that occur regularly to 'clean up' the city of the illegal trade in an "effort to 
protect the younger generation from moral degradation" (JP 3.8.94a). Meanwhile the 
legitimate (and many illegitimate) brothels are allowed to continue operating.
The government further justifies its success as a moral protector by boasting of 
the numbers of women who have been rehabilitated. The official brothel complex at 
Kramat Tunggak reportedly sent 11,624 sex workers (an average of 600 per year) back 
to 'normal life' between 1972 and March 1993: 2,795 into marriage; 6,229 to their 
families; and 1,420 to jobs (JP 21.4.93). Another success of the Ministry of Social 
Services in rehabilitating sex workers is reported in a 1994 article in the Jakarta Post. 
One thousand female sex workers were trained with skills such as sewing, cooking and 
handicrafts, to enable them to make a 'decent' living. (JP 22.8.94). These raids and 
attempts at rehabilitation portrayed in the media display to Indonesians the government's 
public commitment to promote moral integrity to its citizens.
3 .2  'B ehind c losed  doors' - tacit acceptance o f the sex industry
Although the occasional show of a 'crack-down' on the sex industry is performed and 
highly publicised, the reality is that so long as sexual transgression occurs 'behind closed 
doors', the government continues to turn a blind eye to it. The government’s public
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condemnation of the sex industry contradicts the position which it continues to hold in 
society. The ideal sexualities portrayed by the government elite through its programs, 
contrasts directly with the double standard tolerated by the same official institutions with 
regard to men’s sexual behaviour. While the state places great emphasis on the proper 
roles and moral behaviours of women, much less attention is given to men. Although the 
ideal professes otherwise, it is expected that men, married or not, should have access to 
sex workers, so long as this practice remains hidden from the public view.
Sex carries social prestige for men and sex outside marriage is considered a man's 
prerogative. Male sexual prowess is indicative of his virility: "potency is the grounds for 
the possession or loss of political authority, sexual capacity..." and a man "must watch 
out for the impression of his potency" (Keeler 1987:41). A 1952 pamphlet 'Sesalan 
kawin, rusak keluarga dan sengsara dunia', is an exposition on the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases, mainly aimed at men. On the one hand, the author states that "good 
men do not sleep around", and yet at the same time he recognises that they will. Men are 
encouraged to have an examination for STDs before marrying as they are often unaware 
that they are infected. "If infected, they should have the moral fibre to postpone the 
marriage" since there is "nothing more pitiful for a young girl than to get the pox on her 
wedding night" (Sutomo 1952:35,3). Women are then the victims of male sexual 
desires, which although immoral are accepted as 'normal'. The implication is that a 
'good' woman, ie a non-sex worker, can only get a STD through her husband, not by 
any sexual indiscretion of her own. Furthermore, women are responsible for the 
morality of men as Sutomo (1952:16-17) claims that "good wives can keep their men 
away from temptation" and "a housewife must educate her sons well, especially against 
sex before marriage and prostitutes".
Therefore, although Indonesian men should ideally remain faithful to their wives, 
in reality this is not necessarily expected by either men or women. Wives, in fact, may 
consider their husbands visiting sex workers to be a better option than a mistress or a
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second wife, who are both more financially draining. Although wives will attempt to 
prevent their husbands from straying, many accept that men are "permitted to visit 
prostitutes, but shouldn't bring the 'goat' home" (biar jajan asal jangan bawa kambing 
pulang) (Murray 1993:3). Keeler writes in Javanese shadow plavs. Javanese selves 
(1987:53):
A woman's fidelity is much stressed, but a man need only be 
reasonably discreet in his extramarital dalliances. Women are 
sometimes deeply hurt by their husband's infidelities. Yet 
although women in such circumstances may gamer pity, their 
husbands earn little censure. It is considered preferable that he 
go to prostitutes rather than have a mistress, since the financial 
drain is likely to prove much greater in the latter case. It is my 
impression, though, that few men have long-term extramarital 
affairs, preferring the occasional time with a prostitute or perhaps 
a quick visit to some women in the area known to be free with 
her favors. That men and women often look for relatively little 
emotional commitment from each other may account both for this 
casual attitude toward men's extramarital sex, which is seen more 
as a threat to the household economy than to the couple's 
emotional satisfaction, and for the unlikelihood of such activity 
leading to long-term affairs.
It appears to be accepted that men can not abstain and must visit sex workers to fulfill
their desires. For instance, a man may visit a sex worker in the period following the birth
of a child when the couple must abstain from sexual intercourse, otherwise the baby will
become weak and sick from the mixture of milk and semen. Again in Keeler (1987:59):
Many people, especially older people (of both sexes), stress that 
a man should go to prostitutes for a year or so after his wife has 
given birth, and that a woman should accept his doing so, 
because this is better for the baby than conjugal sex.
Therefore, "jw]hile social values and norms do not promote sexual activity outside of 
marriage, it is accepted as 'normal'", at least for men (The Australian 21.1.94). While 
moral standards of 'good' and 'bad' are used to categorise women, men are only limited 
by how much they can afford to pay for sexual services (Murray 1991:105). While the 
sexual activities of clients of sex workers may be subject to public commentary and 
condemnation, clients are nonetheless not openly victimised and controlled as sex
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workers are. So long as their sexual exploits are kept private and hidden, wives and 
society in general turn a blind eye.
3.2.1 National Laws which support sex work
Men's entitlement to sexual relations outside marriage is indirectly supported by national 
laws under which the commercial sex act is legal. There is no law against the sale of 
sexual services per se, but articles 296, 297 and 506 of the Criminal code prohibit those 
who assist in providing them, including pimps, madams and those who trade in women 
and children. The relevant articles read as follows (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull 
1995:10-11):
Article 296: "Those whose actions or attitudes intentionally lead 
to or facilitate illegal sexual activities with other people will be 
given a penalty of one year and four months imprisonment or a 
fine of Rp. 15,000";
Article 297: "Trade in women or in under-age males will incur a 
maximum penalty of six years imprisonment";
Article 506: "Whoever as a mucikari ('souteneur' [pimp])
derives profit from the prostitution of women, will incur a 
maximum penalty of three months imprisonment".
By ensuring that the commercial sex act itself is not criminal and that clients will not be 
prosecuted, the government effectively supports the continuation of the sex industry. 
Furthermore, other laws which cover sexual liaisons outside marriage, are difficult to 
enforce due to their broadness. Articles 284-288 of the criminal code make adultery 
(linah) illegal and punishable by up to nine months in prison. These articles of law could 
theoretically be applied in cases of sexual relations between a man and a sex worker. 
However, the charge of zinah can only be made against a married person, and it would 
have to be established that the sex worker knew that the client was married. In addition, 
the charge would have to involve a formal complaint by the client's wife, including 
evidence that a breakdown of the marriage was occurring as a result of adultery. Due to 
the clandestine nature of most sex transactions, and the "tacit acceptance by many women
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of the perceived 'misdemeanours' of their husbands", these articles are rarely used to 
prosecute sex workers (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:12).
3.2.2 Regulating the sex industry: protecting public order and the public’s health
While the commercial sex act is not illegal, sex workers who work on the streets are 
subject to being picked up by the police under local government ordinances which 
prohibit soliciting and loitering in the streets because this makes the cities 'unclean'. 
They are picked up for violating public order rather than for selling sexual services; the 
issue is less a question of protecting public morality, but of maintaining a "clean and 
authorative government" (Suryakusuma 1994a: 18). These women are displaced from the 
streets and may be taken for 'rehabilitation' to a special centre: either a Panti Rehabilitasi 
Wanita (PRW) managed by the Directorate General for Social Rehabilitation of the 
national Department of Social Affairs; or a brothel complex, Lokalisasi Wanita Tuna 
Susila , run by the local government.
Rehabilitation at at Panti Rehabilitasi Wanita (PRW) is a serious and moralistic 
endeavor. The women who enter this program are rounded up from the streets, illegal 
brothels or hotels and are then strongly encouraged to join the program if they genuinely 
want to leave the sex industry. The program includes: practical elementary skills such as 
reading and writing; lectures of social norms and values; religious education; basic skills 
or trades training such as hair-dressing, sewing, home industries and secretarial work; 
self-confidence lectures and lectures on the commitment to leave the sex industry (Jones, 
Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:20). This program has limited success, since many 
women return to the industry. A 1994 article in the Jakarta Post (22.8.94), reported that 
only 30% of a targeted 1000 prostitutes left the profession, and some did not leave 
permanently, resuming when they were in financial strife.
Sex workers can also be forced to relocate to Lokalisasi Wanita Tuna Susila, 
official brothel complexes where they are registered and can be more easily regulated.
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Although these complexes are designed to 'rehabilitate', the women are still practicing 
their trade at the same time and so it is doubtful that this actually has any impact on the 
women to give up sex work. Lokalisasi come under the auspices of the Dinas Sosial, the 
Municipal Social Welfare Office. They are set up through city or provincial regulations, 
and are regulated and managed by a Regional Executive Council (MUSPIDA 
-Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah) consisting of regional administrators, and the local 
prosecutor, police chief and military commander. The local government authority controls 
the use of buildings and the permits for their use. In an apparent contradiction to the 
national criminal laws, these lokalisasi have officially approved mucikari (pimps) who are 
able to work unharrassed and do not have to pay the heavy random payments to the 
authorities required if they worked outside the official complexes (Jones, Sulistyaningsih 
and Hull 1995:13-18). Unofficial brothel complexes, which do not have a link with the 
social welfare rehabilitation efforts, also have the tacit approval of the local officials, so 
long as there is some benefit to themselves. Likewise, call girls, hotel sex workers and 
other high-class sex workers are generally untouched by official regulations or authority. 
It is in the interests of the government, the military and businessmen to keep the sex 
industry going, as it plays a substantial role in the Indonesian economy and in providing 
the government with revenue. Hadiz, Aripumami and Sabaroedin (1992) report on an 
InfoBank study which calculated an income of Rp 251.8 billion per year from the sex 
industry. This figure was based on 1988-89 data on officially registered sex workers, 
and did not include the income earned by others as a result of their activities. When this 
is taken into account, Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull (1995) estimate that (according to 
1993 figures) the annual turnover of Indonesia’s sex industry is in a range between Rp 
2537 billion and Rp 7095 billion. This accounts for between 0.8% and 2.4% of 
Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:47-48, 78). 
This amount of economic activity is too valuable to local governments for them to 
seriously agree to get rid of the sex industry: "The actual situation in the city is that
65
prostitution is accepted by everyone: police, clerks and lawyers. Arrest and prosecution 
are purely gestures that have to be made to keep up the facade of public morality" (Millet 
1975 in Hadiz, Aripurnami and Sabaroedin 1992:2).
Other government regulations attempt to control the sex industry by limiting the 
movements of sex workers between and within the brothel complexes and various 
regions of Indonesia. These are mainly in the form of local government statutes enforced 
by the local police force. Soliciting is prohibited and sex workers and pimps who work 
outside the lokalisasi risk the danger of being harassed and picked up by the police. 
Other regulations which control migration and rules which require the reporting of 
residence changes attempt to hamper the movements of sex workers from one lokalisasi 
or one region to another. Nevertheless, many female sex workers manage to overcome 
these limitations to move frequently between different towns and localities, to and from 
transmigration sites, and between rural and urban areas. Many women will simply 
change their names and move from one lokalisasi to another when their five year 
maximum period is over (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:13-17).
In addition to preserving public order, lokalisasi provide centralised locations for 
implementing public health programs to control the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases. Sex workers are considered to be the sources of STD infections for the rest of 
the population and so are the focus of STD health programs including, STD prevention 
and condom promotion. One such program was the Regular Mass Treatment Program 
(RMT) implemented in 1957 and administered by the Ministry of Health. In addition to 
undergoing medical checkups for infection, this required registered sex workers to 
receive compulsory regular penicillin injections. The weekly injections of penicillin were 
given regardless of whether or not the sex workers were found to be infected with STDs. 
These injections consisted of 2ml of penicillin aluminium monostearate (PAM) which 
aimed to maintain constant elevated penicillin blood levels so that the recipients would 
remain resistant to the treponema causing syphilis (Soewarso 1988:4-5). The success of
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the RMT program was limited. In 1959, 3848 inoculations were given to sex workers in 
13 towns throughout Java, and in 1963, 243,141 inoculations were given in 33 towns. 
According to Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull (1995), this later figure only implies about 
4,675 women (assuming weekly injections) (Jones, Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:22). 
In 1967, the PAM dose was raised to 3ml when it was discovered that many women 
were missing their injections. After the establishment of lokalisasi in the 1960s and 
1970s, the supervision of medical checkups and regular injections was formalised as the 
women were more easily controlled. The large number of female sex workers who 
worked outside the lokalisasi were neglected in this medical program. A 1972 study of 
the Bandung sex industry showed that 90% of the women picked up in raids had never 
been examined by a doctor or received a penicillin injection under the RMT program. 
Similarly, only 4,000 of 6,000 female sex workers in Surabaya and 2,000 of 12,000 in 
Jakarta had received regular medical examinations and treatments (Susilo 1972).
In 1987, the RMT program was halted due to budgetary constraints, and 
responsibility for the funding and implementation of the injection program and checkups 
was given to local governments. The quality of the program has since declined. Sex 
workers in areas which have stopped or limited government-funded services are 
encouraged or required to see private doctors by brothel managers. Local regulations 
imposed by subdistrict administrations are still in place to encourage routine medical 
check ups and injections from health personnel at the local health authority. The success 
of these regulations in getting sex workers to visit doctors is unknown (Jones, 
Sulistyaningsih and Hull 1995:22-3). In 1993, a Jakarta Post article (21.4.93) reported 
that at the lokalisasi Kramat Tunggak, both sex workers and their pimps underwent 
regular medical checkups. Of the 1669 sex workers and 215 pimps, between 900 and 
1200 received injections for STDs each month. The value of these penicillin injections is 
questionable since they appear to be given irregularly and provide no protection against 
penicillin-resistant strains of syphilis and gonorrhea or against viral STDs, such as herpes
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and HIV. In addition, sex workers are often able to avoid regulations designed to control 
them and so avoid the regular medical examinations which are intended to protect both 
their health and the public’s health.
3 .3  HIV/AIDS and the state construction of immorality
It is within the framework of the state’s ideology of sexuality that HIV/AIDS has become 
associated with immorality. The perception of the arrival of HIV/AIDS as a result of the 
infiltration of the ‘other’ (Western) set of morals is still dominant in Indonesia today, 
despite an attempt to take a public health approach to HIV/AIDS prevention. This theme 
of the ‘other’ has been apparent throughout the first (official) ten years of HIV/AIDS in 
Indonesia. Only people belonging to particular nationalities, sexualities, or occupations 
have been labelled as being at high risk of becoming infected with HIV/AIDS. Blame 
and stigma have been associated with foreigners, gay men, and sex workers who are 
perceived as followers of this ‘other’ set of morals in Indonesia.
Prior to the discovery of HIV/AIDS in Indonesia in 1987, there was widespread 
denial that Indonesians should be concerned about the spread of the disease in their 
nation, as it was thought that "the nation's cultural mores and religious traditions [would] 
contain the spread of the disease and [would] quarantine the population at large" (The 
Australian 2 1.1.94 1994). In 1985, Dr Arjatmo of the University of Indonesia suggested 
that Indonesians may even be protected from AIDS by genetic factors (Murray 1993:3). 
AIDS was seen as a Western disease, affecting those behaving immorally. This image 
was reinforced by the fact that HIV/AIDS was first detected in Indonesia among 
foreigners, and among Indonesian men who were thought to have contracted the disease 
abroad or through foreigners in Indonesia. This was further reinforced by the general 
impression of Western life as decadent, producing members of society who are loose and 
immoral. In the context of HIV/AIDS, being foreign was also linked to homosexuality, 
already itself considered immoral. Not only were the first official cases of HIV among
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homosexual foreigners, but the image of HIV infection in the West was primarily 
homosexual disease. In late 1983, the Health Minister Soewardjono suggested that the 
best way to prevent AIDS was not to become homosexual and to be wary of Western 
tourists (Murray 1993:3). The association of HIV with foreign tourists was further 
drawn from the perceived experiences of other Asian countries, such as Thailand, where 
male tourists were commonly depicted as being at risk. Many of these men would then 
travel to Indonesia, particularly Bali, thus spreading the disease. The perceived threat of 
HIV from foreigners led to the suggestion by the Department of Immigration in 1992 of 
the introduction of 'Free of AIDS' cards for Indonesian residents (JP 29.11.95b). As 
recently as November 1995, the Chairman of the East Java branch of the Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia called on authorities to screen foreign tourists and issue them with 'AIDS free' 
certificates: "This is a necessary step, because AIDS first entered Indonesia through 
tourism areas....[I]f we want to protect the nation from AIDS and HIV, then this tight 
screening procedure has to be conducted" (JP 30.11.95). Perceptions of the immorality 
of foreigners has thus led to concerns over STD-infected expatriates and, in particular, 
tourists from the West.
These attitudes led initially to irrational fears of the repercussions of sex with 
foreigners. As a result of the discovery of four HIV-positive cases among sex workers 
and banci in Surabaya, there was general panic and an immediate response to ban 
foreigners from the prostitution complexes. This ban did not, however, apply to non- 
Westem foreigners. Studies of male and female sex workers in Bali have shown that 
they see themselves at increased risk for acquiring HIV if they have frequent sex with 
tourists. Limiting their clients to Indonesians or non-Westem tourists is seen as a 
legitimate method of protection (Ford, Wirawan and Fajans 1993:196; Wirawan, Fajans 
and Ford 1993:295).
The spread of the infection to include sex workers has led to the inclusion of 
female sex workers in the negative associations of HIV/AIDS with immoral sexual
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behaviour. As a result, the public impression is that only sex workers and gay men 
should be concerned with HIV/AIDS. Articles on HIV/AIDS in newspapers and 
magazines have focussed on the infection among sex workers and band. A particularly 
harsh commentary was given in an article from Sinar Pagi (14.1.92; translation taken 
from Sciortino 1994:63):
The people most exposed to and most responsible for the spread 
of sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS are prostitutes, both 
those operating in recognized brothels as well as those who are 
common housewives and students. In other words, all women 
who have sexual relationships with men who are not their 
spouses. These women have sex with all kinds of men. 
Consequently, the risk they will spread AIDS is very high.
When we examine the practice of prostitution closely, we must 
conclude that it is dirty and amoral. It is an act which is cursed 
by all religions. There is no doubt that it is a serious sin.
However, those possessed by passion do not care about what is 
forbidden by religion. Especially prostitutes tend to forget this.
They think that what they are doing is just a job that can provide 
quite some profit....The fact that it has been estimated that there 
are already 2500 Indonesians suffering from AIDS does not seem 
to intimidate these women. They are not prevented from 
becoming prostitutes to satisfy the men's passion.
Such comments attribute female sex workers (and indeed all women who have sex 
outside marriage) with blame for spreading HIV, while virtually ignoring the role of their 
clients. There is no mention of the 'sin' of the client who is equally capable of forgetting 
that what he is doing is a sin. As reflected in these attitudes, some people see efforts to 
protect prostitutes, band , and gay men from HIV as a waste of funds, since they have 
sinned anyway and so deserve to contract the disease (Aznam 1992:30). Rather than 
supporting and counseling those infected with HIV or coping with AIDS, many have 
called for the surveillance and quarantining of these people17. Many do not realise that 
"[q]uite a number of people who spread AIDS [are] young adults, even senior high 
school students from average middle class families" (JP 18.12.96). In Jakarta, those 
infected come from "broad based "normal"" professions, "data [which] contradicts the
17 This attitude is not, however, supported in the National AIDS Strategy which promotes dignity and 
self-respect for those affected, as well as appropriate counselling and care without discrimination.
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commonly held myth of HIV/AIDS as the kutukan, or curse, for morally "deviant" 
people such as commercial sex workers and homosexuals" (Dharmaputra, Ariawan and 
Iskandar 1996:33). Many of those infected are seen as sinners who deserve to have 
contracted such a disease; it is a case of "enjoyment bringing suffering" (K 26.11.95a).
While the official strategy presents HIV/AIDS as a public health concern, a 
terminal illness which requires urgent attention, the connection between HIV/AIDS and 
sex workers and gay men remains in the government rhetoric. A measure of blame is still 
subtly attributed to them. The simple fact that the majority of studies are on female sex 
workers and that as a result most published studies in the newspapers focus on female 
sex workers, reinforce the general impression that they are most at risk and that they are 
responsible for the spread of STDs. In addition, condom promotion is limited to people 
who have been labelled by the state as belonging to a 'high risk group'. This is used to 
refer to sex workers, gay men, military personnel, truck drivers, and labourers whose 
profession or sexual identity is perceived to place them at higher risk of contracting HIV 
than other people. The label of ‘high risk group’ overlooks the association between HIV 
transmission and individual sexual behaviour. People who do not identify as a member 
of one of these so called 'high risk groups' can feel immune and reject safe sex practices, 
even if they are in fact engaging in high risk behaviours. While targeting people in high 
risk situations with HIV/AIDS prevention programs is considered to be sound public 
health practice, exclusive focus on this as a strategy neglects others who are equally at 
risk. All people involved in serial monogamy without using condoms are at risk, 
irrelevant of their sexuality or whether the sex act is paid for or not. Sex workers, 
condoms and HIV/AIDS are all incorporated into the state’s construction of immorality. 
It is in this context that the state can justify targeting kondomisasi efforts to sex workers, 
but not to the ‘general’ population. This perspective corresponds with that held by the 
Islamic community, whose influence on HIV/AIDS prevention in Indonesia will be 
considered next.
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Chapter Four
The grow ing authority of Islam  over sexuality
State ideological notions of male and female sexuality are paralleled by the teachings of 
Islam, which consider the family, and the roles of men and women within this family, as 
crucial to upholding a moral society. Pre- and extra- marital sex are sinful and punishable 
under Islamic Law as they disrupt society. Islamic texts place an emphasis on sex, the 
family and social morals, and not on matters such as politics. It is a social religion which 
"seeks to organize the practices of social life and, above all, the minute details of family 
life" (Ayubi 1995:81). Parents train their children in social, cultural and moral aspects of 
life: "Parents are responsible for instilling in their children the religious beliefs of Islam. 
They are also to train them for prayer, fasting, honesty and avoidance of evil practices 
such as alcohol, drug abuse, and sexual promiscuity" (Omran 1992:35-6).
Islam is not a private and individualistic religion, but rather "stresses above all the 
collective enforcement of public morals" (Ayubi 1995:81). All Muslims are expected to 
take a stand to enforce good and prohibit evil. Public and official condemnation and 
prosecution of immoral acts reinforces their prohibition to the religious community. 
While the Qur'an, Hadith and fiqh  (Islamic jurisprudence) are sources of Islamic morals, 
the transmission of these to Indonesian Muslims occurs through the ulama (religious 
leaders or teachers) who because of their status and position can potentially determine the 
attitudes and behaviour of the community. Religious texts, written in Arabic, thus 
become accessible to the umat, community of believers. The authoritative interpretation 
of these texts is determined and transmitted by these ulama, as individuals or as 
collectives in Islamic organisations. Religious instructions and fatwa (rulings on 
religious matters) are conveyed to the umat (community of believers) through sermons 
(pengajian or dakwah), through education, particularly at pesantren and madrasah
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(Islamic religious schools), and through the publicly expressed attitudes of ulama 
(religious teachers and leaders) and other prominent Muslims. In the context of the 
religious revival, more and more Indonesians are turning to these Islamic leaders, 
teachers and organisations for guidance on moral issues, such as sexuality. Of increasing 
influence are the fundamentalist Islamic movements which are attracting Muslims who are 
disatisfied with modem life. An examination of the growing influence of Islam over the 
construction of sexual morals, and the process of the transmission of these ideals to the 
umat is important to the understanding of Islam's influence over HIV/AIDS prevention 
policy in Indonesia.
4 .1  Islam ic revival in Indonesia
The revival of religiousness in Indonesia since the early 1980s has been perceptible not 
only among Muslims, but also among Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists. In addition, 
numerous groups based on mysticism and inner peity have arisen and are thriving in the 
context of modernisation. The kebatinan movement is a mystical movement with 
Javanese-Hinduistic characteristics, although there is often some use of Islamic 
terminology (Boland 1982:217). This type of mysticism has a strong historical basis in 
pre-Islamic Java. Such mystical movements form the basis of aliran kepercayaan, “creed 
without religious affliation”, which is an offically recognised religious category under the 
Pancasila (Wahid 1986:84).
The increased importance of Islam in the lives of both rural and urban Indonesians 
is clearly evident from the large numbers of new mosques, prayer houses and Islamic 
schools, as well as the flourishing Islamic organisations (Kiem 1993)18. Islamic content 
on television has increased considerably as has the number of magazines and publications 
with specifically Islamic audiences. Magazines carry stories, fashion articles and
18 According to Noer (1991:23), Indonesia has 154,000 mosques, 365,000 prayer houses and 46,000 
mushalla.
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commentaries on issues of concern to the Islamic community. In addition, more and 
more women, particularly young women, are wearing jilbdb (the veil) (Mulder 1993:190; 
Masri Singarimbun, pers comm).
Tamara (1986) identifies two new types of Muslims who have been most affected 
by this recent revival: the urban poor; and young urban middle and upper classes. 
Raillon (1985 in Tamara 1986:4-5) refers to the new group of urban poor Muslims as 
followers of ‘pop Islam’. He uses the term ‘pop Islam’ as many of these Muslims were 
fans of Rhoma Irama, the ‘king of pop music’, who utilises verses from the Qu'ran and 
Hadith in his music and films. He is refered to as, the ‘satria dakwah ’ (champion of the 
Islamic faith), and ‘rajadari bawah ’ (king of the lower classes). These followers of ‘pop 
Islam’ have only recently renewed their devotion and have returned to Islam because of 
concerns with socio-economic changes, the infiltration of foreign values, and the comfort 
they find in solidarity with fellow Muslims. Tamara (1986) elaborates on the 
characteristics of this largely poor urban religious ‘type’. It is likely that historically, 
‘pop Muslims’ came from the more devout, central and wealthy areas of Indonesia where 
they owned and ran small businesses. They were pushed out of these businesses by the 
new bourgeoisie and made their ways to the cities where they now work largely in the 
informal sector. Rhoma Irama appeals to them not so much because of his religious 
messages, but also because of the concern in his lyrics for the poor and oppressed 
(Tamara 1986:4-5).
A second group of Muslims to emerge in this revival has been among urbanised 
young men and women who come from well-off backgrounds. Their families may still 
have strong connections with traditional culture but little interest in Islam. Seeking a 
solution to their feelings of social alienation, these young Muslims have begun to attend 
variouspengajian at the city’s mosques. In addition, many of these young Muslims are 
attracted by the new pesantren movements throughout Java (Tamara 1986:5).
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In the Islamic revival, there has been a renewed intensity in the transmission of 
religious instruction and an increased desire to heed these teachings. The dakwah 
(missionary) movement has been revitalised to spread the word of Islam and to call 
Muslims back to the faith. There has been renewed interest in the pesantren (religious 
boarding school) tradition, particularly those pesantren which present Islamic teachings in 
the contemporary context of the troubles accompanying modem life. In addition, the 
mass Islamic organisations of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have continued to 
attract a large following and to provide guidance to the umat (community of believers) on 
religious matters through their many institutions dedicated to social welfare, education 
and health. There have also arisen, what Abdurrahman Wahid has called, “neo-orthodoxy 
groups”, which have “splintered” from Islam, including mystical orders or institutions 
with Sufi tendencies (Wahid 1986:94-95).
4.1.1 The Dakwah movement
Dakwah refers to the 'call' or 'invitation' by God and the prophets to believe in Islam and 
has been referred to as 'Islamic propaganda' or 'Islamic Mission' (Boland 1982:190). It 
is a form of missionary activity which is spreading rapidly throughout Indonesia and in 
the modem context aims not only to convert non-Muslims, but also to make people into 
better Muslims (Kiem 1993:108); it aims to “teach the people who want to be called 
Muslims what it means to be Muslim” (Boland 1982:191). In the view of many 
commentators on Islam in Indonesia, the spread of dakwah is the most tangible proof of 
an Islamic resurgence (Kiem 1993:107). Dakwah is key to the promotion of Islam in 
Indonesia and to the clarification of Islamic teachings. Originally, dakwah occurred 
primarily through sermons (khotbah) before Friday prayer, but there are now other forms 
of modem expression, such as through pamphlets, the media, television, books, films 
and the internet. However, dakwah occurs not only through preaching and publications, 
but also by deeds and activities; it also refers to “bringing about what is good and fighting
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what is wrong” (Sanusi 1964:8 in Boland 1982:193). It is “a comprehensive 
Islamization of society” in order to develop and improve it (Boland 1982:193).
While all Islamic organisations are involved in dakwah to some extent, an 
organisation dedicated to it is the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII - Indonesian 
Islamic Dakwah Council). Established in 1967, the DDII seeks to counteract the 
missionary efforts of Christians in several Indonesian provinces and also to curb the 
spread of kebatinan (Javanese mysticism). The program of the DDII as expressed by its 
founding leader, Muhammad Natsir, includes developing methods and techniques for 
more effective dakwah, raising the level of education at pesantren and madrasah through 
close cooperation with these institutitions, and stimulating close cooperation between all 
Muslims and Islamic organisations (Boland 1982:194). Part of its activities, therefore, 
include providing books to Islamic schools, training missionaries, offering scholarships 
and organising education conferences (Noer 1991). An additional aim of the DDII is to 
intensify the tangible contributions of dakwah to socio-economic issues (in particular the 
relief of poverty). A just Islamic society can only be fully realised through the promotion 
of equitable socio-economic development.
A key figure in the dakwah movement has been Rhoma Irama, the 'satria dakwah'
(Champion of Islamic faith), who, as already mentioned, has been influential in the
revival of Islam among the urban poor, the ‘pop Muslims'. His dangdut style songs
reject consumerism, secularism and materialism. He instead embraces the moral values
of Islam and uses verses of the Qur'an in many of his song lyrics (Noer 1991). He has
also made popular dakwah films with songs and storylines which "put across the
intertwined themes of love, personal success, and the defense of proper social and moral
values" (Frederick 1982). The following is an example of the lyrics of his dakwah music
(Frederick 1982:121; translation in Frederick 1982):
Why oh why is alcohol forbidden 
Because oh because it destroys the mind 
Why oh why is adultery forbidden 
Because oh because only animals do that
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Why oh why is everything pleasurable forbidden 
Why is everything that's fun prohibited...
Ah, ah, ah that's the trap the Devil sets 
With all kinds of tempting baits, hey, hey, hey
He attracts many fans from the 'ordinary people' as many of his lyrics reflect social
injustice and the lives of the poor and oppressed. Although not a political figure, he has
exerted his influence as an entertainer to urge Muslims to vote for the Islamic party, the
PPP, in national elections 19. He claims to have at least 15 million loyal fans and so has
an extensive audience for the spread of Islamic messages (Tamara 1986).
Another method of spreading the word of Islam is through the traditional non- 
formal education of pengajian. This involves a group of people gathering in an informal 
setting to discuss everyday problems in an Islamic context. It is led by a knowledgeable 
Muslim specially trained for the purpose or a renowned kyai/ulama (Islamic 
teacher/leader) and is held regularly in a private house, prayer house, mosque or public 
building (Nakamura 1980). The Muhammadiyah organisation has sought to restructure 
the pengajian to be more accessible to ordinary Muslims by making it more relevant to 
their lives and by presenting it in Bahasa Indonesia rather than in Arabic (Kiem 1993).
4.1.2 Non-govemment Islamic Organisations
The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (MUH) are the two largest non- 
govemment Islamic organisations in terms of numbers of followers and branches 
throughout Indonesia. The authority which these non-govemment Islamic organisations 
in Indonesia hold over Muslims places them in a powerful position to influence the 
construction of sexual morality in the Islamic community. Both organisations have their 
own schools, universities, mosques, hospitals, clinics, orphanages, and praying houses 
(pengajian). Effectively shut out of formal Indonesian politics, their activities have been
19 In the run up to the 1997 elections, however, PPP supporters began to see him as a 'traitor' and 
'defector' as he was distancing himself from the Islamic party (PPP) and was instead actively campaigning 
for the ruling Golkar group. In April 1997, the stage he was to have performed on at Pekalongan to 
campaign for Golkar was tom down and rioting took place in the town against the government ( ‘Indian 
Pacific' 6.5.97).
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mainly directed towards social welfare, education and family planning (Center for Health 
Research 1996). They are well-organised groups with extensive networks throughout 
the nation, and they are very influential within certain Islamic circles. The heads of these 
organisations are extremely prominent religious and social leaders: Abdurrahman Wahid 
of NU, and Amien Rais of MUH. The support of these organisations and their leaders is 
crucial to the success of HIV/AIDS prevention efforts as their opinions on moral issues 
are central to the debates surrounding HIV/AIDS prevention.
Nahdlatul Ulama
The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) - literally "revival of ulama" - was founded in January 1926. 
It is a traditionalist organisation which aims to maintain the teachings of Ahlussunnah-wal 
Jamaah, one of the four Islamic schools of jurisprudence20. In 1952, the NU became 
involved in politics and changed its name to Partai NU  (Dharmaputra 1996:7). It became 
incorporated into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP - Party for Unity and 
Development) in 1972, when the government forced the amalgamation of all Muslim 
parties into a single bloc (McVey 1989). In 1984, the NU left the PPP and declared that 
its members could feel free to chose their own political allegiances. The NU began 
concentrating its efforts solely on its social, educational and religious functions (Fealy 
1995). Although the advisory (Mustasyar), religious (Syuriah), and executive 
(Tandfidziah) bodies of the NU are located in Jakarta, near the seat of government
20 There are two schools of Islamic thought in Indonesia: the traditionalists and the
modemists/reformists. Although there are no fundamental differences in basic theology between the two, 
there are differences in soal-soalfiiru' (the details of Islamic teachings) (Dhofier 1980). Both adhere to the 
practices of shalat (ritual prayer five times daily), wirid (recitation of Qur’anic passages), do'a (prayer), 
i'tikaf (conviction), zakat (alms), shaum (fasting), and hajj (pilgrimage). The modernists take only the 
Qur'an and Hadith as valid references and support idjtihad, the "personal effort to answer modem problems 
from one's own study of the Qur'an and Tradition" (Boland 1982:213). They disapprove of tarekat (Sufi 
orders or brotherhoods) which teach asceticism and the repetition of dzikir (recollections or remembrances 
of God's name). Alternatively, the traditionalists go beyond simply the Qur'an and Hadith and in addition 
defend the obligation of taklid which recognises the authority of the four founders of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Traditionalists claim that the Qur'an and Hadith are phrased in difficult language which can 
be better understood if some secondary texts are also considered by those who are more knowledgeable 
(Dhofier 1980). While Nahdlatul Ulama is a traditionalist organisation, Muhammadiyah is the most 
influential modemist organisation in Indonesia.
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power, the influential voices in the organisation are the Kyais of Surabaya (Dharmaputra 
1996:9). The Head and Deputy Head of the Syuriah and the Chairman of Tandfidziah are 
elected every five years at the NU national congress. The influence of the organisation is 
obvious as it has 279 branches in 26 provinces and is estimated to have about 35 million 
members, mostly in rural areas (ibid).
The impact of the NU on Indonesians is further illustrated by considering a few of 
the 10 autonomous bodies, 12 institutes and 5 committees under its influence. The 
Lembaga Kemasylahatan Keluarga NU (LKKNU, the Institute of Family Welfare of 
Nahdlatul Ulama), which is represented in 22 of 27 provinces, seeks to "provide 
guidance for uplifting the family and the community in order to understand, to be aware 
of and to have a responsible attitude towards close relations between family welfare and a 
"complete" human life" (Dharmaputra 1996:7). The Muslimai NU, an organisation 
specifically for NU women, seeks "to improve the well-being and status of Muslim 
women particularly and Indonesian women generally" (ibid). It oversees the Yayasan 
Kesejahteraan Muslimcit (Muslimat Welfare Foundation) and the Yayasan Bina Bakti 
Wanita (Women's Devotion Foundation) and manages orphanages, 3916 kindergartens, 
and 60 mother-care/health centres which participate in the government's family planning 
program. The Muslimat NU  has 26 provincial representatives, 325 branches in districts 
and 2,650 branches in sub-districts (ibid:8). A younger women's organisation, the 
Fatayat NU, has 26 provincial representatives, 303 district branches and 42,628 village 
branches. The Ma'arif Educational Institute manages educational programs and NU 
schools - 4,114 kindergartens, 780 junior high schools, 299 senior high schools, 26 
academies and 19 universities. Rabtha Maahidil Islamy (RMI) manages 5,742 boarding 
schools (pesantren). The expansion of these groups throughout Indonesia (certainly 
throughout Java) demonstrates the enormous influence which the Nahdlatul Ulama 
potentially has over the social and moral lives of Indonesians.
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Muhammadiyah
The Muhammadiyah (MUH), a modemist/reformist organisation established in 1912,
encourages Muslims to learn and understand for themselves the teachings of the Qur'an
and Hadith rather than following unquestioningly the advice of ulama on such matters. It
rejects the reference to Islamic schools of jurisprudence and seeks to simplify and
eliminate non-Islamic elements from rituals and ceremonies. The Muhammadiyah rejects
folk practices such as communal feasts, pilgrimages to graves, consultation of fortune
tellers, and the use of black magic as forms of superstition and polytheism. The MUH
thus has two main aims: to adhere to the beliefs and rituals of Islam as laid out in the
Qur'an and Hadith', and to establish and manage institutions for education and social
welfare (Nakamura 1980). An illustration of the essence of the MUH is a sura (verse)
from the Qur'an which is said to have inspired Ahmad Dahlan to form the organisation:
And let there be one group of you 
who call people to good, 
who urge them to virtuous conduct 
and restrain them from evil deeds.
Those are the ones who prosper
(Surah 3 Ali Imran, v. 104 in Nakamura 1980).
To achieve these aims the MUH has clearly established objectives which include 
(Dharmaputra 1996:10):
• To strengthen the faith, to encourage and to promote the 
realization of the religious services and to develop high 
morality;
• To encourage and intensify the activities of Islamic 
missionary and the efforts to enjoin the good and to forbid the 
wrong;
• To educate young generation to become true Muslims [sic]; 
and
• To implant consciousness and to find acceptance in the 
society for Islamic guidance and rules.
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The Muhammadiyah seeks to strengthen faith and "develop high morality" through the 
vehicles of its educational institutions, associated organisations and through the means of 
dakwah and pengajian.
The influence of the Muhammadiyah in nonpolitical areas is considerable even 
though its membership is not as large as the Nahdlatul Ulama. Like the NU it operates in 
26 of the 27 provinces and has 15 million members (‘Indonesia’s Islam’ 1997). The 
organisation has made significant impacts on health by establishing its own hospitals and 
health centres which provide clinical care and public health programs. These centres 
include clinics and polyclinics (308), mother and child health centres (271), maternity 
hospitals (143), and family planning units (34) (Dharmaputra 1996:11). These centres 
are not subject to direct government control and the implementation of government health 
programs and policies is coordinated with the Muhammadiyah.
The organisation of MUH is extremely structured with a distinct chain of 
command. It is led by a Central Board of Leadership, situated at Yogyakarta, which has 
under it Provincial Boards (26), District Boards (278), Branch Boards at the city, town 
and village levels, and Sub-Branch Boards at the village level. The Central Board 
consists of at least nine members elected every three years at the Muhammadiyah 
Congress. The Central, Provincial and District Boards are assisted by a number of 
councils, including Majelis Pendidikan Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan (Council of 
Education Teaching and Culture) and the Majelis Tarjih (Council of Ulama). The later is 
a council for the deliberation on Islamic law and all Muhammadiyah policies and actions 
go through this council. The Central Board is also assisted by several institutional 
bodies. The MUH has several autonomous organisations which all have vertical lines of 
leadership similar to the mother organisation: Aisyiyah (women's organisation); Pemuda 
Muhammadiyah (Youth Movement); Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (student's 
organisation); Ikatan Usahawan Keluarga Muhammadiyah (Businessmen's Association); 
and Ikatan Karyawan Muhammadiyah (Workers' Association). The extensive branches
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and well organised network of the Muhammadiyah are potentially influential in 
transmitting notions of sexual morality and HIV/AIDS prevention throughout Indonesia.
4.1.3 Educational institutions and the pescmtren movement
The Islamic school is extremely important in the spread and propagation of Islam in 
Indonesia. The Islamic tradition is highly doctrinal, legalistic, scriptural and literary and 
there is an absence of traditional social institutions within the religion, other than schools, 
capable of transmitting this sort of tradition effectively. While the mosque serves a 
ritualistic function and the ulama are a relatively loose collection of individualistic legal 
scholars and teachers, schools form the 'social structural core' of Indonesian Islam 
(Geertz 1969). Historically, the Muslim educational system has been recognised as the 
institution most responsible for the spread of Islam in Indonesia and this function 
continues today. Both traditionalists and modernists agree that formal education is the 
principal channel through which religious ideals are passed on from the religious elite to 
the younger generation. (Dhofier 1980).
While secular education is handled by the Ministry of Education and Culture, 
religious education is overseen by the Ministry of Religion. The government has, 
therefore, recognised the need for religious and secular education to coexist. The 
Ministry of Religion is in charge of religious instruction in state schools including the 
training, appointment and payment of religious teachers, setting the curriculum and the 
preparation of manuals and textbooks (Boland 1982). This religious instruction has been 
compulsory in state elementary and secondary schools since independence and in 
universities since 1966 (Noer 1991). There are three types of Islamic educational 
institutions at the elementary and secondary levels, the curriculums of which contain 
varying degrees of secular and religious subjects: madrasah, (30% religious-70% secular); 
diniyah (70% religious-30% secular); and Pendidikan Guru Agama, where religious 
teachers are trained (50% religious-50% secular). At a tertiary level, there are the
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Institute Agama Islam Negeri (Government Institute of Islamic Studies - IAIN) and 
pesantren (Dhofier 1980).
Madrasah were originally established by reformist Muslims in order to incorporate 
secular elements within religious schools: secular subjects, an organised curriculum, 
grades, text books, class hours, exams and diplomas. The teachers are not ulama or 
especially learned in the scriptures and law. The madrasah combines the tradition of 
Islamic education with Western style education, which is felt to lack instruction on the 
"ennobling of personality (akhlak, budi perkerti) based on Islamic teachings" (Nakamura 
1980:277). Students thus acquire knowledge of the Qur'an and Hadith as well as the 
sciences, technology and humanities. As schools of the modernists, madrasah are 
closely associated with the Muhammadiyah. Because of their more secular education and 
state-run exams, they are not as free of government intervention as are the pesantren 
(McVey 1989). In contemporary Indonesia there has been an increased emphasis on 
madrasah-style education with some pesantren now introducing secular elements into 
their teaching or having a madrasah associated with them21. The gap between religious 
and secular instruction is growing smaller due to the greater component of secular 
subjects at religious schools and to the fact that the government has required religious 
instruction at secular government schools (Dhofier 1980).
Pesantren, literally "a place of religious students (santri)" have formed the basis of 
the Islamic education system for centuries in Indonesia. It is a boarding school for 
students (santri) which provides advanced training in the study of the classical Islamic 
texts (kitab) under the guidance of the pesantren leader/teacher, the kyai. In their classical 
forms, pesantren are completely outside the control of the state as they do not rely on the 
government for recognition or financial assistance (McVey 1989). The pesantren provide 
traditionalist instruction which includes not only the study of the Qur'an and the Hadith,
21 Dhofier (1980:46 - 1980a in Solahudin 1996) describes two types of pesantren. salafi, which focuses 
on the exclusive study of classical texts, without including secular subjects; and khalafi, which has 
introduced secular subjects or incorporated secular schools as well as teaching classical texts.
83
but also of Arabic, fiqh  (Islamic jurisprudence), ushul fiqh  (system of Islamic
jurisprudence), tauhid (Islamic theology), tarikh (the history of Islam), tasawuf (Islamic
Sufism), and akhlaq (Islamic ethics) (Dhofier 1980). The kyai delivers a weekly
pengajian , providing the santri with moral guidance. It is the kyai's duty to urge people
to perform their religious duties and rituals. Pesantren education "emphasizes the whole
person and ...seeks to produce not successful man but moral man" (McVey 1989:211):
The intention is not to fill the minds of students with information, 
but to refine their morals, educate their spirits, propagate virtue, 
teach them propriety, and prepare them for a life full of sincerity 
and purity. Every student is taught to regard religious ethics 
above all else. The student's goal in education must not be to 
obtain power, money, or glory, or to act heedlessly; learning is 
an obligation, a dedication to God (Dhofier 1980:265).
Pesantren tend to specialise in particular studies or activities which then attract particular 
students (santris). For example, Pesantren Blok Agung (Banyuwangi, East Java) 
specialises in the study of Al-Ghazali's tasauf and Pesantren Babussalam (Dago, North 
Bandung) concentrates on the teaching of the Qu'ran, specifically the study of tafsir 
(commentary) (Solahudin 1996:7-8). Pesantren have been, and continue to be, the 
source of specialised religious education for many young Muslims and have produced a 
number of ulama who are highly successful, qualified and influential in Indonesia's 
Islamic community.
Pesantren Daarut Tauhid - an example o f a modern pesantren
Since the beginnings of the 1980s in particular, there has been a considerable revival in 
the pesantren movement. Many young urban men and women, disatisfied with modem 
life, have been attracted to pesantren in search of moral guidance through a return to 
Islamic teachings. This movement is well illustrated by an original study by Dindin 
Solahudin (1996) of the Pesantren Daarut Tauhid in Bandung which specialises in the 
Bengkel Akhlaq, the 'Workshop for Morality'. It aims for "the restoration of Islamic 
values in its followers as a means by which to create righteous Muslims" (Solahudin
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1996:92), those who have attained qolbun salim (a healthy heart, or sound mind) and 
peace with God. Established in 1990, the Pesantren Daarut Tauhid provides an 
environment which attracts young people who reject the moral decadence accompanying 
modem life and who are interested only in akhlaq (Islamic morality). It is attractive to 
young people as it combines secular activities with religious reflection. Ninety-five 
percent of the approximately 3,000 followers are teenagers or in their twenties, and 75% 
are students. This pesantren plays a crucial role in the reinforcement of Islamic morality 
in a contemporary urban community of Muslims.
According to the Kyai at Pesantren Daarut Tauhid, people nowadays "appear to 
have a lust for prestige, praise, appreciation, pomp, honour, self-esteem and the like" 
(Solahudin 1996:94). Furthermore, they are too interested in sexuality and immoral love 
and live a life which the Qu'ran calls mala' ai-gurur (goods and chattels of deception) 
(Sura 3:185 in Solahudin 1996:95). If followers have been fulfilling Allah's commands 
and avoiding his prohibitions, they will feel close to Allah and so religiously secure and 
happy. They will possess an inner orderliness characterised by "calmness, easiness, 
stability, courage, optimism, passion and overall personal orderliness" and are secure 
with the knowledge that they are free of the possibility of divine punishment (Solahudin 
1996:81). The development of inward discipline in ones behaviour relies on the 
knowledge of Allah's supervision, for He will see whatever one tries to hide from 
mortals. Morality is partly enforced by the concern for hisab (accountability) after death 
when all Muslims face reckoning from Allah on the Day of Judgement (ibid:94).
The crucial vehicles for the reinforcement of morality at the Pesantren Daarut 
Tauhid are the public sermons, pengajian, which provide guidance on issues of Islamic 
morality by referring to and exploring particular Islamic texts, kitab klasik. Unusual to 
pesantren, Daarut Tauhid invites kyai from other pesantren to teach there. This promotes 
an interaction with kyai tamu (guest instructors) from different backgrounds of 
knowledge and from various orientations of religious schools of thought. This tradition
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is being developed to encourage friendly intercourse between varying lines of Islamic 
thought.
Pengajian at the Pesantren Daarut Tauhid is known as Taushiyah Penyejuk Hati
(Comforting Religious Advice) and refers to the religious instruction leamt at a social
gathering through a talk delivered by a kyai or muballigh (preacher). At the Pesantren
Daarut Tauhid, this pengajian always concentrates on a moral theme and is designed to
help followers attain qolbun salim, a healthy heart or sound mind. Followers aim to free
the mind of bad thoughts and characteristics and to adopt a high degree of good character;
that is, to acquire or reinforce the character traits of ikhlash (sincerity), tawadhu '
(modesty), jujur (honesty), and sabar (patience) through a solid understanding of and
commitment to tauhid (the oneness of Allah) (Solahudin 1996:98;101-3). An excerpt
from one of these pengajian illustrates this emphasis on morality:
an indication of Allah's favour and love is the cleanliness of 
one's mind and heart....When one's mind is very pure (bening),
Allah will make it easy for one to grasp high knowledge that 
cannot be grasped by other people....This sound mind is like a 
completely clean mirror without any spots on it. People will love 
to make this person a mirror that they can use as an example for 
living. On the contrary, one with a dirty mind is just like a dirty
mirror; none would refer to him.... the way one behaves depends
on whether one's mind is good or bad (Solahudin 1996:110).
The Taushiyah Penyejuk Hati is held at Pesantren Daarut Tauhid twice weekly (Sunday 
afternoons and Thursdays evenings) and is also regularly given on two local radio 
channels, so reaching the wider Bandung audience beyond simply the santri at the 
Pesantren (Solahudin 1996:104).
For santri at Pesantren Daarut Tauhid, Islamic beliefs are asserted and reinforced 
through individual and congregational religious practices, both compulsory (shalat, 
wirid, do'a, i'tikaf, zakat, shaum, and hajj) and optional (.shalat tahajjud - overnight 
prayer; shalat taubat - repenting prayer; shaum Senin-Kamis - fasting on Mondays and 
Thursdays; and shadaqoh - charity). Such assertions and reinforcement also occur by 
symbolic means in clothing and daily behaviour: women wearing kerudung (head cover);
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men wearing white clothing and kopeah haji\ utilising Islamic phrases in greetings and 
exclamations. In addition, ritual weeping accompanies both communal and private 
activities at the Pesantren Daarut Tauhid. This weeping expresses a consciousness of 
life's sins and offers repentance and asks for forgiveness from Allah. Such weeping 
provides personal purification and functions to intensify one's religiousity (Solahudin 
1996:119-21). Through its attention to such activities as ritual weeping and pengajian, 
the Pesantren Daarut Tauhid practices psycho-religious healing whereby Muslims 
"suffering from immorality can indirectly "modify" their daily behaviour" (Solahudin 
1996:93), so healing social and behavioural ills. While the practices at Pesantren Daarut 
Tauhid follow aspects of the pesantren tradition, they are also unorthodox and modem in 
orientation. Young urban Muslims are readily drawn to this combination in order to 
address their concerns for morality in the modem world.
4.1.4 Youth activities and Islam
Equally important as education in the transmission of religious instruction to the young 
are youth organisations and non-formal Islamic educational activities in which youth 
become involved (Kiem 1993). Both Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have youth 
organisations affiliated with them, Pemuda Ansor and Pemuda Muhammadiyah, 
respectively. However, many other Islamic organisations have youth movements (eg the 
Himpunan Pemuda Ansor (HPA) associated with the Yayasan Alkhairat ) and many 
mosques have individual youth groups, remaja mesjid (mosque youth), associated with 
them (ibid). Mosques have become more than just centres for prayer, but also 
incorporate youth activities, providing a forum for the discussion of non-religious matters 
and setting aside areas for sports and recreation activities (Noer 1991).
Remaja mesjid have become vehicles through which pengajian is held; young 
people help other young people in the reading and understanding of the Qur'an. Kiem 
(1993) describes the pengajian organised by orthodox Muslim youth in Temate to counter
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the spread of deviant behaviour among young people. These meetings occur twice a
week and "emphasize the positive role that informal Islamic education can play in
building character (pembinaan mental) during adolescence" (Kiem 1993:119-20). The
Muhammadiyah youth organisation in Temate is involved every Saturday night in a
malam tazkir, which is obligatory for members of the different Muhammadiyah youth
groups. The participants are encouraged to give a short presentation followed by
discussion about the relevance of Islamic teachings to problems in their lives.
Malam tazkir are supposed to provide young people with a 
religious orientation for the conduct of everyday life affairs, and 
to keep them out of activities frowned upon by devout Muslims, 
such as dating, hanging out downtown, going to the movies, and 
drinking alcohol (Kiem 1993:107).
Such pengajian provide guidance to youth on moral issues by enabling them to realise 
their sins and so change their ways.
4.1.5 Mystical movements
Part of the religious revival has involved turning to mystical Islamic movements, 
inspired, in particular, by Sufism. Although Sufism formed the basis of Islam in 
Indonesia when it first arrived, modem Islamic groups shun it. In many cases, however, 
people find that traditional religion can not deliver an appropriate response to the needs of 
development and modernisation and this “has given new impetus to Sufi leaders to 
provide their own answers to the problems faced by Islam in Indonesia” (Wahid 
1986:95). An example of such a movement is that of Sufi master, Muhammad Zuhri, or 
Pak Muh to his followers. He leads a halaqah (a group to leam Sufism) in his village of 
Sekaijalak near Pati called Pesantren Budaya Barzakh (Barzakh Cultural Study Group) 
which meets twice weekly. According to his internet site, he “didn’t follow any Sufi 
order...neither does he form a new one”. He apparently has “revolutionary ideas in 
Sufism” and rather than “[practicing] the idea of self purification with extreme asceticism” 
like some of his predecessors, “he likes to socialize himself with persons from every
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level of society” (Barzakh Foundation internet site, ‘The Revolutionary Sufi Master’). 
He also has disciples in Jakarta and Bandung who he visits once a month. These 
disciples have formed the Islamic organisations, Yayasan Barzakh (Barzakh Foundation) 
and Keluarga Budaya Karzakh (Barzakh Cultural Family) respectively. The Jakarta- 
based Yayasan Barzakh was founded in 1994 by a group of young Muslim intellectuals 
with the aim of improving people’s comprehension of Islam in order to develop a 
harmonous and solid society, to improve social insight and to solve social problems. 
This is to be achieved through monthly discussions about Islam and Sufism under the 
guidance of Pak Muh, through raising donations for the socially and economically 
disadvantaged, and giving treatment and counselling to “solve private (physical or mental 
illness), family, or social problem[s]” through the Sufi Healing method (Barzakh 
Foundation internet site, ‘Introduction’).
Many people apply to Pak Muh to use his spiritual power to cure them, either in 
person or by following his instructions by correspondence. People also visit Pak Muh at 
his house in Sekarjalak for advice and spiritual help to solve their problems. His power 
is evident from the following story (Barzakh Foundation internet site, ‘The Revolutionary 
Sufi Master’):
An example of his many guests is a group of prostitutes who 
came and asked for spiritual help from him so that they will have 
many customers. But instead of giving that kind of help, he gave 
each of them a supplication written in a small paper [sic], which 
will help its carrier to quickly find a husband. Thank God, with 
this tactics [sic] many prostitutes who came to him soon found 
their partner for life, and stopped their wicked profession. Pak 
Muh didn’t reject them because he realized Who [ie Allah] was 
behind those women, Who sent them to him so that they would 
return to the right path
Apart from dealing with spiritual problems, he has also apparently cured many kinds of 
diseases, including cancer, leukemia, paralysis and impotency.
Since 1996, he has turned his attentions to curing people with HIV or AIDS 
through the Yayasan Barzakh in Jakarta. The foundation “regards HIV/AIDS disease as
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a serious threat to humanity” and obviously supports being compassionate to those 
afflicted while promoting prevention through attention to morality: “Deep empathy and 
careful attention are needed to prevent [the] further spread [of HIV/AIDS] and to cure 
already infected patients using every way that conforms to human laws, morality, and 
religion” (Barzakh Foundation internet site, ‘AIDS treatment’). Unless the patient is able 
to meet personally with Pak Muh, the treatment involves simultaneous meditation by the 
patient and the Sufi master over distance. Some patients are given a wifq, a piece of 
paper on which holy verses are written, which must be carried on the patient’s person or 
immersed in a glass of drinking water. Those wishing to take up this opportunity must 
register with the foundation and sign an agreement form. One of the conditions of this 
contract is that: “In order to speed up the healing process, all patients are advised to 
maximise religious activities (praying to God, giving up bad behavior, etc.)” (Barzakh 
Foundation internet site, ‘AIDS treatment’). The Barzakh Foundation is, therefore, an 
example of the trend for young urban Muslims to be attracted to mystical Islamic 
movements in search of a religious response to the economic and social problems of 
modem Indonesia.
4 .2  M asyarakat Islam  - seeking to establish  an Islam ic society
As illustrated by the aims of the dakwah movement, there has been since the early 1980s,
an increasing wish among many Muslims for the creation of a “Masyarakat Islam” ,
“Islamic society”. There is a particular wish to see a government that reflects the values
of Islam. To Muslims such as Nurcholish Madjid, this is a form of “cultural and
historical realism” that cannot be overlooked or denied (in Ramage 1995:80-81):
young people say that Islam, being the religion of the largest 
number of community, is expected to supply the community with 
ethical values; that is, the foundation of the social interactions 
within the state of Indonesia. I always argue that this is a kind of 
social and cultural realism. Its unrealistic culturally to deny the 
possible role of the Muslims, especially because of their 
[advances in] education.
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When Boland (1982:186) asked Muslims what they meant by the term “Islamic society” 
he was met with the following response. An Islamic society means:
1. the attempt to have Islamic principles imbue Indonesian 
society;
2. the promotion and strengthening of the ... Islamic 
brotherhood;
3. making visible the impact of Islam on public life;
4. spreading an Islamic style of life; in short
5. the furthering of everything that could give Indonesia the 
colour of a Muslim country, in accordance with the fact that 
far and away the majority of the inhabitants are Muslims.
Some Muslims go so far as to believe that as the religion of the majority of people, Islam 
should serve as the moral basis of the state, instead of Pcmcasila. While some argue that 
the Pancasila ideology is essential in Indonesia’s pluralist society and for Indonesian 
national unity, others argue that “Islam is the glue that helps bond the nation together” 
and so should be the unifying ideology of the state (Amien Rais in Ramage 1995:110).
To achieve the aim of an Islamic society, there as been an increasing involvement 
by Muslims in politics. It has been recognised that the problems that Muslims are facing 
in society lie with the policies and programs of the government. To influence this policy, 
many Muslims activists are seeking to use the power of the state to Islamise Indonesian 
society: “Rather than oppose the government, which was a losing strategy in the New 
Order, the only alternative was to enter government and to influence policy from within” 
(Ramage 1995:83). Increased Muslim involvement in the state has been made possible 
by Soeharto’s moves to re-Islamise Indonesian politics in order to enhance his Muslim 
credentials and diversify his power base, as he was no longer assured that the army were 
automatically behind him. A manifestation of this re-Islamisation has been the 
establishment of the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), under the sponsorship of Soeharto and Habibie. Ramage 
outlines the three basic purposes of ICMI: help Muslims culturally, economically,
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educationally; unify the Islamic movement away from historic splits, and act as a place 
where “all Muslims can meet”; and implement a number of political objectives (ibid:91- 
2). The official state sponsorship from Soeharto and Habibie enables the non- 
bureaucratic members of ICMI to legitimately carry out their Islamising activities. It 
could be said that, the “ICMI has legitimized the participation of Muslims activists in 
national discourse more so than any other development in the New Order” (ibid: 116). 
Already ICMI membership has grown rapidly with branches in all provinces, most 
districts, and even overseas. While ICMI is important because it speaks to (and for) the 
new urban, middle-class, educated Muslims who have been beneficiaries of 
development, its appeal to this group has been limited. The internal divisions, highly 
politicised nature, and dependency on Soeharto and Habibie has made it less attractive to 
them (ibid:78).
Many Muslim leaders and academics have been critical of the ICMI, and have 
refused to become involved with it. One of the most outspoken critics has been 
Abdurrahman Wahid who claims that ICMI members are not simply seeking to advance 
the cause of Islam and realise an Islamic society. He claims that this is the first step in 
their ultimate aim to establish an Islamic state. Wahid sees this as being damaging to 
religious minorities and to the unity of the state (ibid:64). He feels that the political nature 
of ICMI is a move towards the “re-confessionalizing” of Indonesian politics. Rather, he 
supports “the severing of direct links between one’s religion or ethnicity and how one 
participates in politics” (ibid:58). Wahid and other critics of ICMI are suspicious of the 
Islamic activists involved in ICMI as they suspect that for some the ICMI is merely a 
stepping stone to political power (ibid: 118). On the other hand they are suspicious that 
the organisation is being used by politicians to gain some sort of legitimacy; that it is “run 
by opportunists who profess to be serious about Islam because it is the flavour of the 
moment" (Grant 1996:85). ICMI members are aware that they are being used by
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Soeharto to serve his own ends, but they believe that they can equally take advantage of 
the arrangement.
However, the attempt by Islamic activist members of ICMI to affect government 
policy from within has so far failed. Soeharto did not appoint any ICMI activists to the 
MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly) in 1992, nor 
chose any for his Cabinet in 1993. Although the Cabinet did contain Habibie-cronies 
who were ICMI members, none of the activist members with an interest in an Islamising 
agenda were chosen (Ramage 1995:100-1). While there is significant Muslim 
representation in the MPR, none of these are those people who support formalised links 
between the state and Islam. Despite their ambitions, there have not been any significant 
short-term political gains made by these ICMI activists. Their influence over government 
policies and programs has remained minimal.
The other forum for interaction between the state and Islam is through the 
Ministry of Religion. With the first principle of the Pancasila directed towards religious 
belief, the state required an institution to uphold and regulate this principle. On the one 
hand, the Ministry was established to “prove the positive attitude of the Indonesian state 
towards religion” (Boland 1982:188). On the other hand, the state was able to direct, 
regulate and promote religion from above through the Ministry of Religion, an activity 
which Boland (1982:189) refers to as “religious dirigism”.
The Ministry of Religion has been charged with the following duties (Wahid 
1986:109):
1. to promote religious life in general;
2. to safeguard acknowledged religions from elements 
detrimental to their existence;
3. to supervise nongovernmental activities in religious fields and 
provide them with necessary assistance.
With regards to the promotion of Islam, the Ministry has been involved in activities such 
as: providing financial aid for building mosques and other Islamic places of worship all
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over the country; promotion and administration of Islamic education; stimulating the 
obedience to precepts of Islamic law, such as fasting; setting the official date for the 
observance of Ramadan; regulating religious feasts and celebrations; and promoting and 
administering the payment of alms. The Ministry of Religion also publishes and 
distributes pamphlets on religious topics, including the meaning of Ramadan, the place of 
women in society, the importance of religion for “nation building and character building”; 
and appeals for a return to the moral standards of Islam (Boland 1982:189-90). In 
promoting religious life, the Ministry has many overlapping joint projects with other 
government agencies. For instance, in the health field, the Ministry of Religion 
cooperates with the Ministry of Health in areas such as nutrition education, public health, 
family planning, and of course HIV/AIDS.
The ministry plays a vital role in mediating between government and non­
government religious bodies. Government and non-govemment initiatives are legitimated 
to each other and to Indonesian Muslims through the mechanisms of the Ministry. One 
of the organisations established by the Ministry of Religion to bridge the gap between the 
religious leadership and the state is the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian 
Council of Religious Scholars). Established in 1975, this semi-govemment body was 
intended to form the meeting point between government agencies and non-govemment 
religious organisations. This central council was preceded by regional councils in 
provinces where security was threatened by unrest. They were designed to give advice to 
the local government on community issues and concerns so as to create a level of trust 
between the local people and the government. In 1975, the MUI was created and the 
provincial councils were reorganised. Some claim that it has not been particularly 
successful in influencing the government's policies towards Islam or to have an impact 
on the Muslim community (Noer 1991): "...the ulama who accepted membership in the 
councils have been acutely aware of the danger both to religious independence and to 
their own personal standing in the Muslim community of becoming too closely identified
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with the state, and the system has thus far had little real impact on the affairs of the 
Islamic community" (McVey 1989:209). However, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) 
is probably the highest recognised Islamic authority in Indonesia which decides on fatwas 
or messages which will have a bearing upon the lives of Muslims (Center for Health 
Research 1996:6). In fact, this impact has been illustrated through the formulations 
coming from the November 1995 MUI convention on HIV/AIDS. These formulations 
have provided a clear philosophical basis for the HIV/AIDS policies and plans of action 
of other influential Islamic organisations. The formulations of these plans of action and 
their interaction with government prevention activities will be considered in the final 
chapter.
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Chapter Five
The double bind in HIV/AIDS prevention: 
governm ent policy in the context of Islam ic revival
Muslims who are seeking to establish an “Islamic society” in Indonesia are increasingly 
concerned with the moral issues surrounding HIV/AIDS prevention. To them, 
HIV/AIDS has resulted from the infiltration of Western values and the subsequent 
loosening of morals. Imbuing Indonesian society with Islamic principles is intended to 
counter this. It is perfectly reasonable that HIV/AIDS prevention should attempt to 
increase people’s religiousity. In this way, people will be inspired by moral principles to 
avoid behaviours which may put them at risk. The Muslim activists and fundamentalists 
who wish to achieve the Islamisation of Indonesian society are an influential group in 
Indonesian society, as they have a huge power base from which to work and a dedicated 
following. This following includes those Muslims who have been attracted from among 
the urban poor and from the young of the middle class. Currently, however, the extent 
of their influence on public policy is more as an outside pressure group. Despite the 
attempts of some Muslim activists to attain political positions through the vehicle of the 
ICMI, none have managed to do so. While the ICMI gives these Muslims a political 
voice, it does not give them any real power. They, therefore, continue to have very little 
influence on public policy.
This is not to say that there are no Muslim politicians. Indeed, of the 1000 
members of the MPR in 1992, around 80% are Muslim. However, these are not the 
Muslims who are seeking a formalisation of the links between Islam and the state. 
Instead they are those who have close links to the state elites. They have been closely 
associated with the very processes of development that Islamic activists are criticising 
(Ramage 1996:119-20). Although there are a few Muslim government officials heavily
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influenced by the opinions and words of religious leaders, most do not allow religion to 
affect government policy. While they may be serious Muslims, they also value 
modernisation and enjoy the accompanying consumer lifestyle. This sentiment is shared 
by many older middle class Muslims, who are devout but value a modem lifestyle. Their 
agenda is not to Islamise Indonesian society but to continue modernising it.
While Islamic activists have had little input into the actual development of the 
National AIDS Strategy, they have been influential in directing the implementation of 
prevention policies and activities. This occurs on two levels. Firstly, the revival of Islam 
has led to larger numbers of conservative Muslims whose actions and deeds impact on 
society as a whole. In their attempts to Islamise society, they have managed to introduce 
and sustain a conservative voice on moral issues. Heeding the public mood, the state 
elites seek to incorporate Islamic moral principles into HIV/AIDS prevention policy and 
practice. Thus, the National AIDS Strategy was written so that “approaches to control 
HIV/AIDS should reflect the religious-cultural values found in Indonesia” and that the 
strategy should support "activities [which]...aim to strengthen the resilience and welfare 
of the family and the traditional social support systems rooted in the community" 
(Indonesian National AIDS Committee 1994:7-8). Consideration of Islamic moral views 
enhances the moral legitimacy of the state elite in the eyes of the Muslim majority. 
However, this has not been a particularly difficult concession to make. Islamic moral 
teachings simply parallel and validate the already dominant state rhetoric of ‘religious- 
cultural values’ implied in government rhetoric and development policies. The concepts 
of 'the family' and 'traditional support systems' are important both in the ideological 
model of the state and in Islamic notions of community.
The second way in which Islam is influencing HIV/AIDS prevention activities is 
through the actual development and implementation of plans of action within the Islamic 
community. On the government level, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has presented a 
working program based on the provision of information, education and communication
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(IEC) materials to increase awareness in a religiously and culturally sound way. The 
semi-govemment organisation Majelis Ulama Indonesia has been involved through the 
development of the Tadzkirah Bandung (the Bandung formulations) which provide clear 
philosophical guidelines for Islamic organisations to follow in developing their own plans 
of action. The HIV/AIDS workshops held by the Nahdlatul Ulama and the 
Muhammadiyah have led to the development of their guidelines, the Pesan-pesan Paiton 
and the GEMPITHA respectively. The impact of moral concerns on HIV/AIDS 
prevention strategies in Indonesia can best be explored through a brief examination of the 
policies underlying the strategies of these religious organisations. Their publicly 
expressed opinions have the power to create and maintain a dominant concept of Islamic 
sexual morality and appropriate HIV/AIDS prevention in Indonesian society. This places 
the government in a double bind: how to implement effective HIV/AIDS prevention 
policies while at the same time not appearing to be in favour of immoral sexual 
behaviour. Before considering the plans of action of the various Islamic influenced 
organisations and this double bind in HIV/AIDS prevention, it is necessary to first 
examine the attitudes of the Muslims community towards HIV/AIDS and those infected.
5 .1  HIV/AIDS and constructions o f im m orality
A wide range of attitudes are held in the religious community towards the significance of 
HIV/AIDS and the morality of those infected. One study of the Qur'an and fiqh  
concludes that HIV/AIDS could be interpreted as a trial (cobaan) from Allah to humanity, 
rather than simply a punishment, or curse, inflicted on individuals who have sinned 
(Akhmad and Rasyid 1992). According to this interpretation Allah has caused regular 
natural catastrophes (musibah) to afflict mankind (Suras 2:156; 3:165; 4:62, 72; 5:106; 
9:50; 28:47; 42:30; 57:23; and 64:11), and AIDS can be interpreted as being just another 
such musibah, just like any other epidemic. As in Sura 64:11 (translated by Shakir 
1982), "No affliction comes about but by Allah's permission; and whoever believes in
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Allah, He guides aright his heart; and Allah is cognizant of all things". A study of the 
perceptions and attitudes of ulama in Palembang (Nazir et al 1992), found that the 
majority of them believe that AIDS is a trial from God in the form of a natural 
catastrophe. Only a few said that it is a punishment due to the promiscuity of individuals 
or within the community. A 1992 magazine report, however, claims that the majority of 
ulama in the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) "share the belief that because AIDS was the 
direct outcome of sexual promiscuity, those afflicted were in fact being punished for their 
immoral behaviour" (Aznam 1992:30). Others do not talk of AIDS as a punishment for 
individuals, but rather as a warning (peringatan) to mankind that piety in general must be 
improved. The chairman of the Yogjakarta chapter of the MUI claims that "the spread of 
AIDS would not have happened if men had heeded moral and religious norms and 
values...All disasters befalling human beings, including AIDS, are caused by the 
behavior of human beings themselves" (JP 3.12.93).
A series of letters to the editor of Republika between 27 November and 2 
December 1995 address the question AIDS, Kutukan atau Tantangan?' (AIDS, curse or 
challenge?). HIV is described by one reader as a 'curse' which is spread because of 
people who are not responsible, who let their carnal desires run wild and free (R 
27.11.95). Another feels that HIV is a curse from God to humanity for ruining the 
sacred sexual relationship through widespread adultery (R 28.11.95b). A third believes 
it is an example of a disease caused by the unordered way in which people live. It is a 
consequence of going against the teachings of God and ignoring basic human 
institutions, such as the family and marriage (ibid). Finally, a fourth reader decides it is a 
warning to mankind, and a curse on those who have contravened the instructions of God 
(R 1.12.95e).
However, no matter what the range of opinions expressed within the umat, 
Islamic organisations and ulama have publicly stated that those with HIV/AIDS should be 
given care and support in a non-discriminatory way. They have pointed out that Islam
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emphasises the equality of all in the eyes of Allah (Sura 5:2), and so care and services 
should be provided to those with HIV/AIDS without prejudice (Suras 2:178, 180, 263; 
3:140, 110, 114; 4:114; 7:157; 9:67,71, 112; 7:89; 9:129; 10:71;11:56, 77, 123; 47:10, 
36; 60:4 from Akhmad and Rasyid 1992). There should be no discrimination against 
people with HIV or AIDS and those affected should continue to receive religious 
guidance to gain peace in their lives and salvation from God (Suras 21:107; 25:70; 
27:77). One woman calls on doctors to "give the people with AIDS spiritual injections 
and, if they are Moslem, ask them to perform their shalat (the five obligatory daily 
prayers), and continue giving them medical treatment" (JP 29.12.95b). The Islamic 
community should "Except him who repents and believes and does a good deed; so these 
are they of whom Allah changes the evil deeds to good ones; and Allah is Forgiving, 
Merciful" (Sura 25:70, translated by Shakir 1982). At a NU meeting, a panel discussion 
on the role of pesantren in community health described HIV/AIDS as another 
"catastrophic disease", and focused on treatment and care without discrimination for 
people with HIV/AIDS: "its victims should be cared for and not be discriminated. That 
victims should strive to seek (ikhtiar) treatment and be faithful (tawakal) to the religion" 
(Center for Health Research 1996:22). Several Islamic organisations, such as the Sufi 
Healing centre at the Barzakh Foundation, are turning their attention to addressing the 
spiritual treatment of HIV positive people.
The attitudes and publicly expressed opinions of Muslims towards HIV/AIDS and 
those infected are consistent with the principles of the National AIDS Strategy while still 
focusing on moral issues. HIV/AIDS is afflicting humanity due to the lessening of moral 
values in society and so a return to these moral values is necessary to combat the virus 
and illness. The extension of these moral attitudes to exclude condoms from prevention 
efforts due to their associations with promiscuity is a logical step. The following two 
sections will examine these moral issues as reflected by the public stances of those
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Muslim leaders and organisations who have credibility both in the Muslim community 
and with the state elite.
5 .2  Plans of action o f Islam ic organisations
In the early period of the government response to HIV/AIDS, religious organisations did 
not want to be pushed into action on the issue. Many ulama and umat have been 
concerned by the government's relaxed approach to the introduction and infiltration into 
Indonesian society of a Western lifestyle, consumer mentality, and social ills such as 
drugs, sex work, and premarital sex. These are seen to have occurred as a result of the 
government's policies of development and modernisation. Seeing HIV/AIDS as an 
outcome of this, they have been cautious about becoming involved with the problem. 
From their point of view, the government allowed the existing problems to enter the 
country, despite complaints from Muslims, and now ulama are being called upon to help 
the government out of a situation which they themselves created (Meiwita Iskandar, pers 
comm). The involvement of Islamic leaders and organisations in HIV/AIDS prevention 
has thus been a slow process, involving patient negotiation by government officials and 
AIDS activists.
However, Islamic institutions are now eager to be involved in HIV/AIDS 
prevention, although the strategy supported is the promotion of a return to religious 
values, while excluding condom promotion. These concerns have been expressed by 
representatives of various religious bodies and organisations: the Ministry of Religion; 
the pro-government Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), the highest recognised Islamic 
authority in Indonesia; the traditionalist organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU); and the 
modernist organisation Muhammadiyah (MUH). All of these organisations are eager to 
be involved with HIV prevention but only through a 'religious approach' whereby 
Muslims protect themselves from HIV through an awareness of the virus and by 
increasing their religiousity and adherence to Islamic teachings. These institutions have
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issued statements for direction on HIV/AIDS prevention matters and have created and 
implemented programs for this prevention.
5.2.1 The Ministry of Religious Affairs
In accordance with its position on the National AIDS Prevention and Control 
Commission, the Ministry of Religion has begun the task of increasing the awareness of 
HIV/AIDS through the use of formal and non-formal education, dakwah, public 
information (penyuluhan) and guidance and counseling (bimbingan). This is a program 
specifically developed and implemented within the Ministry, although where necessary, 
the Ministry coordinates with other ministries and organisations to achieve its outcomes. 
The Ministry of Religion is attending to two main issues: HIV/AIDS prevention by way 
of Islamic teachings and increased recognition of family values; and the provision of 
spiritual treatment (Perawatan rohani) for victims and their families and the deceased. 
The first includes the provision of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) to 
increase awareness and to reduce high-risk behaviour, to publicise, campaign for, and 
support the national effort for prevention and control of HIV/AIDS, and "to improve the 
recognition of the concept of Family Resilience .... and enhancing further the Islamic 
religious and cultural values and norms in the daily life of the masses" (Dharmaputra 
1996:2). The second includes providing information and guidelines on the correct 
handling of people who have died of AIDS.
As a basis to implementing its programs, the Ministry of Religion identifies 
HIV/AIDS as caused "both by religiously and culturally "uncontrolled" high-risk sexual 
behavior" (Dharmaputra 1996:5). The Ministry of Religion program intends to target 
people in specific locations (large urban centers, industrial cities, harbor cities/ports, 
tourist destinations, urban poor/slums, red-light districts) as well as providing specific 
groups of people with specific information utilising various media. For instance, the 
general public will be accessed through radio and television Mimbar Agama (religious)
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programs, junior and senior high school students by programs implemented by their 
teachers of religion, and students in madrasah and pesantren by their school heads or kyai 
(Taher 1994:8 in Dharmaputra 1996:3). Sex workers are not specifically named in these 
targeted programs, except perhaps under the heading of Those needing information and 
guidance' who are to be reached through print media and radio and TV Mimhar Agama 
programs. These Mimbar Agama programs are religious programs "presented in a way 
that include[s] not only moral sermons but ... also include[s] ways towards public and 
individual roles in P&C [prevention and control] of HIV/AIDS, using the language of 
religion {bahasa agama)" (Dharmaputra 1996:3).
Among the aims of the Ministry of Religion to achieve within the next five years 
are (Taher 1994:9-10 in Dharmaputra 1996:6):
• Affect change of behavior by ways of increased practice of 
socio-culturally and religiously appropriate norms and values, 
particularly: a) among individuals practicing deviant sexual 
behavior (prostitution, lesbianism, bisexuality, homosexuality, 
free sexuality, frequent exchange of sexual partners, living 
together outside of wedlock, etc), and b) among individuals with 
high-risk sexual behavior who are at risk of being infected, or 
who can potentially infect others;
• Develop the "culture of shame" (budaya malu) and idealism as 
the vehicle to reduce the impact of permissive culture, especially 
those that pertain to sexual permissiveness or high-risk behavior;
• Increase the role of the marriage institution;
• Increase family resilience and the role of the family as the 
vessel to engender religious faith and reverence (keimanan dan 
ketakwaan) since early childhood;
• Empower each household with the ability to prevent every 
possible impact of permissive/free relationships that may 
contribute to the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
In line with these aims, the IEC (information, educational and communication) materials 
provided by the Ministry of Religious Affairs do not offer information on condom use, 
but concentrate on improving family and social life through religiousity. As the Minister 
of Religious Affairs stated at the conclusion of his presentation at the National
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Coordinative Meeting on the control of AIDS (Jakarta 24.8.94), the "success in the 
prevention of HIV/AIDS will largely depend upon our cooperation in returning people's 
sexual behavior back to cultural and religious norms and values long held by Indonesian 
people, and in affecting early diagnoses" (Taher 1994:11 in Dharmaputra 1996:6).
5.2.2 Muzakarah Nasional Ulama - Tadzkirah Bandung
Between 26-30 November 1995, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) and the United 
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) held a convention in 
Bandung, Muzakarah Nasional Ulama tentang Penanggulangan Penularan HIV/AIDS 
(Ulama's National Convention on AIDS Prevention and Control), as a result of which the 
Tadzkirah Bandung (Bandung formulations) were issued. This Muzarakah (convention) 
was attended by around 150 people including representatives from most of the MUI 
branches in the country, Islamic NGOs, heads of pondok pesantren, Muslim intellectuals 
and government officials. The event was opened by the coordinating Minister for 
People's Welfare/Chairman of the National AIDS Prevention and Control Commission 
(KPA). The closing ceremony was held in Jakarta and addressed by the Vice-President 
of the Republic of Indonesia. The closing day coincided with World AIDS Day on 1 
December 1995, which significantly was a Friday, the holy day of the Muslim week. 
Consequently, the MUI called on religious leaders all over Indonesia to communicate 
HIV/AIDS prevention messages as part of their dakwah (sermons) on that significant day 
(R 28.11.95a; R 1.12.95b; JP 4.11.95).
The main themes of the Muzakarah concerned the ABc strategy within the 
guidelines of the National AIDS Strategy, particularly in reflecting "the religious-cultural 
values found in Indonesia". In addition, discussions involved the role of the ulama in the 
prevention of HIV in an appropriate cultural and religious context. KH Hasan Basri, the 
chairman of the MUI commented that although there had been many conferences on 
HIV/AIDS, regrettably none had taken a religious approach; for them religion was just
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symbolic, not teachings which must be put into practice (R 28.11.95a). There was 
general agreement that "Religious teaching is the strongest fortress against the onslaught 
of AIDS" (JP 30.11.95). Ridwan Lubis, a professor at the IAIN (Institute Agama Islam 
Negeri) in Medan, called for instilling in young people the sanctity of sexual relations: "A 
sexual relationship should always be seen as a sacred thing, something to do only within 
marriage....The [HIV education] drive will help those who see sex as something to 
experiment with, to realize their mistakes" (ibid). These themes were reflected in the 
comments made in various speeches and plenary sessions as well as in the final 
formulations. Newspapers reported each day of the proceedings of the conference, as 
well as providing comments from outside the sessions on key issues. As an indication of 
the interface between government and religion, various representatives of the 
government, including the Ministers of Social Welfare and of Health, gave opening 
speeches.
The opening remarks by the Coordinating Minister of Social Welfare, Azwar 
Anas discussed the reasoning behind the strategy of 'A,B and c'. He emphasised that 
abstinence (A) is the most effective way to guard against the spread of HIV and that this 
is consistent with religious teachings. Being faithful (B) or selecting a reliable marriage 
partner ensures that the risk of HIV infection is minimal. The use of condoms (c) is only 
acceptable within the framework of the morals, ethics, culture and religion of society. 
Condom use is acceptable within sexual relations that are 'halal sehat' ( ‘permitted and 
healthy’) when one of the partners is infected with HIV and abstention in the relationship 
can not be avoided. He termed this an 'emergency' situation (darurat) in which condoms 
are an alternative way of lessening the risk of HIV spread. He emphasised that the 
Indonesian H3V prevention strategy does not promote kondomisasi and is written to 
consider religion, culture and health as well as increasing the reliance on the family as the 
smallest unit of the community ('Pengarahan Menteri Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan
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Rakyat', Bandung 27.11.95). An article in Kompas made the details of this speech 
public, covering in depth his views on A,B, and c (K 28.11.95).
Opening comments from the Minister of Health, Dr Sujudi, further supported 
these themes. For him ”[r]isky sexual behaviour is sexual behaviour which does not 
agree with religious teachings" ('Sambutan Menteri Kesehatan', Bandung 27.11.95:2). 
He advocated abstinence as the best method for protecting against HIV, but supported the 
notion that condoms should be used when one partner is already infected. He suggested 
that large scale condom campaigns are not always effective at lowering STDs and HIV. 
While condom campaigns have succeeded in lowering STDs among people in high risk 
situations (eg prostitutes), infection among people in low risk situations (the so-called 
'general population') has increased. Other people in high risk situations, such as the 
customers of female sex workers, have spread HIV to those in low risk situations due to 
the lack of condom use in the 'general population'. Rather than advocating kondomisasi 
for the entire ‘general population’, he interpreted this as a failure of condom distribution 
programs which have targeted sex workers and gay men. He suggested that the majority 
of the religious community is devout and faithful and as a result are strong and 
unwavering. Only a minority are not, and they will be the first ones to spread HIV as 
they will engage in risky sex and become infected with HIV. The Minister of Health then 
emphasised the focus of the National AIDS Strategy on family resilience and called upon 
the Muzakarah to come up with formulations which would also focus on family resilience 
among the Indonesian Islamic community in order to spare the Islamic community and so 
the majority of Indonesians (as most are Muslims) from the danger of HIV/AIDS 
('Sambutan Menteri Kesehatan' Bandung 27.11.95).
Five Tadzkirah (formulations) were developed during the meeting ('Tadzkirah 
Bandung tentang penanggulangan HIV/AIDS'; K 1.12.95b; translation taken from Center 
for Health Research 1996:15, italics in translation):
First, that society, particularly Indonesian Moslems, with all their
Islamic devotion and faith ... are obligated to prevent in all ways
106
possible all their negative ways (perbuatan tercela) that may make 
them vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection to individuals, as well as 
their families, and communities, because case detection continue 
[sic] to be difficult to do.
Second, that society, particularly Indonesian Moslems, with all 
their Islamic devotion and faith are obligated to be more mature in 
their care and concern towards victims of HIV/AIDS as dignified 
human beings.
Third, that society, particularly Indonesian Moslems, with all 
their Islamic devotion and faith ... are obligated to understand the 
threat of HIV/AIDS epidemic by increasing their family's 
resilience {ketahanan keluarga sakinah).
Fourth, the government should strive to strengthen religious, 
moral, and ethical principles by selecting and avoiding negative 
values in this current times of globalization [sic].
Fifth, all of society's potential, particularly those of ulama and 
zu'ama, should strive for better cooperation in the prevention and 
control of HIV/AIDS as part of their religious practice (ibadah) 
and religious responsibility towards Allah SWT.
These formulations, reported to the public in Kompas (1.12.95b), emphasise the HIV 
prevention strategies which limit 'negative ways', avoid 'negative values', and increase 
family resilience.
In the more specific conclusions coming out of the Muzarakat, guidelines were 
proposed to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS among those who are already HIV positive, 
those who are potentially HIV positive, and for the community in general. Those who 
are already diagnosed with HIV should be abstinent (for unmarried people) or use 
condoms in married relationships. They have a duty to disclose their status to their 
partner and to health professionals who are caring for them, and to not do anything which 
will place others at risk (eg donate blood). Those who believe that they may be HIV 
positive have a duty to be tested and to be abstinent or use condoms until their status is 
confirmed. The community should raise its piety to God by following His 
commandments and by avoiding His prohibitions, especially that of adultery ('Rumusan 
keputusan' Nov-Dec 1995). The guidelines also emphasised the significant role of 
religious institutions in providing spiritual guidance and services to those infected and
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their families. In an address to the Plenary Meeting 3, H.Amidhan, the Director General 
of Guidance to the Islamic Community and Division of Haj, Ministry of Religion, 
suggested that spiritual guidance for sufferers of AIDS makes them feel valuable instead 
of lonely. They regain faith in themselves and are thus eager to spend their remaining life 
doing good deeds (Center for Health Research 1996:13; K 30.11.95).
A number of speakers at the Muzakarah promoted the role of the ulama in the 
prevention of HIV among Muslims. The key messages of a number of the plenary 
meetings are summarised in the document 'Research for Determining HIV Prevention 
Interventions through Islamic Organizations in Jakarta and East Java' (Center for Health 
Research 1996:13):
Condoms are ineffective in P&C [prevention and control] of 
HIV/AIDS, more likely it is the role of social and religious 
institutions that will determine the sucess [sic] of P&C of AIDS 
(Pendekatan sosial keagamaan dan kemasyarakatan dalam 
menghadapi AIDS Plenary Meeting 3).
Ulamas have greater role [sic] in the provision of IEC 
[information, education and communication] materials, of 
morals, and ways of avoiding promiscuity (Peran Ulama dalam 
penanggulangan HIV/AIDS Plenary Meeting 4)
The meeting recognised that ulama need to modernise their methods and approaches in 
presenting dakwah, such that messages which raise the piety to God and loyalty to 
religion reach the community more effectively. The role of the ulama in the propagation 
of information about HIV/AIDS was recognised, as was the need to educate students at 
all levels, including secondary and pesantren students ('Rumusan keputusan' Nov-Dec 
1995). At this meeting, MUI committed itself to publishing books and pamphlets about 
HIV/AIDS from an Islamic perspective ('Rumusan keputusan' Nov-Dec 1995; K 
30.11.95).
It was decided that further discussion by the Komisi Fatwa (Fatwa Commission) 
was needed to issue fatwa on euthanasia, quarantine for those with AIDS, and 
sterilisation of HIV infected women ('Rumusan keputusan' Nov-Dec 1995; R 1.12.95a).
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Delegates at the Bandung meeting debated that a lethal injection should be made available 
to AIDS patients to reduce their suffering (Sinar 16.12.95a). Euthanasia is, however, 
against the teachings of Islam and the suggestion drew criticism, both at the conference 
and in the press. According to the Minister for Health, Sujudi, for instance, "matters of 
life and death are matters for God" and to the Head of the Indonesian Medical 
Association, Azwar, euthanasia is against the code of ethics of doctors (Sinar 16.12.95a; 
JP 4.12.95a). Letters to the editors of magazines and papers tended to agree, pointing 
out that euthanasia is against Islam and that AIDS patients should instead be cared for 
(Sinar 16.12.95b; JP 29.12.95a; JP 29.12.95b).
The outcomes of the Muzarakat affirm the government's strategy of ABc, 
whereby abstinence and being faithful are propagated through messages of strengthening 
religious and moral principles within the family and community. Condom distribution 
implies permissiveness towards free sex and promiscuity and is therefore rejected, 
although condom use within a relationship which is 'halal sehat' is permissible.
5.2.3 Responses of Nahdlatul Ulama - Pesan-pesan Paiton
In 1996, the Center for Health Research at the University of Indonesia began a project 
working with Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah to organise meetings to discuss and 
ascertain the viewpoints on HIV/AIDS prevention and control of these organisations and 
the possibilities for future directions. Out of each of these meetings arose a set of 
messages, the Pesan-pesan Paiton (Paiton message) and GEMPITHA respectively, as 
well as recommendations for future directions of the organisations in HIV/AIDS 
prevention and control.
The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) meeting, Sarasehan Ulama dan Pimpinian Pesantren 
se Jawa Timur Tentang HIV/AIDS, took place at the Pesantren Nurul Jadid in Paiton, 
Probolinggo near Surabaya on 8-9 March 1996. The political influence in NU circles of 
this pesantren, as well as its size (around 6000 followers and santris) meant that it had
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great influence over the spread of meeting outcomes to its ummah (followers). The 
workshop was jointly organised by the Center for Health Research at the University of 
Indonesia and the Lembaga Kemasylahatan Keluarga NU (LKK-NU, the Institute of 
Family Welfare of NU). This meeting, reported in ‘Research for Determining HIV 
Prevention Interventions through Islamic Organizations in Jakarta and East Java’ was the 
first step in the attempt to provide direction in the NU’s participation in the prevention 
and control of HIV/AIDS.
On the first day of the Sarasehan more than 180 people attended, including kyais 
and their assistants, members of various NU autonomous bodies throughout East and 
Central Java, studentsIsantris of pesantrens in Paiton, representatives from LKK-NU, 
NGO participants and government officials. The large number of attendees on the first 
day had much to do with the attendance and address by the NU General Secretary, KH 
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur). Many came to hear what he had to say about the role of 
NU in HIV/AIDS prevention. His address pointed out the lack of a NU policy on 
HIV/AIDS and that this Sarasehan would provide NU with directions for the future. He 
acknowledged that NU members were now in danger of infection with HIV and the need 
for NU to be involved in HIV/AIDS prevention activities. However, he stressed the need 
for NU to concentrate on its role as a vehicle of information dissemination to their 
members while leaving prevention activities beyond their scope to other relevant 
agencies.
The discussion and final formulation of the Pesan-pesan Paiton (Paiton Message) 
occurred in a closed session of 25 important kyai of pesantrens and their assistants and 
outlined the concerns and future position of NU members in the region on HIV/AIDS. 
The message supports the multisectoral approach laid out in the National AIDS Strategy 
whereby the government, multi-sectoral agencies, foreign donor agencies, non­
government organisations and the public at large all have responsibilities in the prevention 
and control of HIV/AIDS in Indonesia. The NU should expand its partnership with
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those other agencies working on HIV/AIDS prevention and operate within the policy 
constraints of the government. The message emphasises the importance of HIV/AIDS 
prevention and control activities as part of the religious and national responsibilities of 
NU. As prescribed by Islam, followers should strive for their own welfare and 
happiness and for the care of all members. The message specifically refers to the need 
for the active participation of women and the younger generation in prevention and 
control. It emphasises that HIV/AIDS is not simply “a medical problem and recognizes 
that its presence is very much related to people’s behaviour, people [sic] religious 
understanding, peoples [sic] growing denial of normative values and which denies not 
only both personal and social sanctity, but also of their social and cultural sanctity [sic]" 
(Formulation 3 of the Pesan-pesan Paiton, translation in Center for Health Research 
1996:26). These social problems have come about by foreign influences which brought 
the AIDS epidemic and threatens the welfare of families and the nation: "Thus, the 
Nahdlatul Ulama views this problem as needing serious consideration and participation of 
all parties" (Formulation 4 of the Pesan-pesan Paiton, translation in Center for Health 
Research 1996:26). Ulama should strive to develop initiatives for promotion, 
prevention, curing, and rehabilitation on both the regional and national levels. The Paiton 
Message specifically refers to the need to exert influence on structures in society which 
influence the conditions of HIV/AIDS by repelling all forms of pornography, tightening 
the rules on entertainment places, and tightening film and media censorship that may lead 
to the "harassment" of people's dignity (Center for Health Research 1996:25). Finally, 
the Paiton Message recognises the need to disseminate all of these messages to the wider 
membership and the public at large through various types of activities and media.
Recommended follow up actions included a proposal that the messages of the 
Paiton meeting be discussed further with a wider NU audience at similar meetings at 
other locations in order to develop a common approach and policy among ulama and kyai 
on the issues of HIV/AIDS. Appropriate training was to be provided to NU personnel
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and institutions to prepare NU members to be HIV/AIDS educators and volunteers. 
Those attending the meeting also recognised the need to develop appropriate and accurate 
information to NU masses by developing materials and modules to be used in pesantrens, 
Majelis Taklim, Family Welfare Information Centers, Health Centres and Hospitals.
5.2.4 Responses of Muhammadiyah - GEMPITHA
On 26-29 April 1996, the Muhammadiyah, in conjunction with the Center for Health 
Research at UI, organised the 'Workshop on Muhammadiyah's Efforts for the 
Prevention of HIV/AIDS', Semiloka Upaya Muhammadiyah Dalam Penanggulangan 
HIV/AIDS. The Semiloka was attended by 110 central decision makers from all branches 
of MUH institutions from Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, Surabaya, Semarang, Yogyakarta 
and Bandung. Part of the meeting was dedicated to dissemination of information on 
HIV/AIDS to participants, and MUH leaders of Majelis, MUH autonomous bodies, 
bureaus and Aisyiah (the women's organisation). Themes of the meeting are apparent 
from the addresses given at the conference. A member of the central executive body told 
the meeting of the huge potential of the MUH to participate in the prevention and control 
of HIV/AIDS, particularly with the opening of new branches in East Nusa Tenggara, 
Merauke and Sorong (Irian Jaya). While he called for the extermination of illegal sex, 
another speaker, representing Amin Rais of the MUH in Yogyakarta, claimed that the 
MUH should increase efforts to stop the "sex revolution" caused by organised crime, 
sexertainment, the sex industry, and tourism. The activities of the MUH should focus on 
improving religious values and norms and on improving existing MUH resources, such 
as the AIDS Hotline. The Head of the National AIDS Commission from the office of the 
Ministry of People's Welfare, Suyono Yahya, also stressed prevention via religion, 
culture, and developing family resilience and prosperity. Education, universal 
precautions, blood screening, empowering women and counseling are all means to 
control the spread. The resulting GEMPITHA, Gerakan Muhammadiyah Peduli
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Terhadap HIV/AIDS, 1996 (Movement of Muhammadiyah's Care against HIV/AIDS), 
outlines the role of Muhammadiyah in HIV/AIDS prevention (translation from Center for 
Health Research 1996: 29):
a. To publicizes the understanding on the dangers of HIV/AIDS 
particularly in respect to religious, social and cultural aspects 
(of society) [sic];
b. To promote the elimination or at least the extent of the sex 
industry or sex trade, which are basically violations of human 
dignity and law;
c. To optimize the roles of Majlis Taijih and Majlis Tabligh of 
Muahammadiyah in the prevention of HIV/AIDS;
d. To promote reproductive health education (sex-education) 
within the frameworks of Islamic teachings and to enter it within 
the context of religious learning in formal education.
The MUH are keen to directly address the problem of HIV/AIDS prevention, taking the 
basic philosophical thinking established in the formulations of the Muzakarah Bandung as 
the starting point for future activities. Any activities undertaken can be organised within a 
structure of clearly defined lines of power with a well defined power concentration at the 
top. However, the MUH has limited human and financial resources and so relies on 
cooperation with other bodies to implement programs (Center for Health Research 
1996:50). They have chosen to focus on strengthening and improving their existing 
HIV/AIDS prevention services, such as the AIDS Hotlines at their hospitals. In addition, 
the Semiloka brought up several areas which can be further developed. IEC activities 
should be provided to various MUH groups including pengajian, students and teachers at 
schools and universities, health workers, pre-marital youth groups, and others such as 
sex workers, underprivileged children, street children, and truck drivers. A variety of 
general activities will be implemented including improving care and treatment, testing and 
counseling, research, monitoring and evaluation and training. Other institutional 
improvements will also be improved and developed: optimising cooperation between 
MUH organisations in the efforts to control and prevent HIV/AIDS; creating an
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HIV/AIDS information centre; creating a working group on spiritual welfare; and 
increasing the capacity and capability of the existing hotline services. The 
Muhammadiyah has then joined other prominent Islamic groups in recognising 
HIV/AIDS as a problem for the Indonesian community and is acting on this. While the 
Muhammadiyah has a well-organised infrastructure to cope with the dissemination of 
information and the implementation of programs, the NU has a larger membership to 
whom prevention messages can be spread and is more moderate and open in its approach 
(Nick Dharmaputra and Budi Utomo, pers comm). Religious organisations such as these 
are then a potentially powerful moral force in HIV prevention programs.
5 .3  A cceptable HIV/AIDS prevention in an Islam ic society
The Bandung Message resulting from the MUI convention provides a clear philosophical 
basis for the HIV/AIDS prevention activities of all of these Islamic institutions and 
organisations. In brief, they all support compassion towards people with HIV or AIDS 
and advocate access to non-discriminatory care and counselling. Their primary focus in 
preventing further infection with HIV is on the strengthening of religious moral values 
through the vehicle of the family. Muslim leaders are not against condom use per se. 
The ulama support the use of condom for disease prevention when a partner is already 
infected, but for moral reasons object to their widespread promotion. It is pre- and extra­
marital sex which Islamic leaders condemn and to them condom promotion simply 
promotes promiscuity. If people are encouraged to use condoms, they need no longer 
fear the consequences of unlawful sex (ie STDs/HIV). This has been supported by 
Zubaedah Mochtar of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, "Religions do not object the use 
of condoms [sic]. They object to extramarital sex" (JP 4.12.95b).
In developing and implementing the National AIDS Strategy, government officials 
have needed to find a balance between these moral concerns of the religious community 
and public health issues. In order for HIV/AIDS policy and prevention strategies to be
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successful in Indonesia, they must be accepted and embraced by the ulama. According to
Nafsiah Mboi (pers comm), who was involved in the formulation of the National AIDS
Strategy, religion is crucial in the philosophy behind the HIV strategy. The strategy
makes it clear that there are three important approaches to HIV prevention: "family
resilience, the message of religion, and the "public health" approach (condom use and
STD control)". These approaches should be provided in combination so that people can
make informed choices about staying safe (JP 1.12.95). However, in an effort to
accommodate Muslim sensibilities, the strengthening of the moral principles of
‘abstinence’ and ‘be faithful’ through the resilience of the family is the primary activity
advocated by government officials. As in the words of the National AIDS Strategy:
The family is a social unit which plays a very important role in 
the formation of healthy and responsible behavior. The family is 
also the first and most important line of support and assistance 
for those affected by HIV/AIDS. It is important to increase the 
family's resilience by reinforcing and strengthening the family's 
ability to assume responsibility for encouragement to prevent 
HIV infection and not to discriminate against those living with 
HIV/AIDS (National AIDS Committee 1994:25-6).
In recognition of the sensitive moral issues surrounding condom promotion, the 
government has decided to "take the "positive" approach to the AIDS campaign", utilising 
the established BKKBN policy of 'family resilience and welfare', instead of promoting 
safe sex through condom use (Dharmaputra, Ariawan and Iskandar 1996:48). As a 
means of strengthening moral behaviour, religion is very important in the implementation 
of HIV/AIDS prevention in Indonesia. It is hoped that the majority of people will be able 
to avoid high risk situations because of their religious convictions and because of their 
respect for their family (Nafsiah Mboi, pers comm). Media reports advocate the 
government’s and ulama’s views: "the best way [to avoid HIV] is to avoid 'free sex', 
stay away from drugs, and live a healthy and good life" (R 1.12.95d; see also K 
7.11.95).
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While the concepts of family resilience, abstinence and faithfulness in HIV/AIDS 
prevention are consistent with other official policies and programs, such as the Family 
Planning Program (KB) and the Applied Family Welfare Program (PKK), the 
incorporation of the concept is also designed to avoid criticism from Islamic leaders and 
organisations and other prominent Muslims (Masri Singarimbun, pers comm). As 
reported often in the press, it is likely that the lack of emphasis on condom promotion and 
distribution is primarily to avoid conflict with Muslims: "The government ... earlier 
refused to consent to any campaign which encouraged the use of condoms because of 
strong objections from Moslem leaders who viewed such campaigns as encouraging 
adultery and prostitution" (JP 2.12.95c; see also JP 4.12.95b). At the same time, respect 
for Muslim sensibilities on HIV/AIDS, sexuality, and condom promotion and 
incorporation of these into prevention strategies lends legitimacy to the government. By 
thus respecting these religious principles, government officials hope that they are seen as 
being morally principled themselves and attentive in their duties to maintain the moral 
fabric of the nation. Recognising the potential for Muslims to become upset by particular 
aspects of a HIV/AIDS prevention strategy, policy makers have wisely taken into account 
their sensibilities.
Not only is mass-scale and public kondomisasi considered to be contradictory to 
Indonesia's social and religious norms, but it is thought to encourage people to be 
promiscuous. The association of condoms with promiscuity originates from the 
historical association of sex workers with condom use. The promotion of condoms to 
sex workers and the lack of mass campaigns serve to further reinforce this association. 
The acceptable promotion of condoms has been linked only to married men and women 
under the official banner of the Family Planning Program. Condom use outside a 
married relationship is not acceptable and so promotion to unmarried people remains 
problematic. For this reason, armed forces personnel, while provided with basic 
information on STDs, HIV and sexual behaviour, are not given condoms as this "would
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be perceived as acknowledging the existence of promiscuous behaviour" (Dharmaputra, 
Ariawan and Iskandar 1996:49). Instead of widespread kondomisasi, a Jakarta Post 
article advocates the "targeted, systematic and social needs based approach" involving 
social marketing to those at greatest risk: "A mass campaign promoting condoms is 
certainly inappropriate. Consumers who do not have the need should not be tempted to 
'convert'" (JP 2.12.96).
At the same time, in recognition of public health realities, limited condom 
distribution and use is acceptable, so long as it is not put forth in a public campaign. 
Minister of Health Sujudi has emphasised that condoms should only be used by married 
couples if one partner is already infected with HIV, and by "people who fall into the 
"high risk" category" (JP 4.12.95b). Only those people who can not leave the sex 
industry or who can not return to a 'good' life should use condoms to prevent HIV 
transmission. The concession given by government officials is a tacit approval for non­
government organisations to undertake condom promotion and education in lokalisasi 
with banci, sex workers and their primary client groups (eg sailors, truck drivers, 
migrant labourers). Although the government does not ban such activities, it does not 
openly support them either (JP 3.12.95). They are particularly reluctant to allow NGOs 
to take HIV prevention messages to unauthorised brothel areas for fear of lending 
legitimacy to their operation (JP 29.11.95a; JP 2.12.95a). The Jakarta Post reported that 
the Yayasan Kusuma Buana launched health care and condom distribution programs in 
the only officially recognised brothel area in Jakarta, Kramat Tunggak, where they were 
distributing 2,880 condoms every month. Their activities in unofficial brothel areas of 
the city were restricted. The Jakarta city administration was reported to be reluctant to 
allow condom promotion and HIV prevention programs to be launched at these unofficial 
places for fear of being seen to authorise their operation and leading the public to think 
that they are authorised (JP 29.11.95a). As a reflection of the consideration for a public 
health approach to HIV/AIDS prevention, there are no words of criticism against condom
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use in the National AIDS Strategy, although there are also no words of outright approval 
of their use either.
Many ulama, while publicly condemning and not openly supporting condom 
distribution at lokalisasi, turn a blind eye to the fact that non-government organisations 
are carrying out this work (Meiwita Iskandar, pers comm). Among the discussions at the 
MUI convention was a debate over the appropriateness of condom promotion 
(kondomisasi) in red light districts. Lokalisasi were no longer seen as simply a moral 
problem, but also a place where HIV/AIDS could spread (R 1.12.95a). Although the 
closing of lokalisasi did not enter the discussion, some Islamic leaders spoke outside the 
meeting room in favour of closing them. Prof Dr Dadang Hawaii reported to the 
convention a survey which attributed 95.7% of the spread of HIV to sex workers. He 
also cited the findings of Prof Dr J Mann that 90% of HIV cases result from sexual 
contact outside marriage, ie from sex workers or 'free sex' (ibid). Despite these cited 
examples, kondomisasi campaigns, even just to sex workers, did not receive support as 
this was seen to encourage sex outside marriage: "the free distribution of condoms in 
such places as red light districts could create the image that fornication and adultery were 
legitimate in this country" (JP 2.12.95a). As a measure against the negative image of 
promoting condoms, the chair of the MUI, Hasan Bakri, suggested that condoms only be 
sold at drug stores and be available only to married people with a doctor's prescription 
(JP 2.11.95). Although many ulama acknowledge the work carried out by NGOs, they 
see these efforts as too medically-focused with not enough emphasis on moral and 
religious values (Center for Health Research 1996:15).
While the government allows condom promotion at lokalisasi, it primarily 
encourages activities and prevention campaigns which follow the ABc strategy, out of 
respect for the social, moral and religious values of many Indonesians. 'Loyalty to the 
family' rather than 'use condoms' is the central concept of a HIV prevention program of 
message-writing on the backs of the trucks of long distance truck drivers. Such
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messages include: "My loyalty is as fierce as my roar"; "I'm faithful to my family"; 
""Bring home money, Mas, not illness"; and "There are no lies between us" (JP 5.12.96; 
JP 16.12.96 and K 21.12.96). Another such activity was a workshop held in a shopping 
centre by the AIDS Foundation of Indonesia. The workshop discussed the issues quite 
openly and reinforced that abstinence is the best way for teenagers to avoid HIV. 
However, the presenters did stress that condom use is the only other way of being safe 
"in cases of compelling urgency". During the workshops, the "suggestion of abstinence 
for teenagers was met with huge applause from the audience", underscoring the 
importance of 'abstinence' to public morality (JP 29.11.95b). The Indonesian AIDS 
Foundation also organised a workshop to inform traditional dancers, choreographers and 
puppet masters about HIV/AIDS so that these messages could be incorporated into their 
work. Such media have in the past been extraordinarily successful in transmitting family 
planning and development propaganda, particularly to the lower classes. As with the 
family planning campaign, information can be slipped into conversations and jokes to 
educate the masses about HIV/AIDS and prevention (JP 24.11.95). World AIDS Day is 
also marked by several events. In 1995, the activities included seminars, a debate on the 
place of condoms in prevention (JP 4.12.95b; K 1.12.95a; K 4.12.95a), the distribution 
of stickers and flyers (JP 2.12.95c), a Dangdut concert at Ancol (K 2.12.95; K 
4.12.95b), poster and writing competitions (JP 2.12.95c), and the establishment of 
several hotline services across the country (JP 2.12.95b).
While the promotion of abstinence and faithfulness are valid strategies, they are 
not enough to affect changes by themselves. Some health officials are critical of the 
strong focus in prevention strategies on moral issues which overshadow condom use as a 
legitimate strategy. While Azrul Azwar, the chairman of the Indonesian Medical 
Association, agrees that religion and promotion of family values is essential in the fight 
against AIDS, this should occur concurrently with condom promotion. As he points out: 
"Indonesians are ordinary human beings. They are just like other people. Many of them
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are bad (nakal). Preaching to them will not do any good. We have to be realistic" (JP 
2.11.95). At a debate organised by the Indonesian Medical Association, it was pointed 
out that condoms are effective when used properly and consistently. One of the 
panelists, Dr Suyono Yahya of the Ministry of People's Welfare, commented that "the 
religious approach, when not consistent, is also ineffective" (Kompas 4.12.95a). The 
panel at this discussion felt that doctors have a moral obligation to correctly inform their 
patients and to give them the full range of treatment and prevention options. If it is 
appropriate to present condoms as an alternative, then this should be done (ibid). While 
family resilience "sounds very nice, everyone agrees with it", the reality is that it is not 
enough to ward off the danger of HIV infection for some people (Masri Singarimbun, 
pers comm).
5.4 The double bind: barriers to HIV/AIDS prevention
HIV/AIDS prevention in Indonesia is a delicate situation. Government officials and their 
advisors attempt to find a balance between a public health approach to prevention and 
addressing the moral concerns of the Muslim majority. Internationally, it is commonly 
accepted that in order to successfully address HIV/AIDS, a comprehensive, multi-faceted 
prevention strategy is needed, including programs which promote condoms, improve the 
treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, increase levels of public education, and 
promote abstinence and monogamy. In Indonesia, it is known that there are high 
incidences of non-HIV STDs in the population, that the sex industry is extensive and 
expanding, and that more and more young people are engaging in pre-marital sex. It is 
important in HIV/AIDS prevention to translate this knowledge into public policy, and to 
utilise the experiences of other countries to inform the strategy in Indonesia.
There are, however, several barriers to implementing such a comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS prevention strategy. Firstly, the revival of Islam since the 1980s has led to an 
increasing mass of people seeking to Islamise all aspects of Indonesian society. This
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includes formalising the link between Islam and the state, and allowing Muslims a greater 
input into public policies. The urban poor and the young middle class, in particular, have 
been attracted to the fundamentalist movements in response to disatisfaction with modem 
life. Islamic leaders, relying on this mass of support, are calling for more concessions to 
Muslims, including increasing Islamic content of all areas of society, thus creating a 
‘masyarakat Islam’, an ‘Islamic society’. As with all areas of life, Muslims wish to 
involve Islamic moral principles in the prevention of HIV/AIDS. As the virus and illness 
are seen to be an outcome of an immoral society, a return to moral values are seen as the 
only adequate methods of prevention. There is no room for the promotion of condom 
use, as this promotes infidelity and promiscuity.
The government policy makers respond to this attitude by accepting it and 
incorporating it into the actual implementation of the National AIDS Strategy. This 
implementation thus focuses much more on promoting changes in morality than the 
original policy document advocates. While the document itself advocates a public health 
approach, its implementation must reflect the growing religious conservatism within 
Indonesian society towards sexuality. The NAS does recognise the necessity to heed 
conservative voices in order to successfully implement prevention activities: “approaches 
to control HIV/AIDS should reflect the religious-cultural values found in Indonesia” 
(Indonesian National AIDS Committee 1994:7). At the same time, however, it 
recognises the necessity of condoms as part of a multi-faceted strategy: “Issues such as 
...[the] availability/acceptability of condoms ... are critical to effective implementation of 
the HIV/AIDS strategy”; and “Every person has the right to accurate information in order 
to protect his/her self and others against HIV infection” (Indonesian National AIDS 
Commission 1994:14,7).
The Indonesian elite are under pressure from two fronts to take a more moral 
approach to HIV/AIDS prevention. Firstly, state leaders are eager to maintain the good 
favour of Muslims leaders and activists and the Islamic mass which they represent. This
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is evident in the recent moves by President Soeharto to court Muslims and to re-Islamise 
Indonesian politics. His motivation behind this is primarily the broadening of his power 
base in response to wavering support from the army. He and other state elites wish to 
enhance their legitimacy by improving their Muslim credentials. The concessions which 
have been given to the Muslim community, including the formation of ICMI, are intended 
to improve their standing among a growing mass of Muslims with conservative moral 
views. There is, therefore, definite political advantage to portraying HIV/AIDS 
prevention in terms of religious principles. State officials often appear at religious 
meetings to lend official government support to the discussions. This support is further 
emphasised when government officials give speeches in support of the stand of religious 
organisations. Several government officials, for instance, spoke at the MUI meeting in 
Bandung on 26-30 November 1995 emphasising condemnation of koruiomisasi, but 
supporting the promotion of abstinence and faithfulness within a religious context, and 
condoms only in an emergency. These government opinions are also reflected in public 
forums such as the media and are often presented in religious terms.
The second reason to approach HIV/AIDS from a moral perspective is the 
necessity to live up to the established state ideology of ‘traditional’ Indonesian culture and 
morals. The state constructions of sexuality run parallel to the Islamic ideals of correct 
sexual behaviour. Adherance to this ideology is an attempt to deflect criticism from 
Muslims about the state’s part in creating circumstances favourable to producing an 
immoral Indonesian society. Social dislocation, unemployment, income inequalities, 
consumerism, and Westernisation are all ills attributed to the state’s development 
programs. These conditions are conducive to the expansion of the sex industry and to 
increased pre- and extra-marital sexual activities. The state is accused of being 
responsible for the moral decadence perceived to be evident throughout Indonesia. This 
places the government elite in a contradictory position with regards to their own state 
ideology and places then in opposition to Islamic moral principles. The political pressure
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on the state to maintain the favour of the Muslim majority leads the state to accommodate 
the more conservative moral attitudes towards HIV/AIDS prevention into its policies and 
programs. Although the government’s response to HIV/AIDS is inconsistent with its 
continued support of modernisation and its tolerance of extra-marital sex, it reflects the 
broader social response within a community that is becoming increasingly Islamised.
While there is such a strong emphasis on morality within society, prevention 
efforts will not move far beyond A(bstinence) and B(e faithful). Realistically, the 
government can not escape a religious focus to its HIV/AIDS prevention strategies and 
AIDS activists recognise that it is more appropriate to work within this framework than 
outside it if anything is to be achieved (Meiwita Iskandar, pers comm). HIV/AIDS 
prevention messages are highly accessible to a great many people when they are couched 
in religious and moral terms. Without the approval and help of religious leaders and 
institutions to disseminate prevention messages, the National AIDS Strategy would be 
doomed.
However, at the same time, the public associations drawn by government officials 
and ulama between condoms and female sex workers (and promiscuous sex more 
generally) makes it difficult for women who are not sex workers to negotiate condom 
use. The focus on the sex industry in condom promotion neglects that men and women 
who engage in unsafe sexual practices may do so outside paid relationships. It is 
believed that probably around 80-90% of men and women are not in extramarital 
relationships. Those 10-20% of people who are in extramarital relationships are 
potentially at risk for becoming HIV positive if they do not use condoms. These 
extramarital relationships are not only those with sex workers, but also ‘seks suka sama 
suka’ (mutual attraction) relationships. It is sobering to think that, even if only 10% of 
the Indonesian population are involved in extramarital sexual relationships, that still 
means that millions of people may be at risk from HIV/AIDS. The Indonesian population
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is possibly in considerable danger of widespread HIV infection if condoms continue to 
remain only in the domain of sex workers.
The governing elite have been made aware of the social, economic and health 
conditions in Indonesian society which are leading to the transmission of HIV/AIDS. 
There is a multitude of international research from a variety of settings on the most 
effective HIV/AIDS prevention policies and activities to address these. Attempting to 
apply the knowledge from this international research to the conditions peculiar to 
Indonesia raises “one of the most important but intractable questions on the [STD/HIV] 
research agenda”: how can the barriers that prevent research findings being translated into 
policy at the country level be overcome? (Mayaud, Hawkes and Mabey 1998:31). As 
this thesis has addressed, this is difficult to answer in the Indonesian context. In 
attempting to address HIV/AIDS, the government faces the double bind of 
accommodating the prevailing trend of Islamic revival, while at the same time actually 
supporting the continuation of social and economic conditions which promote ‘immoral’ 
sexual activity. The main barrier to effective HIV/AIDS prevention is the political agenda 
of the government elites, who utilise a state ideology of sexuality to promote unity and 
accommodate the conservative outlooks of Muslims to maintain political power.
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Postscript
In mid 1997, Indonesia entered a period of severe economic and political disorder and 
collapse. The economy has been thrown into complete turmoil: the CPI has risen by 
46.6% in the first half of 1998; the rupiah has lost around 80% of its value since the 
beginning of the crisis; and the GDP is estimated to fall 15% during 1998 (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 1998). As a result of dissatisfaction with the economic disorder and 
perceived government corruption, popular political pressure was placed on President 
Suharto to resign, and on 21 May 1998 he handed over the Presidency to BJ Habibie. 
While outside the period of this study, it is important to briefly mention the potential 
effect of this economic and political crisis on the sex industry and on HIV/AIDS 
prevention activities in Indonesia.
The economic crisis has led to a fall in average income, job losses, and an 
increasingly disparate distribution of wealth. These factors are known to influence the 
growth of the sex industry, as absolute poverty and relative income are among the 
motivations for women and men to enter sex work. In a climate of economic and 
political disorder, more Indonesians are affected by poverty and social instability, making 
sex work an option for some. Poverty in Indonesia in mid-1998 is at the levels of the 
1970s, with 79.4 million people (39.1% of the population) living below the poverty line, 
compared to 22.5 million (11%) in 19%. The average income per head of population has 
fallen from US$ 1,055 in 1997 to US$ 436 in 1998. In particular, the rural population 
have been hit hard: 45.6% are now living in poverty (Economist Intelligence Unit 1998). 
Food security has been threatened by the financial crisis and by severe drought. 
Seventeen million Indonesian families face dire food shortages and millions in central and 
east Java can only afford one daily meal (The Age 15.9.98). The International Labor 
Organisation estimates that 15,000 people each day have been losing their jobs (The Age 
5.9.98), and the Ministry of Manpower estimates that up to late July 1998, around 15.4
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million people, 17% of the total workforce, are unemployed (Economist Intelligence Unit 
1998:25). The industries worst affected by layoffs have been textile and garment 
factories, shoe factories and the construction industry. With the exception of the 
construction industry, most people employed in these industries are women, who have 
consequently been the worst hit by layoffs and forced shorter shifts or pay cuts. Women 
are often the main breadwinners in their families or contribute most or all of their income 
towards family needs. In order to continue providing for their families, sex work may be 
the only option left open to some women (Darmadi 1998).
The crisis has also led to social and political change, with many people left 
trapped in the cities and towns, unable to return to village life due to drought, loss of 
land, and severed links with rural origins. During the relative economic prosperity of the 
1980s and early 1990s, many people sold their land (or were forced off in exchange for 
compensation) and moved to the cities and towns for work. Now that they have been 
displaced by the closure of factories and businesses, they have nowhere to return to and 
no work to maintain their standard of living in the cities and towns. This is affecting both 
middle and lower class workers, and has led to heightened resentment among the general 
population. They have been attracted to the various religious and political movements 
which have been offering them hope, by calling for change in Indonesia and an end to the 
economic crisis.
In particular, these disillusioned people have been attracted to religiously based 
political movements. As at other times in Indonesia's history, the Islamic movement has 
provided a legitimate and concrete force around which to mobilise for protest against the 
actions of the governing elite. Protests against the Suharto regime began among Islamic 
students at Jakarta’s universities. In the lead up to the resignation of Suharto, Amien 
Rais, the head of Muhammadiyah, emerged as a particularly outspoken critic of the 
regime and effectively became the leader of the protest movement which toppled Suharto. 
While some students have continued to call for the further resignation of Habibie,
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believing him as a crony of Suhartos to be incapable of delivering the reforms they 
demand, Islamic leaders, students and youth groups have successfully defended 
Habibie's appointment. Habibie himself comes from a religious background as the first 
Chairman of the ICMI, and has appointed many ministers to his cabinet with strong 
Islamic leanings (The Age 18.6.98 and 23.5.98).
Since the change in leadership and in the lead up to the general elections in 1999, 
there has arisen "a whole swag of new Islamic parties competing to attract Indonesia's 
majority Muslims to ideas such as affirmative action and bans on alcohol" (The Age 
5.12.98). These Islamic political parties include: the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
(National Awakening Party) formed by NU members, and thus ending NU's 1984 
renunciation of politics; Partai Bulan Bintang (Moon and Star Party), formed with the 
ideals and by many of the personalities of the Islamic Masyumi party of the 1950s; and a 
return by the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Party of Unity and Development, PPP) to 
its roots as a religiously defined party. In addition, Amien Rais leads the Partai Amanat 
Bangsa (People's Mandate Party, PAB), a non-sectarian party involving secular 
politicians, intellectuals and modernist Muslims. Several Islamic groups are campaigning 
for specifically Islamic demands: affirmative action in favour of indigenous Muslim 
entrepreneurs; and more emphasis on Islamic symbols in public life, including 
disapproval of gambling, abortion and Western consumerism (The Age 18.6.98).
How could this crisis affect HIV/AIDS prevention activities and policy? Firstly, 
the economic problems which the country faces has led to less public money available for 
all national programs. There are very basic problems facing the Indonesian people, 
including food shortages and the increased price of medical care. The price per kilo of 
rice, a staple part of the diet, increased by 52% between June 1997 and April 1998 
(Johnson 1998), while in November 1997 the price of basic prescription drugs rose 75- 
200% and popular traditional Chinese medicines have on average gone up 300% 
(Darmadi 1998). Government monies are more likely to go to these more immediate
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concerns than they are to any HIV/AIDS prevention, counselling or treatment activities. 
HIV/AIDS is likely to slip off the national agenda as politicians are concerned with more 
pressing matters regarding their own survival.
In the longer term, the effect of the crisis on government policy regarding 
HIV/AIDS prevention is more difficult to determine. With the primary motivating force 
behind the latest political changes being Islamic leaders and students, and with the 
development of many Islamic parties, and the emergence of Amien Rais and 
Abdurrahman Wahid as key opposition figures, Islam has an extremely powerful voice in 
the current Indonesian political scene. In the words of Gerry van Klinken, editor of 
Inside Indonesia. "No government, especially a weak one such as Habibie's can afford 
any longer to ignore the Islamic community the way that Suharto did" (The Age 
18.6.98). An increased influence of Islam in the government bureaucracy and on the 
political scene, may influence a continuation or even raising of the conservative nature of 
current prevention activities.
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ABC
Glossary of A bbreviations and Terms
Abstinence, Be faithful, Condoms
ABG Anak Baru Gede, precocious adolescents
adat customary law
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
akhlaq Islamic morality, Islamic ethics
aliran kepercayaan creed without religious affliation
ARC AIDS-related complex
asas tunggal sole ideological foundation
banci transsexuals
Bapak Pembangunan Father of Development (refers to President Suharto)
bimbingan guidance and counseling
Bupati regent, official in charge of a Kabupaten (regency)
Camat head of a subdistrict (kecamatan)
campus fried chicken young women at universities exchanging sex for financial 
gain (CFC)
cobaan trial, test, ordeal
dak w ah Muslim missionary activity
darurat emergency situation
DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic 
Dakwah Council
Dinas Sosial Municipal Social Welfare Office
DKI Daerah Khusus Ibukota, special capital district
do’a prayer
fatwa rulings on religious matters
fiqh Islamic jurisprudence
GBHN Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, Broad Outlines of State 
Policy
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GEMPITHA 
gotong royong
Gerakan Muhammadiyah Peduli Terhadap HIV/AIDS, 
Movement of Muhammadiyah’s care against HIV/AIDS. 
Arising from the April 1996 Muhammadiyah workshop on 
HIV/AIDS
tradition of mutual help
halal sehat permitted and healthy
halaqah a study group for Sufism
hisab accountability
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ibu literally mother, but also used as a term of respect for 
women in general
ibuisme official discourse on women’s sexuality as termed by 
Suryakusuma (1991)
ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals
IEC Information, education and communication
ikhlash sincerity
IAIN Institute Agama Islam Negeri, Government Institute of 
Islamic Studies
i’tikaf conviction
jujur honesty
Kabupaten regency, headed by a Bupati (regent)
kampung village unit, city quarter
Kantor Menko Kesra abbreviation for Kantor Menteri Koordinator Kesejahteraan 
Rakyat, Office of the Coordinating Ministry of People’s 
Welfare
KB Keluarga Berencana, Family Planning Program
kebatinan Javanese-Hinduistic mysticism
Kecamatan subdistrict, headed by a camat
keren trendy
khotbah sermons
kitab Islamic texts
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K o d ra t W a n ita W o m e n 's  N a tu re
K o m i si F a tw a F a tw a  C o m m iss io n
k o n d o m isa s i lite ra lly , c o n d o m isa tio n ; re fe rs  to  th e  p ro m o tio n  o f  
c o n d o m s
K o ta m a d y a m u n ic ip a lity , h e a d ed  by  a  W a lik o ta  (m ay o r)
K P A K o m isi P e n a n g g u la n g a n  A ID S  N a s io n a l, N a tio n a l A ID S  
P re v e n tio n  an d  C o n tro l C o m m iss io n  (K P A )
K P A D K o m isi P e n a n g g u la n g a n  A ID S  D a e ra h , R e g io n a l A ID S  
P re v e n tio n  an d  C o n tro l C o m iss io n
k u m p u l k eb o liv in g  to g e th e r  o u t o f  w e d lo c k
k u p u -k u p u  c a m p u s see  c a m p u s  fr ie d  ch ic k e n
k u tu k a n cu rse
kya i Is la m ic  tea c h e r, le a d e r  o f  a  p e san tren
kyai tam u g u est Is la m ic  teach e rs
L K K -N U L e m b a g a  K e m a sy la h a ta n  K e lu a rg a  N ah d la tu l U lam a , 
In stitu te  o f  F am ily  W e lfa re  o f  N a h d la tu l U la m a
L K M D L e m b a g a  K e ta h an a n  M a sy a ra k a t D esa , In s titu te  fo r  v illag e  
d e v e lo p m en t
lo k a lisas i
(w a n ita  tu n a  su s ila )
o ffic ia l b ro thel c o m p le x
m ad ra sah Is la m ic  re lig io u s  sc h o o ls
M P R M a je lis  P e rm u sy a w a ra ta n  R ak y a t, P e o p le ’s C o n su lta tiv e  
A sse m b ly
m al am  tazk ir n o n -fo rm a l g ro u p  m e e tin g  o f  y o u th  to  d isc u ss  Is lam ic  
te a c h in g s  (o rg a n ise d  b y  M U H  y o u th  o rg a n isa tio n  in  
T e m a te )
M a sy a ra k a t Islam Islam ic  socie ty
m a ta ' a l-g u ru r ‘g o o d s  an d  c h a tte ls  o f  d e c e p tio n ’
M im b a r A g a m a re lig io u s  (T V ) p ro g ra m s
m u b a llig h p rea c h e r
m u cik a ri p im p s
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M U H M uham m adiyah , n o n-govem m ent m o dem ist Islam ic 
organisation
M UI M ajelis U lam a Indonesia , Indonesian  C ouncil o f  U lam as
m usibah natural catastrophes to afflic t m ankind
M U SP ID A M usyaw arah  P im pinan D aerah, R egional E xecutive C ouncil
M uzarakah convention
N A S N ational A ID S S tra tegy , S trategi N asional P enanggulangan  
H IV /A ID S
N G O N o n-govem m ent o rgan isation
N U N ahdhatul U lam a, non-govem m ent trad itionalist Islam ic 
organisation
P& C Prevention and control
PA M Penicillin  alum inium  m onostearate
Panca D harm a W anita five  basic  du ties o f  w om en  as d efined  by PK K
Pancasila state ideo logy  o f five  basic  principles: fa ith  in one G od, 
hum anity , nationalism , represen ta tive  governm ent and 
social ju stice
pekcun perek  cum a-cum a, free ‘experim ental g irls’
pekerja  seks sex w orker
pelacuran prostitute
pem binaan m ental building character
P endid ikan  G uru  A gam a institu tion fo r train ing  relig ious teachers
pengajian non-form al relig ious education
penyu luhan public inform ation
peraw atan  rohani spiritual treatm ent
perek p erem puan  ek sp erim en , 'experim en tal girls'
peringatan w arning
perm erataan equality
P esan -pesan  Paiton P aiton  m essage, aris ing  from  the M arch  1996 N U  
w orkshop  on H IV /A ID S
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p e san tren Is lam ic  b o a rd in g  sc h o o ls , I s la m ic  c u ltu ra l in s titu tio n s
P K K P e m b in a a n  K e se d ja h te ra a n  K e lu a rg a , A p p lie d  F am ily  
W elfa re  P ro g ram
Pol i si P a m o n g p ra d ja m u n ic ip a l p o lic in g  g ro u p , sp e c if ic a lly  fo r  o p e ra tio n s  a g a in s t 
sex  w o rk e rs  a n d  v a g ra n ts
p o sy a n d u in te g ra te d  h ea lth  p o sts  fo r  th e  d e liv e ry  o f  m o th e r  an d  ch ild  
h ea lth  p ro g ra m s
P P P P arta i P e rs tu a n  P e m b a n g u n a n , P a r ty  o f  U n ity  an d  
D ev e lo p m en t
P R W P anti R eh ab ilita s i W a n ita  ( reh ab ilita tio n  cen tre  fo r  fem a le  
sex  w o rk e rs )
p u s k e sm a s P u sa t K eseh a tan  M a sy a ra k a t, c o m m u n ity  h ea lth  cen tre
P u sk e sm a s  p e m b a n tu co m m u n ity  h ea lth  su b cen tre
q o lb u n  sa lim a h e a lth y  h ea rt, o r  so u n d  m in d
R e h ab ilita s is i T u n a  S osial D irec to ra te  o f  S o c ia l R e h a b ilita tio n , u n d e r  M in is try  o f  
S o c ia l A ffa irs
rem a ja  m esjid m o sq u e  y o u th  (g ro u p )
R epel ita R e n c a n a  P e m b a n g u n a n  L im a  T a h u n , F iv e  y e a r  
D ev e lo p m e n t P lan
R I R e p u b lik  In d o n es ia
R M T R e g u la r  M ass  T re a tm e n t (p ro g ra m )
sa b a r pa tience
sa k an tran q u ility
san tri s tu d e n ts  a t a  p e sa n tre n  ( Is la m ic  b o a rd in g  sch o o l)
se k s  su k a  sa m a  su k a a  re la tio n sh ip  o u ts id e  m arr ia g e  b ased  on  m u ta l a ttrac tio n
sh a d a q o h ch arity
sh a la t th e  f iv e  o b lig a to ry  d a ily  p ray e rs
sh a u m fas tin g
S T D S ex u a lly  tra n sm itte d  d isea se
su ra  (su ra h ) v e rse  o f  th e  Q u r ’a n
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T a d z k ira h  B an d u n g B a n d u n g  F o rm u la tio n s  a ris in g  fro m  th e  N o v e m b e r  1995  
M U I c o n v e n tio n  on  H IV /A ID S
ta rik h th e  h is to ry  o f  Is lam
ta s a w u f Is la m ic  S u fism
tau h id Is la m ic  th e o lo g y , th e  o n e n e ss  o f  A lla h
ta w a d h u ' m o d es ty
u lam a Islam ic  tea c h e rs  an d  lea d e rs
u m at co m m u n ity  o f  b e liev e rs
U N IC E F U n ited  N a tio n s  In te rn a tio n a l C h ild re n 's  E m e rg e n c y  F u n d
W a lik o ta m ay o r, o ffic ia l in  c h a rg e  o f  a  K o ta m a d y a  (m u n ic ip a lity )
w a ria tra n sg e n d e r  p eo p le
w ifq a p iec e  o f  p a p e r  on  w h ic h  h o ly  v e rse s  a re  w ritte n , u sed  in  
S u fi H e a lin g
w in d rec ita tio n  o f  Q u r ’an ic  p a ssag es
W T S w a n ita  tu n a  su s ila  ( lit. w o m e n  w ith o u t m o ra ls ) , sex  w o rk e r
zakat a lm s
z inah sex  o u ts id e  a  m arita l u n io n
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